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 Over the last decade, a globalization of the software industry has taken place which has 
facilitated the sharing and reuse of code across existing project boundaries. At the same time, 
such global reuse also introduces new challenges to the Software Engineering community, with 
not only code implementation being shared across systems but also any vulnerabilities it is 
exposed to as well. Hence, vulnerabilities found in APIs no longer affect only individual projects 
but instead might spread across projects and even global software ecosystem borders. Tracing 
such vulnerabilities on a global scale becomes an inherently difficult task, with many of the 
resources required for the analysis not only growing at unprecedented rates but also being spread 
across heterogeneous resources. Software developers are struggling to identify and locate the 
required data to take full advantage of these resources. The Semantic Web and its supporting 
technology stack have been widely promoted to model, integrate, and support interoperability 
among heterogeneous data sources.  
This dissertation introduces four major contributions to address these challenges: (1) It 
provides a literature review of the use of software vulnerabilities databases (SVDBs) in the 
Software Engineering community. (2) Based on findings from this literature review, we present 
SEVONT, a Semantic Web based modeling approach to support a formal and semi-automated 
approach for unifying vulnerability information resources. SEVONT introduces a multi-layer 
knowledge model which not only provides a unified knowledge representation, but also captures 
software vulnerability information at different abstract levels to allow for seamless integration, 
analysis, and reuse of the modeled knowledge. The modeling approach takes advantage of 
Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) to guide knowledge engineers in identifying reusable 
knowledge concepts and modeling them. (3) A Security Vulnerability Analysis Framework (SV-
AF) is introduced, which is an instantiation of the SEVONT knowledge model to support 
iv 
evidence-based vulnerability detection. The framework integrates vulnerability ontologies (and 
data) with existing Software Engineering ontologies allowing for the use of Semantic Web 
reasoning services to trace and assess the impact of security vulnerabilities across project 
boundaries. 
Several case studies are presented to illustrate the applicability and flexibility of our 
modelling approach, demonstrating that the presented knowledge modeling approach cannot 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
The Internet has revolutionized our society and impacted the software industry [1], with 
knowledge and information sharing becoming a central part of software development, facilitating 
the globalization of the software industry [1]. This change in information flow removes 
traditional project boundaries and promotes free flow of information, resources, and knowledge 
across projects. Globalization in the software industry [2] can have several facets including out- 
and crowd-sourcing parts of the development process, the wide spread use of collaborative 
environments facilitating resource sharing, and the introduction of completely new software 
development paradigms such as open source.  
Open source software (OSS) publishes source code and other related artifacts on the Internet 
using specialized code and artifact sharing portals such as Sourceforge1, GitHub2, and Maven3, 
allowing these artifacts to be shared and reused globally. This reuse can take on different forms, 
such as integrating open source projects into existing software ecosystems (e.g., reuse of code 
libraries) or extending and customizing available projects to meet specific requirements (e.g., 
creating specialized Linux distributions [3]). 
Shared knowledge resources not only facilitate reuse and collaboration; they also introduce 
new challenges to the Software Engineering (SE) community. Knowledge and resources are no 
longer controlled by a single project or organization, but instead are now distributed across 
multiple projects, organizations, or even global software ecosystems. Among the challenges 
arising from this knowledge sharing is Information Security (IS), which has emerged as a major 
threat to the software development community. At its core, IS promotes the notion that one 
should consider different security concepts (e.g., secure coding practices, knowledge about 





software security vulnerabilities and their analysis) in the development process. The importance 
of IS for the software community is reflected by the fact that it has become an integrated part of 
current SE best practices [4].  
As part of this IS integration process, developers and other stakeholders require access to 
vulnerability related knowledge resources. Security vulnerabilities databases (SVDBs) are an 
example of such knowledge resources which can provide software professionals with access to 
existing security issues affecting different software products. Access to this information can help 
prevent inadvertent (security) mistakes that might damage their systems or reduce the potential 
risk their systems might be exposed to. Different public SVDBs (e.g., National Vulnerability 
Database - NVD4) have been introduced to track known software vulnerabilities and potential 
solutions to resolve them. These SVDBs can be seen as a direct response by the software 
industry to the ever-increasing number of software attacks, which are no longer limited to a 
particular project or computer but now often affect hundreds of different systems and millions of 
computers.  
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
In response to the increasing number of software vulnerabilities and attacks, various private and 
public organizations have introduced SVDBs. Each of these databases captures not only different 
types of vulnerability information but are also of interest to developers and other stakeholders 
since they contain valuable information about software flaws, causes of defects, and details on 
how vulnerabilities arise, etc. [4].  
While the SE research community is becoming increasingly aware of these SVDBs, no 
comprehensive literature survey exists that studies how they (i.e., SVDBs) are used in software 
development. 
 
Problem Statement 1: Investigating the SE literature will provide insights on how usage of 
SVDBs in the SE domain has evolved over the past decade and outline some open challenges 
associated with their use. 
                                                     
4 https://nvd.nist.gov/ 
3 
Effective use of security vulnerability information can enhance software productivity, create 
economic benefit to software stakeholders (reduce cost and consuming time), and increase 
security of the software systems. However, with security vulnerability data growing at 
unprecedented rates, SE stakeholders (e.g., developers) are struggling to take full advantage of 
available vulnerabilities information. One main reason for this is that vulnerabilities data usually 
originates from disparate sources. This can result in vulnerabilities data heterogeneity and 
prevent data from being digested easily. Among other techniques developed, Semantic Web 
technologies and its supporting ontology based approaches are a promising method for 
overcoming heterogeneity and improving vulnerability data interoperability. 
 
Problem Statement 2: Providing a unified knowledge-model for different vulnerabilities 
sources (e.g., SVDBs) can be a viable solution to integrate existing vulnerability data sources.  
 
SE developers are often unaware or unfamiliar with SVDBs and the fact that known 
vulnerabilities might already be published in these SVDBs. As a result, vulnerabilities affecting 
their systems (either directly or indirectly through external vulnerable components used by their 
systems) often remain uncovered. For example, in September 2017, the Equifax breach [5] was 
caused by the Apache Struts5 vulnerability [6]. The Apache Struts vulnerability CVE-2017-56386 
was disclosed on March 7 and patched on the very same day, meaning a secured version of 
Apache Struts was available in SVDBs since March 7 for developers to update any vulnerable 
version they might have.    
However, increasing both awareness and automate accessibility to SVDBs during software 
development can improve software reliability and quality. Establishing such required traceability 
among vulnerabilities across software artifacts is an essential aspect in identifying and locating 
vulnerable code, applying existing fixes, and improving the analysis of potential impacts of 
vulnerabilities. 
In addition, new vulnerabilities are constantly being found in OSS code and many projects 
have no mechanisms in place for locating and fixing these problems. According to a recent Snyk 
survey [7] of open source maintainers, 44% have never had a security audit and only 17% said 
that they had a high level of security know-how. The survey also showed that 34% of the 
                                                     
5 Apache Struts is a popular open-source framework for developing web applications in the Java programming language. 
6 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5638 
4 
developers surveyed indicated that they use deprecate, the older, insecure version. Twenty five 
percent reported that they make no effort at all to notify users of vulnerabilities, and only 10% 
file a CVE7.  
A survey conducted by Sonatype [8] further suggests that software reuse through OSS 
components has become a de-facto industry norm, with 90% of survey participants relying on 
pre-existing open source code in their own implementation. Moreover, deployed OSS polices are 
reported to have major shortcomings with only 21% of these policies enforcing the use of secure 
OSS code, 63% having no active monitoring of vulnerabilities over time, and lastly, 78% of the 
surveyed policies have never banned the usage of certain OSS components. This poor 
management of third party artifacts in software systems could be compromised by intruders. 
As the use of OSS grows, this risk surface expands. A recent report [9] reveals that there is 
no standard way of documenting security on OSS projects. In the top 400,000 public repositories 
on GitHub, only 2.4% had security documentation in place. 
 
Problem Statement 3: With known vulnerabilities published in public SVDBs and using 
these SVDBs knowledge model in software development, managing the security of OSS 
components, tracing the vulnerabilities impacts, and calculating the OSS components 
trustworthiness can be automated.  
 
In the next section, we summarize the specific thesis contributions and how these 
contributions address the problem statements. 
 
1.2 Thesis Contributions 
In this thesis, we make the following contributions:  
 We conduct a literature survey; we reviewed 94 articles discussing the use of SVDBs in 
the SE domain (Chapter 3). Among the key findings of this survey are: 
o An increasing awareness in the research community that describes the use and 
application of SVDBs in the SE domain. 
                                                     
7 https://cve.mitre.org/ 
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o The majority of the surveyed papers apply SVDBs only to a limited number of SE 
activities. 
o Most contributions only rely on a single SVDB in their approach. 
 We introduce a novel knowledge engineering methodology that applies Formal Concept 
Analysis (FCA) to semi-automate the software vulnerabilities knowledge acquisition and 
extraction from SVDBs (Chapter 4). 
o We conduct a literature review of existing software security vulnerability 
ontologies. 
o We propose a semi-automated methodology using FCA to create a unified 
ontological knowledge model (SEVONT, Software sEcurity Vulnerability 
ONTology) that supports knowledge sharing, linking, and inference across 
SVDBs boundaries. 
o We present alignment rules to facilitate knowledge integration and improve our 
overall knowledge design. 
o We illustrate the applicability of our modeling approach by providing examples of 
how our modeling approach supports vulnerability analysis across individual 
SVDBs. 
 We developed a Security Vulnerability Analysis Framework (SV-AF) to support 
evidence-based vulnerability detection (Chapter 5). The main contributions of this 
framework are: 
o Integration of different ontologies such as builds systems ontologies, source code 
ontologies, version systems ontologies, vulnerabilities ontologies, etc. 
o Applying ontologies alignment using Probabilistic Soft Logic (PSL) to establish 
weighted links between ontologies. 
o Performed two case studies to illustrate the applicability of the presented 
approach. We identify that 750 Maven project releases are directly affected by 
known security vulnerabilities, and by considering transitive dependencies an 
additional 415,604 Maven projects can be identified as potentially affected by 
these vulnerabilities. 
 Our approach takes advantage of the Semantic Web and its reasoning services, to trace 
and assess the impact of security vulnerabilities across project boundaries (Chapter 6). 
6 
 We introduce a novel Ontological Trustworthiness Assessment Model (OntTAM) which 
(1) supports the automated analysis and assessment of quality attributes related to the 
trustworthiness of libraries and APIs in open-source systems, and (2) provides developers 
with additional insights on the potential impact of reused libraries and APIs on the quality 
and trustworthiness of their project. We illustrate the applicability of our approach by 
assessing the trustworthiness of libraries in terms of their API breaking changes, security 
vulnerabilities, license violations, and their potential impact on client projects (Chapter 
7). 
 
1.3 Related Publications 
Earlier versions of the work completed in this thesis have been published in the following 
papers:  
1- S. S. Alqahtani and J. Rilling, "An Ontology-Based Approach to Automate Tagging of 
Software Artifacts," 2017 ACM/IEEE International Symposium on Empirical Software 
Engineering and Measurement (ESEM), Toronto, ON, 2017, pp. 169-174. 
2- S. S. Alqahtani, "Enhancing Trust – Software Vulnerability Analysis Framework," 2017 
IEEE International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation (ICST), 
Tokyo, 2017, pp. 563-564. 
3- S. S. Alqahtani, E. E. Eghan and J. Rilling, "Recovering Semantic Traceability Links 
between APIs and Security Vulnerabilities: An Ontological Modeling Approach," 2017 
IEEE International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation (ICST), 
Tokyo, 2017, pp. 80-91.  
4- S. S. Alqahtani, E. E. Eghan and J. Rilling, "SV-AF — A Security Vulnerability 
Analysis Framework," 2016 IEEE 27th International Symposium on Software Reliability 
Engineering (ISSRE), Ottawa, ON, 2016, pp. 219-229.   
5- Sultan S. Alqahtani, Ellis E. Eghan, Juergen Rilling, “Tracing known security 
vulnerabilities in software repositories – A Semantic Web enabled modeling approach”, 
Science of Computer Programming, Volume 121, 2016, pp. 153-175.  
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1.4 Thesis Organization 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 introduces core concepts and terminologies used in 
this research. Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are dedicated to the main contributions of this thesis, 
which were mentioned earlier. The conclusions and some promising avenues for future work are 




Chapter 2  
2 Background   
 
The work presented in this research combines different aspects of multiple fields of study in SE 
and software security. In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of the core techniques and 
terminologies used in our research. If you are already familiar with these concepts, you can 
safely move on to the next chapter as cross-references are provided wherever specific 
background information is required.  
 
2.1 The Semantic Web and Ontologies in a Nutshell 
The term “ontology” originates from philosophy, where it denotes the study of existence. In 
computer science, a widely accepted definition has been introduced by Studer [10]: “an ontology 
is a formal, explicit specification of a shared conceptualization.” Ontologies are typically used as 
a formal and explicit way to specify concepts and relationships in a domain of discourse. They 
can overcome portability, flexibility, and information sharing problems associated with databases 
[11]. Compared to relational approaches which assume complete knowledge (closed world 
assumption), ontologies support the modeling of incomplete knowledge (open world assumption) 
and the extendibility of the ontological model. 
The Semantic Web (SW) allows for machine understandable Web resources that can be 
shared and processed by both software tools (e.g., search engines) and humans [12]. Ontologies 
are an important foundation of the SW as they allow knowledge to be shared between different 
agents and the creation of common terminologies for understanding [12]. Moreover, the resulting 
data representation format becomes reusable rather than being proprietary to specific tasks. The 
current data-model used to represent meta-data in SW is the Resource Description Format (RDF) 
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[13]. RDF is used to formalize meta-models in the form of <subject, predicate, object>, which 
are called triples. RDF triples make statements about resources, with a resource in the SW being 
anything—a person, project, software, a security bug, etc. In order to make triples persistent, 
RDF triples stores are used, with each triple being identified by a Uniform Resource Identifier 
(URI) [13]. 
The Web Ontology Language (OWL) [14] is used on top of the RDF layer (see Figure 1). It 
is a standard modeling language put forward by the W3C8 to pursue the vision of the SW. OWL 
provides for machine understandable (i.e., capturing semantics) information, allowing Web 
resources to be automatically processed and integrated. The widely used OWL sub-language 
OWL-DL is based on Description Logics (DLs) [15].  
 
 
Figure 1: Semantic Web architecture in layers [16]. 
 
Description Logic (DL): A DL based knowledge representation system provides typical 
facilities to set up knowledge bases and to reason about their content [12]. Figure 2 illustrates a 
typical DL based knowledge system. 
                                                     












Figure 2: Description Logics System. 
 
Such a knowledge base (KB) consists of two components—the TBox contains the 
terminology (i.e., the vocabulary of an application domain), and the ABox contains assertions 
about named individuals in terms of this vocabulary. The terminology is specified using 
description languages introduced previously in this section, as well as terminological axioms, 
which make statements about how concepts or roles are related to each other. In the most general 
case, terminological axioms have the form: 
𝐶 ⊑ 𝐷 (𝑅 ⊑ 𝑆) 𝑜𝑟 𝐶 ≡ 𝐷 (𝑅 ≡ 𝑆) 
Where 𝐶 and 𝐷 are concepts (𝑅 and 𝑆 are roles). The semantics of axioms are defined as: an 
interpretation 𝑰  satisfies 𝐶 ⊑ 𝐷 (𝑅 ⊑ 𝑆) if  𝐶𝑰 ⊑ 𝐷𝑰 (𝑅𝑰 ⊑ 𝑆𝑰) . A Tbox, denoted as  𝑻 , is a 
finite set of such axioms. The assertions in an ABox are specified using concept assertions and 
role assertions, which have the form 𝐶(𝑎), 𝑅(𝑎, 𝑏), where 𝐶 is a concept, 𝑅 is a role, and 𝑎, 𝑏 are 
names of individuals. The semantics of assertions can be given as: the interpretation 𝑰 satisfies 
the concept assertion 𝐶(𝑎) if 𝑎𝑰 ∈ 𝐶𝑰, and it satisfies the role assertion 𝑅(𝑎, 𝑏) if (𝑎𝑰, 𝑏𝑰) ∈ 𝑅𝑰. 
An Abox, denoted as 𝑨, is a finite set of such assertions. 
A DL system not only stores terminologies and assertions, but also offers services that allow 
reasoning about them. Typical reasoning services for a TBox are to determine whether a concept 
is satisfiable (i.e., non‐contradictory), or whether one concept is more general than another (i.e., 
subsumption). Important reasoning services for an ABox are to find out whether its set of 
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assertions is consistent, and whether the assertions in an ABox entail that a particular individual 
is an instance of a given concept description. 
A DL knowledge base might be embedded into an application in which some components 
interact with the KB by querying the represented knowledge and by modifying them, i.e., by 
adding and retracting concepts, roles, and assertions. However, many DL systems, in addition to 
providing an application programming interface that consists of functions with well‐defined 
logical semantics, provide an escape hatch by which application programs can operate on the KB 
in arbitrary ways [12]. 
In addition to RDF, OWL, and OWL-DL, the SW community provides tools to process OWL 
semantics and RDF data. Jena [17] emerged as a Java framework for building applications and 
providing a programmatic environment for RDF and OWL. Reasoners (e.g., RDFS++9, Pellet10) 
can infer new facts about the designed ontology and form a set of asserted axioms. RDF 
databases, such as Virtuoso [18] and Allegrograph  [19], are used to materialize and store RDF 
triples. SPARQL is a RDF query language, that is, a semantic query language for databases able 
to retrieve and manipulate data stored in RDF format.  
The SW has been designed from the ground up to address the integration challenges 
traditional relational databases are facing, such as [20]: (1) The SW facilitates the creation of 
taxonomies using ontologies, which can be shared across applications and domains; this is in 
contrast to relational database where schemata sharing and reuse is not natively supported [20]. 
(2) SW meta-models are extensible, allowing new knowledge to be added without affecting 
existing knowledge, unlike relational databases where extending the schema becomes a time-
consuming operation often affecting a complete database. For example, a change of index type 
(foreign key) might require dropping and recreating several other dependent database indices. (3) 
The SW makes relations explicit. In contrast, relational databases do not provide a consistent 
method to obtain the semantics of a relation. A query can join any two table columns as long as 
their datatypes match—there is no interpretation of the meaning of the actual relation performed. 
As a result, relational databases are not machine interpretable, and the inference of knowledge 
(explicit or implicit) requires human interaction. (4) Linking data is a key property of the SW, 
with any resource being identified by its Uniform Resource Identifier (URI). These URIs allow 
for a consistent identification of the same resource across various knowledge resources. This 
                                                     
9 http://franz.com/agraph/support/learning/Overview-of-RDFS++.lhtml 
10 https://www.w3.org/2001/sw/wiki/Pellet  
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contrasts with relational databases where resources are local and not universal, restricting the 
ability of relational databases to establish resource links outside their own local schema.  
 
2.2 Ontologies in Software Engineering 
Despite ontologies and Knowledge Engineering sharing the same roots, ontologies emphasize 
aspects such as inter-agent communication and interoperability [21]. An ontology defines a set of 
primitives to model a domain of knowledge or discourse. This set of representational primitives 
are typically classes (or sets), attributes (or properties), and relationships (or relations among 
class members) [22]. An important aspect of ontologies is that they must be formal and, more 
precisely, understandable by a computer or “codified in a machine interpretable language” [23]. 
 
Ontologies in SE. Representing software in terms of knowledge rather than data, ontologies can 
be more abstract than, say, database schemata, and provide better support for semantics [13]. 
With the adoption of Description Logic (DL) as a major foundation of the recently introduced 
SW and OWL [12], there is a trend to utilize ontologies or introduce taxonomies as conceptual 
modeling techniques into the SE domain. These existing approaches support knowledge 
representation and sharing, and automated reasoning. For example, in requirement engineering, 
ontologies have been used to support requirement management [24], traceability [25], and use 
case management [26]. In the software testing domain, KITSS [27] is a knowledge-based system 
that can provide assistance in converting a semi-formal test case specification into an executable 
test script. In the software maintenance domain, Ankolekar et al. [28] provide an ontology to 
model software, developers, and bugs. The authors developed a prototype Semantic Web system, 
Dhruv, for OSS communities. Dhruv provides an enhanced semantic interface to bug resolution 
messages and recommends related software objects and artifacts. Ontologies have also been used 
to describe the functionality of components using a knowledge representation formalism that 
allows more convenient and powerful querying. For example, the KOntoR [29] system allows 
storing semantic descriptions of components in a knowledge base and performing semantic 
queries on it. In [30], Jin et al. discuss an ontological approach of service sharing among 
program comprehension tools.  
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Ontologies vs. Models. A model is “an abstraction that represents some view on reality, 
necessarily omitting details, and for a specific purpose” [31]. However, in SE, ontologies and 
models try to address the same problems (representing software complexity in an abstract 
manner) but from very different perspectives. The differences between ontologies and models 
often result in different artifacts, uses, and possibilities. For example, modern SE practices 
advise developers to look for components that already exist when implementing functionality, 
since reuse can avoid rework, save money, and improve overall system quality [32]. In this 
example, ontologies can provide clear advantages over models in integrating information that 
normally resides isolated in several separate component descriptions. Furthermore, models (e.g., 
UML) rely on the close world assumption, while ontologies (e.g., OWL) support open world 
semantics. OWL, an example of ontology languages, is a “computational logic-based language” 
that supports full algorithmic decidability in its OWL-DL (description logic) variant. It is not 
possible to use algorithms supported by OWL (e.g., subsumption) for modeling languages due to 
their different semantics. Additional differences between ontologies and models are reported and 
discussed in [33]. 
 
2.3 Formal Concept Analysis (FCA)  
Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) [34] is a data analysis method that uses mathematical theory to 
perform data grouping. It provides a way to find, structure, and display relationships between 
concepts which consist of objects with common attributes [35]. Ganter et al. [34] defined a 
formal concept analysis as follows:  
Definition 1: A context is a triple 𝒞 = (𝒪, 𝒜, ℛ) where 𝒪  and 𝒜  are the set of objects and 
attributes respectively, and ℛ ⊑  𝒪 × 𝒜 is a relation among them.  
A context is represented as a relation or context table, where rows represent objects and columns 




Table 1: An example of a context table 
𝒞𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 (𝒪, 𝒜, ℛ) 
 
𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝒜 








girl x x   
woman x  x  
boy  x  x 
man   x x 
 
Definition 2: A concept 𝒸 = (𝒪, 𝒜)  of a context (𝒪, 𝒜, ℛ)  is part where  𝑂 ⊑  𝒪 , 𝐴 ⊑ 𝒜 , 
𝛼(𝐴) = 𝑂 and 𝜔(𝑂) = 𝐴. The extent of 𝒸 is 𝜋𝑜(𝑐) ≡ 𝑂 while the intent is 𝜋𝛼(𝑐) ≡ 𝐴. The set of 
all concepts of (𝒪, 𝒜, ℛ) is denoted by 𝐵 = (𝒪, 𝒜, ℛ). 
A concept lattice of a formal context (table) is a collection of all formal concepts (conceptual 
clusters) equipped with a sub-concept and super-concept hierarchy (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3: Concept lattice (Galois lattice) of Table 1. 
 
FCA has gained popularity due to its: (1) programming language independence, (2) ability to 
easily define different views (using different object, attribute combinations), (3) availability of 
tools to generate context tables and lattices, and (4) analysis being quite inexpensive, especially 
compared with other dynamic dependency and trace analysis techniques.  
 
FCA applications: Within the SE community, FCA has various applications in SE [35], such as 
feature interaction, software component retrieval, identifying objects from legacy code, model 
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restructuring, and minimizing test suites. In the knowledge modeling community, FCA has been 
used for data analysis and knowledge discovery [36] (e.g., knowledge discovery in databases, 
ontology engineering, and machine learning). 
In Chapter 4 we will show how FCA contributes to knowledge model engineering in the 
literature, and how we adopted this technique in our thesis contribution. 
 
2.4 Vulnerabilities Databases  
Security Vulnerability Databases (SVDBs) can be defined as “a platform aimed at collecting, 
mailing, and disseminating information about discovered vulnerabilities targeting real computer 
systems” [37]. 
While vulnerability information in existing SVDBs (e.g., National Vulnerability Database - 
NVD11) varies, they typically include a detailed description of reported software vulnerabilities 
and their potential impacts on existing systems, as well as instructions on how to mitigate these 
vulnerabilities and countermeasures (such as patches) to thwart further system exploitations. 
However, security engineers face a major challenge when dealing with existing SVDBs due to 
the diversity of data models, content, and accessibility of information [38]. For example, many 
SVDBs use traditional relational databases, while others rely on mailing lists, newsletters, or 
newsgroups to publish their content.  
Existing work on mitigating this problem with heterogeneity has focused on standardizing 
the publishing of vulnerability information. For example, MITRE12, a not-for-profit organization 
that operates research and development centers sponsored by the U.S. federal government, has 
introduced several standards to be used by the information security community. Three of their 
most popular standards are: Common Vulnerabilities Exposure (CVE), Common Weakness 
Enumeration (CWE), and Common Platform Enumeration (CPE). Below, we provide a brief 
overview of these standards.  
 




CVE13  is a catalog of publicly known security vulnerabilities and exposures. It is used by 
SVDBs to simplify the sharing of vulnerability data across different databases and tools by 
providing a common identifier for vulnerabilities.  
CWE14 is a community-developed dictionary of software weakness types. It provides a standard 
language of common software security terms in an attempt to remove ambiguity in the use and 
interpretation of vulnerability information. 
CPE15 is a structural naming scheme for IT systems, platforms, and packages. It provides a 
standard naming scheme. What CVE and CWE languages both have in common is a need to 
refer to IT products and platforms in a standardized way that is suitable for machine 
interpretation and processing. 
Another well-known standard, Common Vulnerabilities Scoring System (CVSS16), is an 
open-standard designed to assess the severity of vulnerabilities. This scoring system allows for a 
standardized ranking of vulnerabilities based on their potential impact. 
 
2.5 Vulnerabilities Detection Techniques  
In the SE domain, the concept “false sense of security” [39] means that a project manager 
believes that their system is secure from vulnerability attacks, when in fact that may not be the 
case. However, involving vulnerability detection techniques (tools) during the software life cycle 
removes such subjectivity from security vulnerability assessments and gives a project manager 
quantitative insight into the effectiveness of a projects’ security controls.  
The discovery and disclosure of new vulnerabilities occurs on a regular basis and is an area 
of research that is fairly well understood. For example, Liu et. al [40] performed a survey on 
techniques of discovering vulnerabilities and outlined a number of techniques: static analysis, 
penetration testing, fuzzing, Vulnerability Discovery Models, and more. These techniques are 
already deployed in practice while research on new and existing techniques is continuing.  
The traditional techniques used to audit software projects against security vulnerabilities are 
based on static analysis tools (e.g., FindBugs [41]) and vulnerability scanners (e.g., OWASP 
Dependence-Check [42]). Security static analysis, also called security static code analysis, is a 






method of automatic program code debugging without execution. Vulnerability scanner tools 
play a different role than traditional static analysis tools by scanning the security vulnerability in 
network or system (such as using vulnerable components in software project). These 
vulnerability scanners use predefined rules (maintained by security engineers) to identify 
security violations on networks or systems. In addition, the vulnerability scanner usually uses 
vulnerability databases (vendor vulnerability database, or third party database such as NVD, 
SecurityFocus, etc.) to compare the information it finds against known vulnerabilities.   
Over the last few years, new versions of vulnerability scanners have taken a different 
direction in identifying and tracking security vulnerabilities. A study [43] revealed that, in the SE 
domain, software developers include third party libraries in their applications that contain well-
known published vulnerabilities (such as those at NVD) which are hard to detect by traditional 
static and dynamic analysis tools. However, the gist of this kind of vulnerability scanner is to 
identify project dependencies and check if there are any known, publicly disclosed, 
vulnerabilities. These scanners help to validate the inventory of components on the software 
project. An inventory includes the open-source libraries (third party libraries), projects 
information (e.g., Maven pom.xml), source code, and other applicable project information. In 
what follows we give a detailed example of OWASP Dependence-Check [42] (vulnerability 
scanner tool), which we used to evaluate our proposed approach discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
OWASP Dependency-Check [42] is a vulnerability scanner tool that identifies software project 
dependencies and checks if there are any known vulnerabilities. The current version of the tool 
supports Java and .NET; and additional experimental support has been added for Rube, Node.js, 
Python, and limited support for C/C++ build systems (autoconf and cmake).  
OWASP Dependency-Track is a web application that allows organizations to document the use 
of third party components across multiple applications and versions. Further, it provides 
automatic visibility into the use of components with known vulnerabilities.  
 
Dependency-Track embeds the Dependency-Check project which uses public data from the 
NVD. Dependency-Check uses evidence-based analysis to match vendor, product, and version to 
the CPE’s identified in CVEs. Dependency-Track v1 is essentially an asset management 
application for tracking components and their use in each application, along with vulnerabilities. 
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Dependency-Track/Dependency-Check does not rely on a centralized database of additional data 
(such as tracking non-disclosed vulnerabilities). Some commercial solutions use these 
approaches to offer more comprehensive solutions. However, both Dependency-Track and 
Dependency-Check are open-source projects. 
Most of the vulnerabilities scanner tools share the same environment of the vulnerability 
scanning process. They use what is called Language Type and Evidence Collection 
identifications, in order to identify the vulnerable libraries in the third party vulnerability 
databases.  
 
Language Type. The tools identify the language of the project under scanning by checking what 
build/package manager is being used. This is done by finding the configuration file for a given 
build/package manager in the root of the project, or in the location where a configuration file 
might typically be found. For example, a pom.xml in the root of a project indicates a Maven 
repository. This information is how the tools distinguish coordinates amongst the various 
build/package managers.  
 
Evidence Collection. The aforementioned tools collect information about files they scan during 
the build process, in combination with the language type. The information collected is a set of 
coordinates called Evidence. There are three types of evidence collected: vendor, product, and 
version. The evidence for each build/package manager may vary from one to another. For 
example, the coordinates (evidences) for each language are the following: Java (Maven) uses 
groupId, artifactId, and version, Node.js (NPM) uses library name and version, Python (PyPi) 
uses library name and version, and Ruby (Ruby Gems) uses library name and version. However, 
by sending these evidences, the aforementioned tools are able to check whether the libraries are 
vulnerable or not by matching against the vulnerability database. 
Finally, vulnerabilities scanners that depend on evidence identification may suffer from false 




2.6 Chapter Summary 
The work presented in this dissertation is a novel fusion of several techniques from disparate 
domains. In this chapter, we provided background information to the technologies and concepts 
used in our research implementations. We will frequently refer to this chapter in subsequent 
chapters, since the provided information will be extensively required.   
In the next chapter, we will survey the SE literatures that use SVDBs in software 
development, and outline some research opportunities that we are trying to address in this thesis.   
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Chapter 3  
3 A Study on the Use of Vulnerability 
Databases in Software Engineering 
 
3.1 Introduction  
As discussed earlier (in Chapter 1), in response to the constantly increasing number of software 
vulnerabilities and attacks, various private and public organizations have introduced software 
vulnerabilities databases (SVDBs) such as the National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD17). Each 
of these databases captures not only different types of vulnerability information, but are also of 
interest to developers and other stakeholders since they contain valuable information about 
software flaws, causes of defects, as well as details surrounding how vulnerabilities arise, 
vulnerability measurements, and guidelines on secure coding practices, etc.[38].  
While the information content in SVDBs varies, they typically include a detailed description 
of each vulnerability and any potential impacts these may have on existing software projects. 
Additionally, instructions are included on how to mitigate the reported vulnerability, as well as 
information surrounding countermeasures (such as patches) to thwart further system 
exploitations and violations. However, working with different SVDBs also involves dealing with 
heterogeneous data sources since no single repository provides information for all available 
disclosed software security vulnerabilities [38]. Furthermore, retrieving relevant vulnerability 
information is not always a straight forward task since every organization and vendor publishing 
a SVDB relies on proprietary categorization and representation of their vulnerabilities data [38]. 
While many SVDBs use traditional relational databases to publish their vulnerability 
                                                     
17 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/data-feeds 
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information, others rely on mailing lists, newsletters, or newsgroups to provide access to these 
datasets.  
Software developers are often unfamiliar with SVDBs and the fact that known vulnerabilities 
might already be published in these SVDBs. As a result, vulnerabilities affecting their systems 
(either directly or indirectly through external vulnerable components used by their systems) often 
remain uncovered. In 2017, the Equifax breach18, for example, involved a vulnerability in the 
Apache Struts [45] open source software. The patch came out in SVDBs a couple of months 
before the breach occurred. Increasing awareness and accessibility of SVDBs, as well as linking 
vulnerabilities to software artifacts, are an essential aspect in locating vulnerable code, applying 
existing fixes, and improving the analysis of potential impacts of vulnerabilities.  
 
3.1.1 Definitions 
SVDBs can be classified into two major categories, private and public vulnerabilities databases: 
 
1. Private SVDBs are typically managed by for-profit organizations, covering vendor 
specific product (closed source) vulnerabilities and rarely disclose this information to the 
public.  
2. Public SVDBs are organized and maintained typically by non-profit organizations (e.g., 
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERT) 19 ) and disclose their vulnerability 
information to the public. These public SVDBs can be further divided into subcategories: 
specialized and general (i.e., common) SVDBs. 
a. Specialized SVDBs are databases covering specific vulnerability aspects (e.g., 
Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory (MFSA)20). Many software manufactures 
operate their own, highly specialized databases in which publicly known 
vulnerabilities of their products are documented [46].   
b. Common SVDBs are databases that publish vulnerabilities for a number of 
software projects across vendor boundaries. These databases disclose 





vulnerabilities to the public after being reviewed by security experts (e.g., 
NVD21).  
 
Also, the following definitions help to clarify the meaning of Software Engineering (SE) tasks 
supported by SVDBs, which we used for classifying our literature review. 
1. SE tasks: any SE method (described in the paper) the SE researchers used to achieve their 
research goals. For example, SE researchers used empirical research methods to study 
vulnerability evolution.   
2. SE repository: a central place to keep software resources which SE researchers can pull 
from when necessary. SE repositories such as issue tracker systems (e.g., JIRA), version 
control systems (e.g., GIT), software management repositories (e.g., Maven), etc.  
 
3.1.2 Goals and Outcomes 
While the SE community is becoming increasingly aware of these SVDBs, no comprehensive 
literature survey exists that studies where (and how) SVDBs are used in SE research. Our 
literature survey provides insights into current state-of-the-art usage of SVDBs in software 
development activities. Our primary goals are to characterize and quantify:  
- Which SVDBs are commonly used in the SE research community,  
- Which SE repositories were mined together with SVDBs,  
- Which SE task was being supported through using SVDBs. 
To achieve these goals we surveyed 94 articles from the SE literature that used SVDBs to 
solve SE tasks. Findings from our analysis show that SVDBs are most commonly used for 
empirical research (e.g., security [empirical] studies), generating security test cases, or modeling 
vulnerabilities detection techniques. We also found that SE researchers discuss a broad range of 
security topics, from creating theoretical foundations for new security analysis techniques to 
implementing them as part of software development environments.  
The outcome of our study can be beneficial to different stakeholders since the study provides 
insights on current trends and open challenges related to the use of SVDBs. In particular, our 
                                                     
21 https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/data-feeds 
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study provides software developers and maintainers the necessary knowledge about the 
underlying challenges for fixing security vulnerabilities and developing patches by 
understanding the steps and best practices provided by SVDBs. The study also provides a 
detailed analysis on how the security vulnerability research landscape has evolved over the past 
decade. It should be noted that our dataset and results are available online to facilitate the 
replication and reuse of our findings [47]. 
 
3.2 Literature Search and Selection 
In this section, we describe the process used to find literature, including our scope, considered 
venues and search terms, search methodology, and article selection results. We adopt and follow 




For this paper we were interested in locating articles that used SVDBs information to solve SE 
tasks. We focused our attention on articles written between January 2001 and April 2017, more 
than a full decade of research results. This period was chosen because the SVDBs (e.g., NVD) 
that propelled vulnerability sharing to become widely adopted were launched in 2005.  
Our survey is not a Systematic Literature Review (SLR). Our study aims to define, collect, 
and curate the disparate literature, arguing and demonstrating that there does, indeed, exist a 
coherent area of research in the field that can be termed “using SVDBs information for secure 
Software Engineering”. We hope that this will prove to be an enabling study for future SLRs in 
this area.  
We applied the following inclusion criteria: 
i. The paper is related to SE, and may have actionable consequences for software users, 
developers, and maintainers.  
ii. The paper is related to SVDBs analysis, concerning the use of collections of 
vulnerabilities from one or more SVDBs to tackle software issues.  
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We applied the following exclusion criteria:  
i. The paper focuses on software vulnerability but does not use vulnerability information 
from SVDBs. 
 
3.2.2 Considered Venues and Search Terms 
Table 2 lists the journals and conference venues that we included in our initial search for articles. 
 
Table 2: The selected journals and conference venues that we considered in our initial article 
selection process 










IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering  
ACM transactions on Software Engineering & Methodology  
Empirical Software Engineering 
Journal of System and Software 
Journal of Science of Computer Programming 
Software – Practice & Experience 
Information and Software Technology 














International Conference on Software Engineering 
European Software Engineering Conference / Symposium on the Foundations of 
Software Engineering 
International Conference on Automated Software Engineering 
International Conference on Software Maintenance 
International Conference on Program Comprehension 
International Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering 
International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation 
International Symposium on Software Testing and Analysis 
The ACM / IEEE International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering 
and Measurement 
International Workshop/Working Conference on Mining Software Repositories 
 
Search Terms. We collected the initial set of articles by performing keyword searches on the 
publisher websites for each of our considered venues. We also searched using aggregate search 
engines, such as the ACM Digital Library and IEEE Xplore. The keywords and search queries 
that we used are listed in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Keyword searches for online library search 
3.2.3 Search Methodology  
In order to collect all relevant literature to date that met the scope defined in Section 3.2.1, we 
performed a systematic search for the terms defined in Table 3, from each repository (defined in 
Table 2). 
Unique papers were collected into a table, and a decision was made based on the inclusion 
criteria in two stages:  
Title and Abstract: We inspected the title and abstract, and removed publications which were 
clearly irrelevant according to the scope defined in Section 3.2.1. 
Body: Results were read fully and a judgement was made on whether the paper (a) meets the key 
requirements on what is defined as “using SVDBs information for secure Software Engineering” 
in our scope, or b) is very relevant to the field and so should be included as “expanded literature” 
to put the main literature into context. Papers matching the requirements of (a) or (b) were 
included in this survey.    
This yielded an initial set of related articles. For each of the articles in the initial set, we 
considered the citations that were contained in each article for additional relevant articles. Then, 
we reached our final set of articles.  
 
3.2.4 Snowballing  
In addition to the repository searchers specified in Section 3.2.2, we also performed snowballing 
[51] on many of the included studies. To do this we inspected the studies cited by the study and 




("vulnerable" OR "vulnerability" OR "vulnerabilities" OR "vulnerability database" OR 




("vulnerable" OR "vulnerability" OR "vulnerabilities" OR "vulnerability database" OR 
"vulnerability databases") 
AND  
("software requirement" OR "software design" OR "software coding" OR "software 
testing" OR "software verification" OR "software evolution" OR "software maintenance") 
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performing this process in addition to repository keyword searching, we reduced the risk of 
omission of relevant literature from this survey.  
 
3.2.5 Article Selection Results 
We finally arrived at 94 articles published between 2001 and 2017. Figures 4 and 5 show the 
distribution of venues and years for the articles. One of the main findings from our first data 
analysis is that there has been a significant increase in the number of  publications (per year) that 
address vulnerabilities analysis in SE, which is a good indicator for growing research interest in 
the domain. Secondly, we observe that the main conferences and journals that consider SVDB 
related articles as a relevant topic are top tier conferences such as ICSE and ASE, and journals 
such as JSS, IEEE, and TSE. 
 
Figure 4: Percent of articles per venue. 
 
Figure 5: Number of articles per year. 
 
 
Figure 5 shows that the period between 2001 to 2005 was not included in the final results 
because papers in that period did not use SVDBs. Figure 4 shows that 15% of ICSE papers deal 
with SVDBs, while 8% of ASE papers use SVDBs. For the journal papers we found 11% of JSS 
papers use SVDBs in contrast to 5% of papers in TSE that involved SVDBs in their research.   
 
3.3 Research Trends 
In what follows, we report on the major trends which we observed in our literature survey 
involving the use of SVDBs in the SE lifecycle. In order to structure our literature review, we 
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define a set of attributes that allow us to characterize each of the surveyed articles. Additionally, 
we define three facets of related attributes, summarized in Table 4.  
First and foremost, we are interested in which SVDB was primarily used in the study: 
specialized or common SVDBs (defined in Section 3.1.1). Second, we document the SE 
repository being used together with the SVDB in the article. Finally, we are interested in the SE 
task (defined in Section 3.1.1) that was being performed along with using SVDBs information. 
These SE tasks were identified and classified manually from surveyed articles (94 articles). We 
include a range of tasks to allow a fine-grained view of the literature. 
We manually processed each of the articles in our article set and assigned attribute sets to 
each. The results allow the articles to be summarized and compared along our three chosen 
facets.   
Table 4 shows our three facets: which SVDB was used, which repository was used, and 
which SE task was being performed. We now analyze the research trends of each facet. 
 
Table 4: The set of attributes we collected on each article 
Facet Attribute Description 
SVDB 
Common  
Free and open source SVDB which is operated by public organizations that report 
known vulnerabilities for different software products. 
Specialized 
Free and open source SVDB which is operated by private vendors and includes 
known vulnerabilities specific for those vendors. 
Type of paper –  
SE repository used 
along with SVDBs 
Source code Involves source code or revision control repository. 
Requirements/design Involves requirements or design artifacts. 
Logging Involves execution or search engine logs. 
Bug/vulnerability 
reports 
Involves issue trackers or vulnerability reports from SVDBs. 
Others Involves Q&A sites, build repositories (e.g., maven, nmp, etc.), emailing list, etc. 
Type of paper -   
SE tasks supported 
with SVDBs  
Empirical research  
Papers in this SE task make use of collections of software artifacts (corpora) plus 
SVDBs from which to derive empirical evidence. 
Source code: 
Vulnerability analysis 
Papers in this SE task perform low level analysis (source code and binary code) to 
investigate vulnerable code characteristics, develop vulnerability static analysis 
tools, reverse engineering analysis, etc. 
Security testing  
Papers in this SE task introduce vulnerability testing techniques, such as 
vulnerability test suit generator, model-based testing approaches (using black-and 
white-box methods), etc.   
Modeling  
Papers in this SE task develop models, for example framework models for 
vulnerability traceability, vulnerability prediction and detection models, 
knowledge source modeling for interlinking between repositories, etc. 
Risk analysis 
Papers in this SE task are more focused on vulnerability assessment and impact 
during software deployment, for example developing a security assessment 
approach in incorporating OSS into commercial software systems. 
Other  Any papers that did not fit into the aforementioned classes. 
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3.3.1 Facet 1: Which SVDBs are Commonly Used in the SE 
Research Community? 
Our survey shows that none of the surveyed SE articles reported on the use of common SVDBs 
prior to 2006 (see Figure 6). This is due to the fact that the first widely-recognized common 
SVDBs (e.g., NVD [38]) became publicly available only in late 2004 and early 2005, with more 
specialized public SVDBs emerging in SE articles in late 2010.  
 
Figure 6: Trends of common vs specialized SVDBs use. The cumulative number of usages 
indicates the total number of published articles using SVDBs to the year shown on the x-axis. 
Our analysis also shows that the majority of surveyed articles (91%) use common SVDBs in 
their work, whereas only 9% rely on specialized SVDBs as their primary resource for 
vulnerability information. Further analysis of common SVDBs usage in these papers (see Figure 
7) shows that most of the surveyed articles (26%) used NVD as their SVDB of choice, followed 
by CVE22 (16%). It should be noted that NVD is based on the CVE dictionary augmented with 
additional analysis information, a database, and a fine-grained search engine. NVD is 
synchronized regularly with CVE such that any CVE update will also be reflected in NVD (after 
approval by the NVD security engineers). NVD includes security checklists, security related 
software flaws, misconfigurations, affected product names, and impact metrics.  
The OWASP is another common SVDB which was used by 14% of the surveyed articles. 
OWASP is dedicated to maintaining a list of Web applications with known security incidents and 
is commonly used for experiments in testing security vulnerabilities affecting web applications 
(e.g., [52]–[54]). The Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB), used by 8% of the 
surveyed articles, is one of the earlier publicly available common SVDBs. However, as of April 
                                                     
22 https://cve.mitre.org/ 
29 
2016 the database is no longer maintained and announced to be shut-down by the vendor. Other 
popular common SVDBs included are CWE (7%) and SecurityFocus (6%). CWE is maintained 
by MITRE23 and provides a classification of vulnerabilities types which are commonly used for 
testing and classifying security attacks. SecurityFocus is an online software systems’ security 
news portal that obtains its data from the Bugtraq24 mailing list. Bugtraq is an independent 
source for security vulnerabilities, alerts, and threats. 
 
 
Figure 7: Top 6 common SVDBs used in our surveyed articles. 
 
While some articles compare their vulnerability results obtained from one SVDB with results 
from other SVDBs, only a few studies (e.g., [55], [56]) combined the usage of different common 
SVDBs in their approaches. As shown in [17], combining different common SVDBs data sources 
can increase the zero-day detection performance of vulnerability detection and analysis 
techniques.  
  
                                                     
23 https://www.mitre.org/ 
24 http://seclists.org/bugtraq/ 
Although the CVE database has been available longer than NVD, most surveyed articles 
used NVD in their approach. We believe that one of the reasons for the widespread use of 
NVD is the easy access to vulnerability data through supported feeds and the regular 
updates to the database. Moreover, we found that little research exists in combining 
different SVDBs. 
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3.3.2 Facet 2: Which SE Repositories were Mined Together with 
SVDBs? 
Among the most common SE repositories used in combination with SVDBs are source code and 
bug repositories (see Figure 8). In recent years there has also been increasing research activity in 
combining SVDBs with logs, requirements, and “others” knowledge resources. A main reason 
for the use of source code and issue tracker repositories in conjunction with SVDBs is that both 
are typically part of open source systems and SVDBs often contain explicit traceability links to a 
vulnerability’s patch information in either repository. In contrast, requirements and design 
documents are normally not part of open source systems. We also observed that since 2013 there 
have been an increasing number of publications combining SVDBs and execution logs. One of 
the reasons for this is the increasing need to analyze security vulnerabilities that depend on the 
execution behavior typically found in ultra-large scale or distributed systems (e.g., vulnerability 




Figure 8: The SE repositories used with SVDBs. On the right, a stacked bar plot which shows the 
trends on the SE mined repositories. On the left, a plot shows the distribution of the literature 
survey according to the SE repository used. 
 
 
The most common SE repositories used and analyzed in combination with SVDBs are 
source code and issue trackers. Among the main reasons for their widespread use is their 
availability (e.g., open source projects) and the explicit traceability links among these 
resources (e.g., commits with cross references to an issue being fixed). 
31 
3.3.3 Facet 3: Which SE Task was Being Supported Through Using 
SVDBs? 
The most popular SE tasks in the surveyed articles are empirical research (37% of articles), 
modeling (20% of articles), source code analysis (for static/dynamic vulnerability analysis 16% 
of articles), and testing (14% of articles).  
Empirical research such as a case study is a task well suited for using SVDBs since the goal 
of empirical research in SE is to gain knowledge by means of direct and indirect observation or 
experience [57]. However in order to achieve that, the SVDBs provide empirical evidence (the 
record of one's direct observations or experiences) of software vulnerabilities which can be 
analyzed quantitatively or qualitatively. 
The modeling task in software security has become popular recently. For example, software 
threat modeling (e.g., Berger  et al. [58]) has been adapted as a key activity in an organization’s 
secure development life cycle (e.g., Microsoft SDL [59]). The modeling task in the surveyed 
articles include papers discussing vulnerability prediction/detection models (e.g., Chatzipoulidis 
et al. [60], Scandariato et al. [61], and Shar et al. [62]), or vulnerabilities knowledge source 
modeling for software ecosystems interrelationships (e.g., Ilo et al. [63], Wu et al. [64], Pham et 
al. [65], Anbalagan et al. [66], and Cavusoglu et al. [67]). SVDBs play the important role of 
providing SE researchers structured representations of vulnerability information that affects the 
security of an application. This helps SE researchers study the vulnerability impacts on the 
software systems (i.e., how the vulnerability indirectly affects software system components). 
Source code analysis includes static/dynamic vulnerability analysis. Our surveyed articles 
classified in this SE task (i.e., vulnerability static/dynamic approaches) used SVDBs to analyze 
the system source code for all possible run-time behaviors and seek out coding flaws (e.g., 
Pasaribu et al. [68], Zheng et al. [69], Møller et al. [70], Shahriar et al. [71], and Wassermann et 
al. [72]), detecting known vulnerabilities attacks such as SQL injections (e.g., Thome et al. [73]) 
and buffer-overflow attacks (e.g., Wang et al. [74] and Gao et al. [75]). 
For the SE testing task, we find SVDBs as the ideal source for software security testing since 
many researchers believe that using SVDBs, which contain a wealth of information of software 
security vulnerabilities, helps to validate the proposed testing techniques with existing known 
software vulnerability test-cases. The SE testing tasks in the surveyed articles include papers 
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proposing and discussing black-box testing of web-application vulnerabilities (e.g., Ceccato et al. 
[76]), fuzzing approaches (e.g., Pham et al. [77]), automatic test-cases generation (e.g., Stivalet  
et al. [78]), etc.  
 
 
Figure 9: A stacked bar plot which shows the trends of the investigated tasks. The y-axis shows 
the number of articles published in a given year. 
 
Figure 9 shows a stacked bar plot of the trend of the tasks performed by the surveyed articles 
across the years reviewed. We see the emergence of articles that conduct studies on collections 
of vulnerable software systems (risk analysis articles) since 2009. The reason for this may be the 
increased popularity of common SVDBs and their supporting tools, which give researchers the 
right techniques for analysing vulnerabilities impacts on collections of software systems. In 
addition, source code vulnerability analysis studies also emerged around 2008, and we noticed 
several articles that are published on this task each year since 2008.  
The tasks in the “other” category include benchmarking methodology for the security of 
software-based systems (e.g., Mendes et al. [56]) and techniques for counteracting web browser 




Most research that uses SVDBs information performs empirical study, testing, or modeling. 
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3.4 Common Uses of SVDBs on Software Engineering 
Tasks 
In this section we describe and evaluate in detail the surveyed articles that used SVDBs along 
with SE repositories to perform some SE tasks. We organize the work into subsections by SE 
task (as is described in Table 4). We provide a brief description of each task, followed by a 
presentation of the relevant articles. 
 
3.4.1 Empirical Research 
In SE, empirical research is a validating process that compares what the researchers believe to 
what they observe [57]. Specifically, empirical research helps the researchers understand how 
things (in software systems) work and allows researchers to use this understanding to materially 
alter their world. Empirical research takes many forms. It is realized not only as formal 
experiments, but also as case studies, surveys, and prototyping exercises as well.  
In our survey, among the SE tasks which are supported by SVDBs, empirical research is the 
most common. The results are shown in Table 5, which shows summaries of the articles 
classified in this SE task, including the reference of each article, publication year, name of the 
used SVDB, what the SVDB was used for, and self-classification.  
In this SE task, we manually classified the articles under this category based on self-
classification criteria. Note that we do not claim to have surveyed such empirical research 
studies in SE research comprehensively as this is not the focus of this study, but it can be a 
direction for future work. However, we tried to understand and classify the empirical research 
based on self-classification criteria (as it is suggested by [80]). For each paper we manually 
captured what words authors used to describe their efforts (e.g., case study, experiment). We 
collected explicit self-classification from the author’s keywords mentioned in the paper or we 
looked for sentences in the paper such as “we have conducted a case study” and concluded that 
the current paper is empirical research and, more specifically, a case study. Some of the self-
classifications were very detailed and not precise (e.g., “empirical analysis,” “empirical 
assessment,” or “experiment study”); in such cases we reduced the type to a simpler version 
(e.g., an empirical study). As a result, we came up with four sub-categories of the empirical 
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research area: case study, exploratory, comparison, and empirical study. As seen from Table 5, 
authors most often used terms such as “exploratory” and “empirical study” to describe their 
research. In some cases, papers contained more than one self-classification.  
 
Table 5: Results of SE empirical research articles using SVDBs 
Reference Year SVDBs How SVDBs Used Self-classification 
Hafiz et al. [81] 2016 SecurityFocus 
Extracted vulnerabilities’ authors’ 
information.  
Empirical study (survey) 
Munaiah et al. 
[82] 
2016 NVD 
Downloaded Chromium project’s 
vulnerabilities.  
Case study (Chromium project) 
Ye et al. [83] 2016 CVE 
Extracted 100 buffer overflow 
vulnerabilities.  
Empirical study (buffer 
overflow attack) 
di Biase et al. 
[84] 
2016 CVE 
Downloaded Chromium project’s 
vulnerabilities reports.  
Case study (modern code 
review) 
Jimenez et al. 
[85] 
2016 NVD 
Downloaded vulnerabilities for Linux 
kernel. 
Case study (Linux Kernel) 
Murtaza et al. 
[86] 
2016 NVD Mining NVD.  Exploratory study (mining) 
Camilo et al. [87] 2015 NVD Related to Munaiah et al. [82]  
Fang et al. [88] 2014 SecurityFocus 
Related to Hafiz et al. [81], but this paper 
focused on how buffer overflow attack 
types. 
 
Tan et al. [89] 2014 NVD 
The authors used NVD to find the security 
bugs for their analyzed studied systems.  
Empirical study (bug 
characteristics) 





Mining NVD. Comparison study 
Stuckman et al. 
[90] 
2014 CVE The authors used CVE-IDs for traceability. Exploratory study (mining) 











Downloaded vulnerability information for 
vulnerable releases of Linux kernel.  
Exploratory study (mining bugs 
vs vulnerabilities) 
Meneely et al. 
[93] 
2013 NVD 
The authors used NVD to trace 68 




Meneely et al. 
[94] 
2013 CWE Studied types of vulnerability attacks. Empirical study (survey) 
Lee et al. [95] 2013 CVE 
Downloaded CVE vulnerabilities for 
Fedora open source. 
Case study (RedHat Fedora) 






The authors aggregated 46310 
vulnerabilities SVDBs.  









Used for annotating specific vulnerability 
classes of attacker activities.  
Empirical study (classifying web 
systems vulnerabilities) 
Liu et al. [98] 2012 NVD 
Downloaded 11, 395 vulnerability entries 
and related information. 





2012 CVE Related to Wijayasekara et al. [92]  
Austin et al. 
[100] 
2011 CWE 
The authors studied the type of 
vulnerabilities.  
Comparison study (two 
electronic health record systems) 
Smith et al. [101] 2011 CWE 
The authors used SVDB as a source for 
vulnerability classifications.  
Empirical study (prioritizing 
security V&V) 
Zhang et al. [102] 2011 NVD Mining NVD. 
Empirical study (mining NVD 
data) 








Extracting and studying vulnerabilities 
reports. 
Case study (Firefox 
vulnerability vs. bugs) 





Studying whether the vulnerabilities share 
any common properties or not.  





The authors extracted vulnerabilities entries 
for Windows Vista.  
Empirical study (evaluate the 
efficacy of pre-defined metrics 
predicting vulnerabilities on 
Windows Vista)  
Neuhaus  et al. 
[106] 
2010 NVD Mining NVD. 
Exploratory study (vulnerability 
trends) 






Studying the security vulnerabilities 
behaviour.  
Exploratory study (mining) 
Wal et al.[108] 2009 
NVD and 
CVE 
Extracting vulnerabilities counts for web 
applications.  
Empirical study (vulnerability 
characteristics in PHP 
applications) 
Anbalagan et al. 
[109] 
2009 NVD 
Trace open source projects issue trackers to 
their security vulnerabilities. 
Exploratory study (tracing 
vulnerability for Fedora, 
Ubuntu, and OpenSuse) 
Anba et al. [110] 2009 NVD 
Extracting vulnerabilities data for Linux 
distributions.  
Empirical study (vulnerability 
reports characteristics of Linux 
Distributions) 
Vache [111] 2009 OSVDB 
Downloaded vulnerability information to 
study the vulnerability life cycle and the 
exploit appearance.  
Exploratory study (characterized 
quantitatively the 
vulnerability life cycle and the 
exploit appearance) 
Telang et al. 
[112] 
2007 CERT  
The authors extracted vulnerabilities 
information. 
Empirical study (vulnerability 
impact on product market price) 





The authors extracted vulnerabilities 
information.   
Comparison study 
Frei et al. [114] 2006 
OSVDB, 
NVD 
The authors downloaded vulnerability 
reports. 
Exploratory study 
(understanding of the 
vulnerability lifecycle) 
 
Case Studies. This type of empirical research uses specific open-source projects to study and 
analyze the security vulnerability. For example, Munaiah et al. [82] performed an in-depth 
analysis of the Chromium project to empirically examine the relationship between bugs and 
vulnerabilities. They used NVD as a source of the Chromium vulnerabilities. The bug reports 
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were collected from Google code portal as a source for the Chromium bugs. Towards the same 
goal, Zaman et al. [103] used Firefox as a case study to investigate how different types of bugs 
(performance and security bugs) differ from each other and from the rest of the bugs in a 
software project. These researchers used Mozilla Foundation Security Advisory (MFSA) (i.e., 
specialized SVDB). 
The main objective of the study by Jimenez et al. [85] was to determine the effectiveness of 
vulnerability prediction models (e.g., Software Metrics, and Text Mining) to distinguish between 
vulnerable and non-vulnerable software components of the Linux Kernel under different 
scenarios. The case study dataset was based on extracting vulnerabilities reports from the NVD 
and the bug/commit-reports from Linux Kernel repository (Bugzilla).    
Lee et al. [95] verified the assumption about using software reliability models for security 
assessment. They investigated a range of Fedora open source software security problems to see if 
some of the basic assumptions behind software reliability growth models hold for discovery of 
security problems in non-attack situations. They used CVE identifications to locate security 
discussions from open source RedHat Bugzilla data25 for Fedora.  
di Biase et al. [84]  conducted an empirical case study aimed to fill the gap between Modern 
Code Review (MCR) and post-release bugs (software quality). They explored the MCR process 
in the Chromium open source project. They used the CVE dataset to correlate the vulnerability 
(security) issues of the project to the reported ones in the project’s host portal.  
 
Comparison Studies. We have found comparisons in 4 papers. The comparison is made for the 
technique, approach, or tool that was introduced in the study—to evaluate the proposed 
technique, approach, or tool. However, in this SE task, we find that all 4 papers (Massacci et al. 
[91], Walden et al. [55], Alhazmi et al. [113], and Austin et al. [100]) share the same goal of 
performing a comparison study to validate and evaluate vulnerability prediction/discovery 
models. For example, Massacci et al. [91] introduced an empirical comparison methodology to 
evaluate vulnerability discovery models (e.g., Alhazmi and Malaiya Logistic model [115], and 
Logarithmic Poisson [116]), and they evaluated the performance of VDMs with two dimensions 
(quality and predictability). The vulnerability data used in the study were extracted from two 
sources: (1) common SVDBs (e.g., NVD, OSVDB, etc.), and (2) specialized SVDBs, the 
                                                     
25 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/ 
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vulnerability database maintained by the software vendor (e.g., MFSA, Microsoft Security 
Bulletin). In some cases, authors used open source and commercial products (e.g., Apache26 and 
Microsoft IIS 27  HTTP servers) for measuring and enhancing prediction capabilities of 
vulnerability discovery models as described in [113].  
 
Exploratory Studies. In this SE task we noticed exploratory research articles mainly focused on 
studying vulnerability evolution (including vulnerabilities trends, patterns, and life cycle). The 
studies involved more understating of the nature of vulnerabilities databases by extracting the 
vulnerabilities features, and involved mining techniques. We found studies by Murtaza et al. [86] 
and Neuhaus et al. [106] in which they mined the vulnerabilities data extracted from NVD to 
analyze the security vulnerabilities’ trends and patterns. Anbalagan et al. [109], Stuckman et al. 
[90] and Meneely et al. [93] mined SVDBs (e.g., CVE and NVD) to trace security 
vulnerabilities. For example, Meneely et al. [93] conducted an exploratory study to explore the 
properties of vulnerability-contributing commits in order to check when a software 
vulnerabilities patches go bad. In this paper, the authors traced 68 vulnerabilities (extracted from 
NVD) in the Apache HTTP server back to the version control commits that contributed to the 
vulnerable code originally.  
Other exploratory studies involved large scale exploratory analysis of software vulnerability 
life cycles (e.g., Shahzad et al. [96], Vache et al. [111], and Frei et al. [114]) and attempted to 
understand the security behaviour of certain projects (e.g., [107]). Mauczka et al. [107] used 
mining techniques to extract security changes in FreeBSD28. They used the gathered security 
changes to find out more about the nature of security in the FreeBSD project, and they tried to 
establish a link between the identified security changes and a tracker for security issues (security 
advisories). For their study the authors used vulnerability information provided by OWASP and 
CWE repositories. 
 
Empirical Studies. The rest of the empirical research articles in our literature survey were 
classified as empirical studies. Our further manual analysis of the related articles of these 
empirical studies shows that: empirical studies used SVDBs for surveying vulnerability reporters 





[81] and studying the security knowledge of SE students [94]. For example, Hafiz et al. [81] 
conducted an empirical study on 127 vulnerability reporters to understand the methods and tools 
used during the discovery of the software vulnerability and whether the community of 
developers exploring security vulnerability differ in their approach from another community of 
developers exploring a different vulnerability. The study was based on vulnerability reporters in 
the SecurityFocus repository. In addition, the authors analyzed certain types of vulnerability 
attack reports (e.g., SQL injection and cross site scripting vulnerabilities) extracted from the 
SecurityFocus repository. Similarly to [81], Fang et al. [88] replicated the same experiment but 
with a focus only on how buffer overflow attack types are discovered. 
Some studies were concerned with comprehending the security bugs’ (vulnerabilities) 
characteristics (e.g., Tan et al. [89], Huynh et al. [104], Wal et al. [108], Anba et al. [110], Ye et 
al. [83], Wijayasekara et al. [92], and Wijayasekara et al. [99]). For example, Tan et al. [89] 
studied the bug characteristics in open-source software (e.g., the Linux kernel, Mozilla, and 
Apache). They used bug related vulnerabilities (2,060 vulnerability reports) from the NVD 
repository and manually studied these bugs in three dimensions—root causes, impacts, and 
components. Some studies focused on analyzing vulnerabilities’ characteristics for web 
applications, as discussed in papers [108] and [104]. Some papers studied vulnerabilities 
characteristics that affect certain development platforms such as Linux environment [110]. Also, 
some studies investigated common vulnerabilities attacks. Ye et al. [83] performed a quantitative 
and qualitative study on static buffer overflow detection. The data was collected from buggy and 
fixed versions of 100 buffer overflow bugs from 63 real-world projects based on the 
vulnerability reports from the CVE dataset.  
Wijayasekara et al. [92] and [99] mined bug databases for unidentified software 
vulnerabilities. The authors claimed that it has been suggested in previous work that some bugs 
are only identified as vulnerabilities long after the bug has been made public. These 
vulnerabilities are known as hidden impact vulnerabilities. Wijayasekara et al. presented a 
vulnerability analysis from January 2006 to April 2011 for two well-known software packages: 
Linux kernel and MySQL. They showed that 32% (Linux) and 62% (MySQL) of vulnerabilities 
discovered in this time period were hidden impact vulnerabilities. The study also showed that the 
percentage of hidden impact vulnerabilities has increased from 25% to 36% in Linux and from 
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59% to 65% in MySQL in the last two years. They used CVE database as the source of 
vulnerabilities for the studied subjects.  
Liu et al. [98] presented an empirical study to improve vulnerability rating and scoring 
system (VRSS-based) vulnerability prioritization using an analytic hierarchy process. They 
analyzed 11, 395 CVE vulnerabilities to expose the differences among three current vulnerability 
evaluation systems (IBM Internet Security Systems (ISS) X-Force [117] , Common Vulnerability 
Scoring System (CVSS) [118], and Vulnerability Rating Systems (VRSS) [119]). 
Papers introduced by Goseva-Popstojanova et al. [97] and Smith et al. [101] used machine 
learning algorithms to classify software vulnerabilities. For example, Goseva-Popstojanova et al. 
[97] used multiclass machine learning methods to classify malicious behaviors aimed at web 
systems—Web 2.0 applications (i.e., a blog and wiki). They used the vulnerability data from 
OWASP, NVD, and SecurityFocus. Smith et al. [101] showed a classification method of 
detecting different types of web application vulnerabilities (subject systems are WordPress, a 
blogging application, and WikkaWiki, a wiki management engine). The authors relied on the 
vulnerabilities types extracted from the CWE database. 
Last, we found empirical studies that used SVDBs information in investigating 
vulnerabilities impacts on the software stock market (e.g., [112]). In their paper, Telang et al. 
[112] completed an empirical analysis of the impact of software vulnerability announcements on 
firm stock price. They collected data from leading national newspapers and industry sources, 
such as the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), by searching for reports on published 
software vulnerabilities. The researchers showed that vulnerability announcements lead to a 





The common use of SVDBs in this SE task is downloading/extracting vulnerability 
information for the subject systems. In some cases, exploratory studies were more involved 
in comprehending the vulnerability behaviour (e.g., trends and life cycle) by extracting the 




Modeling in SE research is primarily concerned with reducing the gap between software 
problems and implementation through the use of models that describe complex systems at 
multiple levels of abstraction and from a variety of perspectives [120]. Table 6 summarizes the 
surveyed articles classified in this SE task, showing title of each article, publication year, name 
of the used SVDB, and what the SVDB was used for. 
 
Table 6: SE articles using SVDBs in SE modeling task 
Reference Title of Paper Year SVDBs How SVDBs Used 
Alqahtani  et al. [44] 




information.   
Morrison et al. [121] 





Modeling secure coding 
practices knowledge.  
Ilo et al. [63] 
Combining Software 






Chatzipoulidis et al. 
[60] 
Information Infrastructure Risk 
Prediction Through Platform 
Vulnerability Analysis 
2015 NVD 
Used vulnerability measures 
information.  
Scandariato et al. [61] 
Predicting Vulnerable Software 
Components via Text Mining 
2014 NVD 
Extracted seven 
vulnerability reports related 
to Android apps.  
Murtaza et al. [122] 
Total ADS: Automated Software 
Anomaly Detection System 
2014 CVE 
Downloaded specific 
vulnerabilities examples.  
Milenkoski et al. 
[123] 
Experience Report: An Analysis of 




Shar et al. [62] 
Mining SQL Injection and Cross 
Site Scripting Vulnerabilities Using 





information.   
Berger et al. [58] 
Extracting and Analyzing the 
Implemented Security Architecture 
of Business Applications 
2013 CWE 
Extracted vulnerability 
attacks examples.  
Almorsy et al. [124] 
Automated Software Architecture 




security pattern attacks. 
Shar et al. [125] 
Predicting Common Web 
Application Vulnerabilities from 





Almorsy et al. [126] 
Supporting Automated 





information and attack 
types.  
Gauthier et al. [127] 
Fast Detection of Access Control 





number of vulnerability 
information.  
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Wu et al. [64] 
Empirical Results on the Study of 
Software Vulnerabilities (NIER 
Track) 
2011 CWE, CVE 
Modeling vulnerability 
attack and relations with 
software projects. 
Pham et al. [65] 
Detecting Recurring and Similar 
Software Vulnerabilities 
2010 CERT and CVE 
Downloaded and analyzed 
2, 598 vulnerabilities.  
Anbalagan et al. [66] 
Towards a Unifying Approach in 
Understanding Security Problems 
2009 OSVDB, NVD 
Downloaded and analyzed 
43, 710 vulnerabilities.  
Cavusoglu et al. [67] 
Efficiency of Vulnerability 




Downloaded and studied the 
disclosure policy of 
vulnerabilities reports.  
Xu et al. [128] 
Threat-Driven Modeling and 
Verification of Secure Software 
Using Aspect-Oriented Petri Nets 
2006 SecurityFocus 
Studied specific 
vulnerability attacks.  
Byers et al. [129] 
Modeling Software Vulnerabilities 
With Vulnerability Cause Graphs 
2006 CVE 
Used vulnerability 
information as a case study.  
 
Table 6 shows articles classified in this SE task. We manually classified these articles based 
on their content into four categories: knowledge modeling papers, vulnerability prediction 
models papers, threat modeling papers, and others. In what follows, we provide a summary of 
each article in each category.  
 
Knowledge modeling. In our survey, this SE task (i.e., modeling) often uses SVDBs as a source 
of knowledge modeling for vulnerability analysis and interlinking (e.g., Alqahtani et al. [44], 
Morrison et al. [121], Ilo et al. [63], Wu et al. [64], Pham et al. [65], Anbalagan et al. [66], and 
Cavusoglu et al. [67]). Alqahtani et al. [44] introduced a vulnerability analysis framework based 
on Semantic Web technologies, and used NVD as an example of SVDBs that can be integrated 
with SE knowledge sources (e.g., source code repositories, issue tracker systems) to study 
software security evolution. In other related work, Ilo et al. [63] introduced abstract research, 
which proposed an ontology for the semantic modeling of the relationships between SE 
ecosystems as linked data. They also proposed to evaluate their approach by integrating the data 
of several ecosystems (Maven29 and NVD) and demonstrated its usefulness by creating tools for 
vulnerability notification and license violation detection. Wu et al. [64] proposed organizing the 
information in project repositories around semantic templates (semantic templates are 
generalized patterns of relationship between software elements and faults, and their association 
with known higher level phenomena in the security domain [130]). In this paper the authors 
presented preliminary results of an experiment conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of using 
                                                     
29 https://search.maven.org/ 
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semantic templates as an aid to studying software vulnerabilities. In the experiment they used 
several reported vulnerabilities in the Apache Web Server from NVD. 
We found SVDBs used as a knowledge source for software security practices—for example, 
Morrison et al. [121] who proposed a security practices evaluation framework. The goal of their 
framework is to aid software practitioners in evaluating security practice use in the development 
process by defining and validating a measurement framework for software development security 
practice use and outcomes. For evaluating the framework they proposed the use of historical data 
and industrial projects from different repositories such as OWASP and NVD. 
By using vulnerabilities from OSVDB and NVD, Anbalagan et al. [66] discussed a model 
that captures software systems vulnerabilities status including the type of vulnerabilities, their 
disclosure status, exploit status, and their correction status. They mapped vulnerabilities for 
Bugzilla and FEDORA products to the model, with the goal to estimate model parameters in 
terms of studying the relationship between security problems and security exploits. In related 
work, Pham et al. [65] showed an approach to detecting recurring and similar software 
vulnerabilities. They proposed SecureSync, an automatic approach to detect and provide 
suggested resolutions for recurring software vulnerabilities on multiple systems sharing/using 
similar code or API libraries. They extracted and analyzed vulnerabilities reports from the US-
CERT database. Additionally, the authors used some vulnerability information from the CVE 
database. 
Cavusoglu et al. [67] studied how vulnerabilities should be disclosed to minimize the 
associated social loss. The authors developed a game-theoretical model [67] in which the 
coordinator minimizes the societal loss, which includes both damage to vulnerable firms and the 
patch development cost to the software vendor. The proposed model consists of four 
stakeholders in the vulnerability knowledge dissemination process: software developer (vendor), 
software deployers (firms), vulnerability identifier (benign user or hacker), and central 
coordinator (CERT30).  
 
Vulnerability Prediction Models (VPM). We also found that the surveyed articles in this SE task 
used SVDBs for VPMs (e.g., Chatzipoulidis et al. [60], Scandariato et al. [61], Shar et al. [62], 
and Shar et al. [125]). VPM is a field of study which aims at automatically classifying software 
                                                     
30 Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT): https://www.us-cert.gov/ 
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entities as vulnerable or not. For example, Shar et al. [62] and [125] showed a machine learning 
technique to predict common web application’s vulnerabilities from input validation and 
sanitization code patterns. They proposed a set of static code attributes that represent the 
characteristics of input validation and sanitization routines for predicting the two most common 
web application vulnerabilities—SQL injection and cross site scripting. The test subjects’ 
vulnerability information was extracted from the SecurityFocus repository and CVE dataset. In 
related work, Scandariato et al. [61] presented an approach based on machine learning to predict 
which components of a software application contain security vulnerabilities. The approach is 
based on text mining the source code of the components.  
Chatzipoulidis et al. [60] aimed to provide a complementary approach to existing 
vulnerability prediction solutions and launched the measurement of zero-day risk by introducing 
a risk prediction methodology for an information infrastructure. The practicality of the risk 
prediction methodology is demonstrated with an implementation example from the electronic 
banking sector and vulnerability information extracted from NVD. 
 
Threat Modeling. Some of the surveyed articles in this SE task introduced threat modeling 
approaches (e.g., Berger  et al. [58], Xu et al. [128]) using SVDBs as a knowledge source. Threat 
modeling is an approach for analyzing the security of an application [131]. It is a structured 
approach that enables you to identify, quantify, and address the security risks associated with an 
application [131]. Berger et al. [58] proposed a technique that automatically extracts the 
implemented security architecture of Java-based business applications from the source code. 
They carried out threat modeling on this extracted architecture to detect security flaws. To create 
the proposed approach’s knowledge base containing well-known threats as well as possible 
mitigations, the researchers inspected the CWE database which lists a number of security 
problems and their consequences, as well as potential mitigations. Xu et al. [128] presented a 
formal threat-driven model approach which explores explicit behaviors of security threats as the 
mediator between security goals and applications of security features. They demonstrated their 
approach through a systematic case study on the threat-driven modeling and verification of a 




Others. Last, we find other papers in this SE task that introduce modeling approaches with help 
from SVDBs information. For example the use of SVDBs in modeling specific vulnerabilities for 
anomaly detection (e.g., Murtaza et al. [122]), using SVDBs information to model and 
understand hypercall 31  handler vulnerabilities (e.g., Milenkoski et al. [123]), defining and 
modeling formal vulnerabilities signatures by using vulnerabilities signatures provided by 
SVDBs (e.g., Almorsy et al. [124], Almorsy et al. [126]), and locating the vulnerability root 
cause by modeling SVDBs vulnerabilities based on the vulnerability cause graph technique (e.g., 




3.4.3 Source Code: Vulnerability Analysis 
Source code vulnerability analysis is a static/dynamic analysis method destined to analyze the 
source code and/or compiled versions of code to help find security flaws [132]. Table 7 
summarizes the articles classified in this SE task, showing the title of each article, publication 
year, name of the used SVDB, and what the SVDB was used for. 
 
Table 7: SE articles using SVDBs in vulnerability analysis 
Reference Title of Paper Year SVDBs How SVDBs Used 
Wang et al. [74] deExploit: Identifying Misuses of 
Input Data to Diagnose Memory-
Corruption Exploits at the Binary 
Level 
2017 Exploit-DB Downloaded selected exploit codes. 
Sampaio et al. [52] Exploring Context-Sensitive 
Data Flow Analysis for Early 
Vulnerability Detection 
2016 OWASP Investigated vulnerability source code and 
security attack examples. 
Nguyen et al. [133] An Automatic Method for 
Assessing the Versions Affected 
by a Vulnerability 
2016 NVD The authors downloaded vulnerable releases. 
                                                     
31 Hypercalls are software traps (i.e., interrupts) from a kernel of a fully or partially para-virtualized guest Virtual Machine (VM) to the 
hypervisor. 
From our surveyed papers, we find that the common use of SVDBs in this SE task manifold 
in three reasons: extract vulnerabilities information from SVDBs to improve vulnerability 
prediction/detection models, to trace and localize vulnerability in software systems, and to 
enrich proposed frameworks for software security practices.  
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Gao et al. [75] BovInspector: Automatic 





Selected vulnerable releases, and used CVE 
information as motivation example in the 
introduction and related work. 
Ming et al. [134] StraightTaint: Decoupled Offline 
Symbolic Taint Analysis 
2016 CVE The authors extracted specific vulnerabilities 
from CVE . 
Thome et al. [73] Security Slicing for Auditing 
XML, XPath, and SQL Injection 
Vulnerabilities 
2015 OWASP Downloaded vulnerable web applications. 
Theisen et al. [135] Approximating Attack Surfaces 
with Stack Traces 
2015 NVD Downloaded vulnerable releases of 
Windows. 
Renatus et al. 
[136] 
Improving Prioritization of 
Software Weaknesses Using 
Security Models with AVUS 
2015 CWE and 
CVSS 
Used for rating and classification. 
Pasaribu et al. [68] Input Injection Detection in Java 
Code 
2014 CVE and 
OWASP 
Downloaded vulnerable web applications.  
Zheng et al. [69] Path Sensitive Static Analysis of 
Web Applications for Remote 





The authors used specialized vulnerable web 
apps that suffer from remote code execution. 
Coker et al. [137] Program Transformations to Fix 
C Integers 
2013 SRD and 
CWE 
Downloaded vulnerable applications and 
vulnerability information. 
Ofuonye et al. 
[138] 
Securing Web-Clients with 
Instrumented Code and Dynamic 
Runtime Monitoring 
2013 MS bulletins Use one vulnerability example for case 
study.   
Møller et al. [70] Automated Detection of Client-
State Manipulation 
Vulnerabilities 
2012 OWASP The authors downloaded vulnerable web 
applications and vulnerability information. 
Bernat et al. [139] Structured Binary Editing with a 
CFG Transformation Algebra 
2012 NVD The authors downloaded CVEs for Apache 
subject system. 
Shahriar et al. [71] Client-Side Detection of Cross-
Site Request Forgery Attacks 
2010 OSVDB Downloaded vulnerable projects. 
Wassermann et al. 
[72] 
Static Detection of Cross-Site 
Scripting Vulnerabilities 
2008 CVE The authors used CVE vulnerability 
examples. 
 
Our survey shows a focus of research activity related to static (and dynamic) analysis 
research. Static analysis is performed in a non-runtime environment [140]. Typically static 
analysis research will focus on inspecting program code for all possible run-time behaviors and 
seek out coding flaws, back doors, and potentially malicious code. Dynamic analysis adopts the 
opposite approach and is executed while a program is in operation [140]. SVDBs in this context 
are often used as a source of validating the proposed approaches with known vulnerability 
attacks, understanding specific types of security attacks, tracking and evaluating the attacks 
patterns, and checking and investigating the root cause of the attack in the source code.   
We found that articles classified in this SE task are dedicated to static analysis to detect and 
analyze known security vulnerabilities (e.g., Thome et al. [73], Pasaribu et al. [68], Zheng et al. 
[69], Møller et al. [70], Shahriar et al. [71], Wassermann et al. [72] and Coker et al. [137]). For 
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example, Thome et al. [73] introduced an approach to assist security auditors by defining and 
experimenting with pruning techniques to reduce original program slices to what they refer to as 
security slices. The approach focused on extracting relevant security vulnerabilities implemented 
in web application source code such as XMLi [141], XPathi [142], and SQLi vulnerabilities. The 
authors validated their approach on vulnerable web applications downloaded from the OWASP 
repository. Pasaribu et al. [68] introduced a tool for input injection (SQL injection, command 
injection, and cross-site scripting) detection in java code. The authors extended an existing static 
analysis tool—FindBugs32—for input injection detection. The tool was verified on vulnerable 
web applications, WebGoat from OWASP and ADempiere 33  vulnerable version from CVE. 
Zheng et al. [69] used a static analysis approach to detect Remote Code Execution (RCE) attacks 
in web apps. They proposed a path- and context-sensitive interprocedural analysis to detect RCE 
vulnerabilities. The authors used selected vulnerable web apps that suffer from remote code 
execution. Shahriar et al. [71] and Wassermann et al. [72] used static analysis techniques to 
detect Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) and Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities attacks 
in web applications, respectively. Shahriar et al.’s [71] approach relies on the matching of 
parameters and values present in a suspected request with a form’s input fields and values that 
are displayed on a webpage. They validated their approach on web applications that have been 
reported to contain CSRF in OSVDB. Wassermann et al. [72] presented a static analysis for 
finding XSS vulnerabilities that directly addresses weak or absent input validation. The proposed 
approach combines work on tainted information flow with string analysis. The approach is 
evaluated in web applications and finds both known and unknown vulnerabilities using 
vulnerabilities information extracted from CVE database. 
Møller et al. [70] introduced an approach for automated detection of client-state manipulation 
vulnerabilities in web applications. They presented a static analysis for frameworks such as Java 
Servlets, JSP, and Apache Struts. Given a web application archive as input, the analysis 
identifies occurrences of client state and infers the information flow between the client state and 
the shared application state on the server. To validate their proposed approach, the researchers 
ran experiments on a collection of open source web applications, some of them introduced as 
vulnerable apps from OWASP. 




Coker et al. [137] discussed static program transformations to fix C integers. The paper 
describes three program transformations that fix C integer problems—one explicitly introduces 
casts to disambiguate type mismatch, another adds runtime checks to arithmetic operations, and 
the third one changes the type of a wrongly-declared integer. The authors validated their 
proposed approach on dataset from NIST’s SAMATE reference dataset34 and CWE information.  
Dynamic analysis research on monitoring web applications security is discussed in [138] and 
[139]. Ofuonye et al. [138] introduced an approach to securing web-clients with instrumented 
code and dynamic runtime monitoring. The proposed approach seeks to isolate exploitable 
security vulnerabilities and enforce runtime policies against malicious code constructs. To 
validate their approach the authors used four case studies, and for one of them they used a 
publicly available proprietary vulnerability database (Microsoft bulletins). Bernat et al. [139] 
introduced a dynamic approach for structured binary editing with control flow graph (CFG) 
transformation algebra. They defined an algebra of CFG transformations that is closed under a 
CFG validity constraint, thus ensuring that users can arbitrarily compose these transformations 
while preserving structural validity. They demonstrated the usefulness of their approach by 
creating a patching tool that closes three vulnerabilities (extracted from NVD repository) in a 
running Apache HTTPD server without interrupting the server’s execution.  
A hybrid vulnerability analysis approach has been discussed in the security topic taint 
analysis. Taint analysis approach has been widely applied in ex post facto security applications, 
such as computer forensics, attack provenance investigation, and reverse engineering. Ming et al. 
[134] developed StraightTaint, a hybrid taint analysis tool that decouples the program execution 
and taint analysis. In order to test the accuracy of their approach/tool, they used CVE data to test 
the accuracy of the taint analysis task in terms of software attack detection.   
Among the surveyed papers, research includes work on locating vulnerable source code, 
identifying attack surface, and prioritizing vulnerability impacts using static analysis tools (e.g., 
Nguyen et al. [133], Theisen et al. [135], Renatus et al. [136], and Sampaio et al. [52]). When a 
vulnerability is disclosed, it may impact organizations which rely on retro versions of the 
software. Nguyen et al. [133] proposed an automated method to determine the code evidence for 
the presence of vulnerabilities in retro software versions. Identifying the vulnerable code in retro 
versions is based on identifying the lines of code that were changed to fix vulnerabilities. To 
                                                     
34 https://samate.nist.gov/SRD/ 
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show the scalability of the method, the authors performed experiments on Chrome and Firefox 
(spanning 7, 236 vulnerable files and approximately 9, 800 vulnerabilities) on NVD. Theisen et 
al. [135] proposed an approach that approximates attack surfaces with stack traces. An approach 
for identifying vulnerable code is to identify its attack surface, the sum of all paths for untrusted 
data into and out of a system. The experiments were conducted on datasets collected for 
Windows 8. However, the dataset used in this experiment to characterize the vulnerabilities in 
Windows is data from NVD. Sampaio et al. [52] discussed context-sensitive data flow analysis 
for early vulnerability detection. The authors showed two goals of their proposed approach: (1) 
they proposed to perform continuous detection of security vulnerabilities while the developer is 
editing each program statement, also known as early detection; and (2) they explored context-
sensitive data flow analysis (DFA) for improving vulnerability detection and mitigating the 
limitations of pattern matching. They used the OWASP repository as the source for vulnerability 
information for their method implementation. Renatus et al. [136] provided a tool to improve 
prioritization of software weaknesses using security models. The authors introduced a 
lightweight tool, the Augmented Vulnerability Scoring (AVUS) tool that adjusts context-free 
ratings of software weakness according to user defined security model. The tool is based on 
information from CWE databases and CVSS scoring schema.   
Wang et al. [74] and Gao et al. [75] used static analysis approaches to diagnose and resolve 
memory vulnerabilities and to detect buffer-overflow issues, respectively. Wang et al. [74] 
proposed an approach for detecting memory corruption at the binary level by identifying the 
misuse of input data and presented an exploit diagnosis approach called deExploit. The authors 
evaluated their approach with several binary programs extracted from a publicly available 
exploits database (Exploit-DB). Gao et al. [75] presented BovInspector, a tool framework for 
automatic static buffer overflow warnings inspection and validated bugs repair. The tool takes 
two inputs—program source code and vulnerability warning—and performs a warning 
reachability analysis. The tool was evaluated against selected vulnerable projects from different 





3.4.4 Security Testing 
Testing can be classified utilizing the three dimensions of flow, scales, and characteristics [143] 
shown in Figure 10. Test flow explains where tests are derived from, scripting/coding (white-
box) or requirements (black-box). Test scale describes the granularity of the system under test 
(SUT) and can be unit testing or anything up to system testing. The test characteristics are the 
reason or purpose for designing and executing a test, for example testing the system’s 
functionality, robustness, capacity, or usability.  
 
 
Figure 10: Types of testing in SE [143].  
 
Model-based testing is “the automation of test design”. Tests are generated automatically 
from a model of SUT [144]. Because test suites are derived from models and not from source 
code, model-based testing is usually seen as a form of black-box testing [144].  
Researchers in SE use static and dynamic analysis approaches to locate vulnerable code 
and analyze known security vulnerabilities (e.g., XSS and CSRF). A common use of SVDBs 




Identifying vulnerabilities and ensuring security functionality by security testing is a widely 
applied measure to evaluate and improve the security of software. Software security testing is a 
process intended to reveal flaws in the security mechanisms of information systems that protect 
data and maintain functionality as intended [145]. 
Our survey provides an overview of the security testing techniques used in SE research. 
Table 8 summarizes the articles classified in this SE task, showing the title of each article, 
publication year, name of the used SVDB, and what the SVDB was used for.  
Table 8: SE articles using SVDBs in security testing task 
Reference Title of Paper Year SVDBs How SVDBs Used 
Stivalet  et al. 
[78] 
Large Scale Generation of 
Complex and Faulty PHP Test 
Cases 
2016 CWE and 
OWASP 
Used vulnerabilities information 
for comprehending security 
attacks.  
Ceccato  et al. 
[76] 
SOFIA: An Automated Security 
Oracle for Black-Box Testing of 
SQL-Injection Vulnerabilities 
2016 CVE Downloaded vulnerable web 
applications and web services 
affected by SQL injection.  
Pham et al. 
[77] 
Model-Based Whitebox Fuzzing 
for Program Binaries 
2016 OSVDB and 
CVE 
Downloaded vulnerable projects. 
Palsetia et al. 
[53] 
Securing Native XML Database-
Driven Web Applications from 
XQuery Injection Vulnerabilities 
2016 OWASP Used security guidelines.  
Bozic et al. 
[54] 
Evaluation of the IPO-Family 
Algorithms for Test Case 
Generation in Web Security 
Testing 
2015 OWASP and 
Exploit-DB 
Downloaded vulnerable web 
applications. 
Appelt et al. 
[146] 
Behind an Application Firewall, 
Are We Safe from SQL Injection 
Attacks? 
2015 OWASP Used the database as a knowledge 
source to comprehend SQL 
injection attack. 
Pham et al. 
[147] 
Hercules: Reproducing Crashes in 
Real-World Application Binaries 
2015 CVE Downloaded selected CVEs 
vulnerabilities reports. 
Aydin et al. 
[148] 
Automated Test Generation from 
Vulnerability Signatures 
2014 OWASP Downloaded vulnerable web 
applications. 
Hossen et al. 
[149] 
Automatic Generation of Test 
Drivers for Model Inference of 
Web Applications 
2013 OWASP Downloaded vulnerable web 
applications. 
Blome et al. 
[150] 
VERA: A Flexible Model-Based 
Vulnerability Testing Tool 
2013 OWASP Downloaded vulnerable web 
applications. 
Lebeau et al. 
[151] 
Model-Based Vulnerability 
Testing for Web Applications 
2013 CAPEC and 
OWASP 
Used vulnerability knowledge and 
types of security attacks. 
Buchler et al. 
[152] 
SPaCiTE -- Web Application 
Testing Engine 
2012 OWASP Downloaded Webgoat, a 
vulnerable web application. 
Zhang et al. 
[153] 
SimFuzz: Test Case Similarity 





Extracted 100 buffer overflow 
vulnerabilities.  
Shahriar et al. 
[154] 
MUTEC: Mutation-Based Testing 
of Cross Site Scripting 
2009 OSVDB Downloaded five open source web 
applications suffering from Cross 
Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability.   
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The surveyed papers in this SE task used SVDBs information to perform security testing and 
techniques in different aspects such as black-box testing (including model-based testing) as 
discussed in Ceccato et al. [76], Palsetia et al. [53], Appelt et al. [146], Aydin et al. [148], 
Hossen et al. [149], Blome et al. [150], Lebeau et al. [151], and Buchler et al. [152].  
 
Black box and model-based testing. Black-box and model-based security testing are testing 
techniques that describe how a system securely behaves in response to an action (determined by 
a model). Ceccato et al. [76] introduced SOFIA, a security oracle for black-box testing of SQL-
injection vulnerabilities. The main purpose of SOFIA is to detect types of SQLi attacks. The 
proposed approach validated vulnerable web applications that use SQL relational database and 
has known vulnerabilities published in the CVE dataset.   
Palsetia et al. [53] proposed a black-box fuzzing approach to detect different types of 
XQuery injection vulnerabilities in web applications driven by “native XML databases”35. The 
primary objective of the proposed method for detecting XQuery injection vulnerabilities is based 
on OWASP guidelines in native XML database-driven web applications. 
Appelt et al. [146] focused on web application firewalls and SQL injection attacks. They 
presented a black-box (machine learning-based) testing approach to detect holes in firewalls that 
let SQL injection attacks bypass. They developed a tool that implements the approach and 
evaluated it on ModSecurity36, a widely used application firewall provided by the OWASP 
project. 
Aydin et al. [148] showed that vulnerability signatures computed for deliberately insecure 
web applications (developed for demonstrating different types of vulnerabilities) can be used to 
generate test cases for other applications. Their proposed approach is a black-box specification-
based testing approach. The authors used a deliberately insecure web application called Damn 
Vulnerable Web Application (DVWA) listed in the OWASP broken web applications project. 
Hossen et al. [149] proposed automatic generation of test drivers for model inference of web 
applications. The authors have applied the method on WebGoat. WebGoat is organized in 
lessons; the goal of a lesson is to show a type of vulnerability and its corresponding attack. The 
                                                     
35 http://www.rpbourret.com/xml/ProdsNative.htm  
36 https://www.modsecurity.org/ 
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authors chose the stored cross-site scripting (XSS) lesson, which has a demonstrated 
vulnerability in the Top10 within OWASP. 
Blome et al. [150] introduced VERA—a flexible model-based vulnerability testing tool. The 
proposed method is a tool that allows users to define attacker models where the payloads and the 
behavior are separated and that abstract away from low-level implementation details such as 
HTTP requests. The researchers give two examples of Injection flaws: Cross Site Scripting and 
SQL Injection using information from WebGoat extracted from the OWASP database. Lebeau et 
al. [151] introduced model-based vulnerability testing for web applications. The approach is 
based on a mixed modeling of the application under test; the specification indeed captures some 
behavioral aspects of the web application and includes vulnerability test purposes to drive the 
test generation algorithm. This approach is illustrated with the widely-used DVWA example. 
Buchler et al. [152] presented a model checking tool called SPaCiTE - Web Application 
Testing Engine. The proposed tool relies on a dedicated model-checker for security analyses that 
generates potential attacks with regard to common vulnerabilities in web applications. The 
authors applied SPaCiTE to Role-Based-Access-Control (RBAC) and Cross-Site Scripting 
(XSS) lessons of WebGoat, an insecure web application maintained by OWASP.  
 
Hybrid approaches. We found papers that used a combination of different testing approaches, 
such as model-based white box testing approach (e.g., Pham et al. [77]), and an article that 
combined different approaches such as black box fuzzing, code analysis, and combination (i.e., 
combinatorial) testing (e.g., Zhang et al. [153]). 
Pham  et al. [77] presented Model-based Whitebox Fuzzing (MoWF), an automated testing 
technique for program binaries that process structured inputs. MoWF is a combination of model-
based black box fuzzing and white box fuzzing. They evaluated their approach on 13 
vulnerabilities in 8 program binaries with 6 separate file formats, and compared the explored 
vulnerabilities with ones from OSVD and CVE public databases.   
Zhang et al. [153] proposed a fuzzing approach aimed to produce test inputs to explore deep 
program semantics. The fuzzing process integrates techniques from black-box fuzzing, code 
analysis, and combination testing. The main purpose of the approach is to detect memory 
corruption vulnerabilities such as buffer overflow and pointer out-of-boundary operations. The 
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authors used top 100 buffer overflow vulnerabilities from searching the vulnerabilities of NVD, 
SecurityFocus, and SecurityTracker. 
 
Others. Other papers used SVDBs information in testing approaches such as the combinatorial 
testing approach discussed in Bozic et al. [54], and symbolic execution testing explained in Pham 
et al. [147]. In this category are also mutation-based testing introduced in Shahriar et al. [154] 
and test case generator tool for PHP introduced in Stivalet et al. [78]. 
Bozic et al. [54] evaluated in-parameter-order (IPO-Family) algorithms, namely the IPOG 
and IPOG-F algorithms, for test case generation in web security testing by using a combinatorial 
testing approach. They validated the proposed approach on vulnerable web applications 
published in the OWASP Broken Project37 and in the Exploit Database38. 
Pham et al. [147] presented the design and evaluation of the Hercules approach for finding 
test inputs which can reproduce a given crash. The approach is based on symbolic execution and 
its distinctive features. The test input generated by their method serves as a witness of the crash. 
They illustrated the pertinent aspects of the approach using data from the CVE database.   
Shahriar et al. [154] introduced an approach called MUTEC, a Mutation-based Testing of 
Cross Site Scripting. The approach tries to address XSS vulnerabilities related to web-
applications that use PHP and JavaScript code to generate dynamic HTML contents. Shahriar et 
al. proposed 11 mutation operators to force the generation of an adequate test dataset. The 
proposed operators were validated by using five open source applications having XSS extracted 
from the OSVDB repository.  
Stivalet et al. [78] presented an automated generator of test cases, which are designed to 
evaluate source code security analyzers. The tool produces PHP programs with most common 
vulnerabilities embedded in various code complexities. The authors used CWE weakness dataset 
and OWASP vulnerabilities categories to generate selected PHP programs test cases. The 
generated PHP test cases were added to the Software Assurance Reference Dataset (SARD). 
 






3.4.5 Risk Analysis and Management  
Some software development projects still have high failure rates [155]. A diversity of risk 
management approaches are suggested by researchers and followed by organizations in order to 
minimize the failure rate and ensure project success [155]. In particular, risk management is all 
about perception and detection of sources of risks through the different phases of software 
development [155]. Table 9 summarizes the articles classified in this SE task, showing the title 
of each article, publication year, name of the used SVDB, and what the SVDB was used for. 
 
Table 9: SE articles using SVDBs in risk analysis and management 
Reference Title of Paper Year SVDBs How SVDBs Used 
Plate et al. [156] Impact Assessment for Vulnerabilities 
in Open-Source Software Libraries 
2015 NVD Downloaded specific vulnerable releases.  
Yu et al. [157] Automated Analysis of Security 
Requirements Through Risk-Based 
Argumentation 
2015 CWE and 
CAPEC 
Used vulnerability mitigation guidelines.  
Cox et al.[158] Measuring Dependency Freshness in 
Software Systems 
2015 CVE Downloaded and extracted vulnerability 
information such as disclosure date.  
Kannavara et al. 
[159] 
Assessing the Threat Landscape for 
Software Libraries 
2014 CWE and 
CAPEC 
Downloaded types of vulnerabilities 
attacks and patterns. 
Kannavara et al. 
[160] 
Securing Opensource Code via Static 
Analysis 
2012 NVD Map defined vulnerabilities to known 
vulnerabilities in NVD entries.  
Houmb et al. 
[161] 
Quantifying Security Risk Level from 
CVSS Estimates of Frequency and 
Impact 
2010 CVSS The authors used severity score system.   
Fruhwirth et al. 
[162] 
Improving CVSS-Based Vulnerability 
Prioritization and Response with 
Context Information 
2009 NVD Extracted severity scores from sample 
number of vulnerabilities reports. 
Boldt et al. [163] Software Vulnerability Assessment 
Version Extraction and Verification 
2007 OSVDB Found publicly disclosed vulnerabilities 
for specific projects. 
 
The surveyed articles in this SE task focused on assessing security vulnerability threats and 
impacts on software systems.  
 
Among the articles being classified under this SE task (i.e., software security testing), the 
common use of SVDBs is to generate security test cases and validate the testing approaches 
on real-world vulnerable applications.  
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Open source threat and impact assessment. We found 3 articles (Plate et al. [156], Kannavara et 
al. [159], and Kannavara et al. [160]) discussing the risk of adopting open source components 
(e.g., libraries) in the development environment. For example, Plate et al. [156] proposed an 
approach to support the impact assessment based on the analysis of code changes introduced by 
security fixes of open source libraries. For the evaluation, the authors depended on 
vulnerabilities from the NVD database. Kannavara et al. [159] sought to assess the threat 
landscape associated with software open source libraries and discussed mitigation strategies via 
Security Development Lifecycle (SDL). The used datasets in this research were from CWE and 
CAPEC for common vulnerability attack patterns. Kannavara et al. [160] attempted to some 
extent to address open source code security challenges by applying static analysis on a popular 
open source project (i.e., Linux kernel). Based on their analysis, the authors proposed an 
alternate workflow that can be adopted while incorporating open source software in a 
commercial software development process. For the vulnerability analysis part, the authors used 
CVE information for Linux kernel in the NVD repository.   
 
Assessing security requirement. Yu et al. [157] discussed automated analysis of security 
requirements through risk-based argumentation. The authors’ earlier work on RISA (RIsk 
assessment in Security Argumentation) showed that informal risk assessment can complement 
the formal analysis of security requirements. They incorporated an automated search 
functionality to match catalogues of security vulnerabilities such as CAPEC and CWE with the 
keywords derived from the arguments.  
 
Vulnerability impact and severity assessment systems. We found two articles (Houmb et al. [161] 
and Fruhwirth et al. [162]) discussing the CVSS system risk estimation and improvements. The 
CVSS aids in such prioritization by providing a metric for the severity of vulnerabilities. For 
example, Houmb et al. [161] presented a risk estimation approach that makes use of one such 
data source, the CVSS. The CVSS Risk Level Estimation estimates a security risk level from 
vulnerability information as a combination of frequency and impact estimates derived from the 
CVSS. Fruhwirth et al. [162] introduced an approach for improving CVSS-based vulnerability 
prioritization and response with context information. They claim the CVSS scores provided by 
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the NVD alone are of limited use for vulnerability prioritization in practice. They presented a 
method that enables practitioners to estimate missing context information (improvements).  
Last, we find articles assessing the software versions security and updates (e.g., Boldt et al. 
[163] and Cox et al. [158]). Boldt et al. [163] introduced a method for software vulnerability 
assessment—version extraction and verification. A tool is proposed for identifying relevant 
version information and for verifying potential threats matched against a software vulnerability 
database (based on OSVDB). Cox et al. [158] aimed to make prioritization of the software 
libraries updates more transparent by introducing metrics to quantify the use of recent versions of 
dependencies (i.e., the system’s “dependency freshness”). They validated the usefulness of the 
metric using interviews, analyzed the variance of the metric through time, and investigated the 




3.4.6 Other Tasks 
Our survey also showed that SE researchers used SVDBs for domains not associated with any of 
our manual classes mentioned in the above sub-sections. Mendes et al. [56] proposed a 
methodology for benchmarking the security of software-based systems. The vulnerabilities 
information for the subject systems were crawled from OSVDB and NVD data sources. Min et 
al. [79] proposed a technique for counteracting web browser exploits. The approach was 
validated on two vulnerable applications versions (Flash and Adobe Reader) extracted from the 
CVE database.  
 
3.5 Study Implications 
In this section, we organize the results of our mapping study of the surveyed articles and present 
a discussion on the common pitfalls when using SVDBs for SE tasks. 
The common use of SVDBs within this SE task is to investigate vulnerabilities impacts on 
OSS libraries, to elicit security requirements through risk-based argumentation, and 




3.5.1 How the Surveyed Articles Used SVDBs for Different SE Tasks 
For each task, we look at two dimensions: (1) the SVDB that is used, and (2) the repositories that 
are used along with the SVDB. In other words, given a SE task, we want to answer the questions 
of which SVDB is usually used and which SE repositories are often used along with SVDBs. 
The results may help new researchers (and practitioners) determine how to best use SVDBs to a 
particular SE task. 
Table 10 shows how the surveyed articles support each of the SE tasks. We focus on the six 
tasks that we previously identified (see Table 4), and we show the percentage of the surveyed 
articles that used each kind of SVDBs and SE repository. We found that most articles reported 
on the use of common SVDBs compared to specialized SVDBs. The reasons for this are 
manifold such as: (1) Specialized SVDBs contain known security vulnerabilities affecting 
specific systems written in a specific programming language (e.g., PHP). Analysis results 
obtained from specialized SVDBs are typically not generalized to other systems (e.g., using Java 
vs PHP), therefore limiting the potential impact of the published work. (2) Common SVDBs 
contain more diverse known security vulnerabilities affecting different types of software systems 
and therefore can accommodate different research interests. (3) Among the common SVDBs, we 
found NVD to be the most popular SVDB used in the SE community. There are several reasons 
for the popularity of NVD including ease of access (e.g., automatic data feeds), updates, size, 
and quality of the dataset. 
 
Table 10: Summary of how surveyed articles used SVDBs for different SE tasks. The numbers 













Common  47 22 15 13 9 3 
Specialized 2 0 0 2 0 0 
SE Repo. 
Used 
Source Code 15 10 8 13 3 1 
Bugs / Vuln. Reports 29 9 2 2 2 2 
Logs 2 1 2 0 0 0 
Req./Desgin 1 2 0 0 3 0 
Other SE dataset 1 0 3 0 1 0 
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Even with the popularity of common SVDBs, studies have shown that developers are often 
not aware of known security vulnerabilities affecting their systems [156], [164], [165], resulting 
in situations where known vulnerabilities are only late or never patched after the disclosure of a 
vulnerability. This implies limited communication between vendors in charge of patching the 
vulnerabilities and common SVDBs providers, since vendors are expected to provide a new 
(patched) version of components with known vulnerabilities or at least provide users with patch 
information on how to fix the vulnerabilities.   
A limitation of many common SVDBs is that they do not include the actual code causing the 
security vulnerability, which is in contrast to specialized SVDBs that often share the code of 
known security vulnerabilities. Having direct access to this vulnerable code fragment simplifies 
the work of SE researchers evaluating their security analysis approaches.    
We find that most tasks only analyze source code and bugs/vulnerability reports (i.e., issue 
tracker data) and rarely use other repositories. With the open source community and its 
supporting ecosystem providing access to its source code and bug repositories, the security 
research community takes advantage of these available knowledge resources to analyze known 
vulnerabilities reports and link vulnerabilities reported in SVDBs with available open source 
issue tracker or version control systems. 
We reviewed SE tasks discussed in SE articles that used SVDBs in their research 
methodology to identify how these SVDBs are used. We classified the articles based on 
describing SE tasks for a more fine-grained analysis. Our findings reveal that empirical research 
such as security studies (e.g., case studies, comparison studies) are among the most common 
research activities covered by our reviewed articles. Although some research has shown that 
combining multiple SVDBs can improve vulnerability detection coverage and performance [91], 
[166], we found most articles cited only a single SVDB. Also we found most SVDBs host 
vulnerabilities affecting commercial (or closed-source) applications, but most of the use case 
studies were conducted on open source applications such as Apache project 39 , Chromium 
project40, and Mozilla open source project41. We believe the reason for this is that the open 
source project provides rich information resources (e.g., issue tracker data, source code and 
version history, email archive, etc.) which can be used along with SVDBs information. This 
                                                     
39 https://projects.apache.org/  
40 https://www.chromium.org/  
41 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Mozilla/Developer_guide/Introduction  
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helps to study the complete development environment for analyzing security vulnerability (i.e., 
evolution). This advantage of gaining such application’s information is not always available for 
commercial (or closed-source) applications.  
The second most common SE task covered by our reviewed articles is modeling. The 
common use of SVDBs in this task (e.g., [129]) is to apply a vulnerability model to a number of 
well-known vulnerabilities. In general, this has resulted in comprehensive understanding of the 
vulnerabilities and the measures required to prevent them. 
Lastly, testing task is also a common SE task covered by our survey articles. Most of the 
testing approaches were conducted on web-applications (e.g., [54], [76], [151], [152]) and, more 
specifically, validating testing approaches on injection attack (e.g., [73], [76], [146]). One of the 
reasons the injection attack is classified as 1st most critical web application security risk is that it 
has been confirmed as an OWASP Top 10 42  attack type. However, SVDBs attracted SE 
researchers in this domain (testing) due to the rich information provided by SVDBs regarding 
this type of attack. For example, in 2018 NVD host 6.09% injection attack, ranging from SQL 
injection 2.56% (inject SQL commands that can read or modify data from a database) to OS 




3.5.2 Common Pitfalls when Using SVDBs in Software Engineering 
Tasks 
In Section 3.4, we discussed how SVDBs are commonly used in different SE tasks. In this 
subsection, we further discuss the common pitfalls when using SVDBs in SE tasks. 
                                                     
42 https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project  
Summary: The common use of SVDBs in these SE tasks is extracting vulnerability 
examples for validating the assumptions proposed by authors and comprehending the 
security vulnerability affecting the software system. Also, studies on vulnerability 
repositories focus on harvesting statistical trends or creating vulnerability models and 
using them for prediction. Other studies focus on the vulnerability reporters who possess 
the most important information. 
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3.5.2.1 Vulnerability disclosure date 
Although researchers in SE have proposed several approaches ranging from empirically studying 
the vulnerability evolution to vulnerability prediction models, we see very few studies that 
consider the various vulnerability sources in order to avoid bias threats to the validity of their 
approaches. Determining the public disclosure date of a vulnerability is vital to understanding the 
timeline of a vulnerability’s life cycle. Previous studies (e.g., [102], [167], [168], [106], and 
[169]) relied on a single SVDB (e.g., NVD) as a source for their empirical studies on 
vulnerability life cycle and security patches. But SVDBs entries contain a CVE publication date 
that corresponds to when the vulnerability was published in the database, not necessarily when it 
was actually publicly disclosed. For example in our surveyed articles, Munaiah et al. [82] and 
Murtaza et al. [86] relied on a single SVDB source for their vulnerability empirical analyses. 
Munaiah et al. [82] used NVD and relied on the vulnerability disclosure date provided by NVD 
only. In the same way, Murtaza et al. [86] used NVD vulnerabilities release dates without 
considering other SVDBs. However, this may affect the proposed approaches on vulnerability 
lifetime analysis, which would in turn affect the authors’ conclusions.  
Current studies usually use SVDBs as a black box and do not consider the effect of using 
different SVDBs information on the SE task. As a result, future studies may want to examine the 
effect of different SVDBs information on SE tasks. For example, there is no clear guideline on 
how estimating the vulnerability disclosure date may affect the result of vulnerability prediction 
models. Providing such a guideline can help SE researchers choose better vulnerability 
disclosure dates. 
 
3.5.2.2 Vulnerability information noise 
When using SVDBs for tasks such as tracing security vulnerabilities, unstructured vulnerability 
information in some SVDBs may affect the vulnerability extraction and linking process. For 
example, unstructured vulnerability information in SVDBs requires text mining techniques and 
human labor in order to detect patch information and locate vulnerability causes in the source 
code. Since this relies on the vulnerability auditors and reporters themselves, we do not currently 
see a way to enforce this. Other vulnerability representation-related solutions include those that 
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synthesize exploit code examples for specific vulnerability or those that try to present existing 
vulnerability online resources in ways more useful to developers (e.g., [165]).  
 
3.5.2.3 Lack of knowledge  
Sometimes researchers may not be aware of different existing public SVDBs. Due to that lack of 
knowledge, researchers might miss important vulnerability information which is already known. 
For example, Scandariato et al. [61] showed detailed background about SVDBs (i.e., NVD); 
however, they used the Fortify SCA tool to identify vulnerabilities via static source code analysis 
rather than using the vulnerabilities reported in a database such as the NVD. For that, the authors 
claimed that “the choice was obligatory, as there are no public databases with sufficient 
numbers of vulnerabilities to analyze for Android application”. Although Android vulnerabilities 
were rarely published in NVD at the time, they were published and discussed in other SVDBs 
very often; for example, Exploit-DB 43  and vulnerability-lab 44   host over 200 android apps 
vulnerabilities.   
However, relying on vulnerability scanner tools to extract vulnerabilities without (or instead 
of) using known vulnerabilities published in different SVDBs may increase the threats to validity 
of a researcher’s approach and increase the effort in evaluation. 
 
3.6 Threats to Validity  
In what follows we discuss external and internal threats to validity for our study and how we 
attempted to mitigate them. 
 
External Threats: Literature search and selection process. Our online library search is based 
on keyword queries that include terms related to vulnerabilities databases and SE. It is possible 
that our search omitted some studies that either implicitly used vulnerabilities databases without 
mentioning the term ‘vulnerability’, or papers that described the use of vulnerabilities databases 
in SE activities which were not covered by our search terms. To mitigate this threat, in addition 
to the online search we performed a manual issue-by-issue search covering articles published in 
                                                     
43 https://www.exploit-db.com/  
44 https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/  
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major SE conferences and journals between 2001 and 2017. The manual search allowed us to 
identify those implicit ‘vulnerabilities database’ papers and those papers that leverage 
vulnerabilities database for SE activities not covered by our Web-based keyword search. We also 
used citations in relevant papers to further extend our dataset to include other relevant articles. 
   
Internal Threats: Literature classification. We manually classified all 94 papers into 6 
categories based on their study types and their targeted SE domains/tasks. There is no ground 
truth labelling for such classification. Even though we referred to the ACM Computing 
Classification System, the IEEE Taxonomy of Software Engineering Standards, and the 2014 
IEEE Keywords Taxonomy, there is no well-defined standard methodology of classification 
regarding the used schemes. To minimise any potential classification error, we carefully analysed 
the full text of the collected papers and had three Ph.D. students from our lab perform a cross 
validation of the classification, reaching an average inter-rater agreement of 91%. The 
disagreed/controversial papers were resolved through further discussion. 
 
3.7 Future Research Opportunities 
In this section, we discuss some opportunities for future work on using SVDBs to support SE 
tasks. 
 
Using SVDBs beyond just being information silos. Our results show that a majority of SE 
researchers use SVDBs to gain security related knowledge. In fact, developers already use 
SVDBs to identify security vulnerabilities and determine features (e.g., vulnerability patch 
information) that they want to implement. Presently, the role of SVDBs is mostly as a repository 
for reporting known security vulnerabilities. However, we envision that future versions of 
SVDBs will play an increasing role as an integrated knowledge source for guiding secure 
software development, providing security testing, and refining software security design. Hence, 
we believe that future versions of SVDBs need to incorporate a mechanism through which SE 
researchers can link and trace vulnerability information directly across knowledge resources.  
Another interesting finding is that SE researchers reuse vulnerability information usually 
only from one source (single SVDB), thus limiting their analysis approach to the data available 
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in this SVDB. One approach to address this problem is to improve the accessibility of 
information across SVDBs boundaries. Providing users with standardized access to these 
knowledge resources, where queries will retrieve information across SVDBs boundaries, will 
represent a first step to performing new types of vulnerability analyses (e.g., global security 
impact). While linking these knowledge resources is an important initial step, additional 
semantic modelling will be needed to ensure the consistency and quality of knowledge across 
SVDBs boundaries. For example, threats to consistency and ambiguity across these knowledge 
resources will have to be addressed to ensure that a vulnerability reported in two databases is 
actually the same (or different) instance. One approach would be to replace current proprietary 
knowledge modelling approaches used by SVDB providers and agree upon a standardized 
knowledge modelling approach, which would include the ability to semantically link query 
SVDBs across the repository boundaries and to provide each vulnerability with a global, unique 
identifier, similar to the Universal Resource Identifier used by the SW.  
 
Linking Security Commit Changes to SVDBs. With more widespread use of SVDBs in software 
development, we believe that SVDBs should become an integrated part of current software 
development processes and best practices. Similar to the current practice of adding an issue 
number to a commit message, a commit message also should include a link to the vulnerability in 
the SVDB where it is reported. Such vulnerability traceability can provide additional insights and 
documentation to QA45 and future maintainers when analyzing and comprehending the code 
patch. Furthermore, a bi-directional link from the vulnerabilities to the known and patched code 
would be desirable. We further believe that next generation IDEs should not only facilitate this 
linking process, but also take advantage of these links to recommend patches or identify potential 
impacts of these vulnerabilities on other parts of the system. 
 
Vulnerability scanner tools using SVDBs. The existing vulnerability detection tools provide too 
much detail about the vulnerability issue and these details, sometimes, are unnecessary to the 
regular developer which affects the vulnerability comprehension. We do not see this as 
something that can be enforced, but at least guidelines can be developed to help regular 
developers achieve vulnerability patches easily.  
                                                     
45 Quality Assurance  
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The unified model for the public SVDBs (suggested above) can be used to enhance the 
vulnerability scanner tools to reduce false positive and negative results. Thereby, we suggest the 
following list of tool features that encourage future tools or solutions design to be considered:  
 Support at least the following tasks: tracing the same vulnerability from different 
SVDBs, summarized report about the vulnerability and its impacts, provide patch 
information if it exists, automatically deploy the patch to the vulnerable project if 
needed, vulnerability dependencies and its global impact (find relevant libraries that 
might be affected with the same vulnerability). 
 Given a piece of code that introduces the vulnerability, identify any internal or external 
calls for this vulnerable code.    
3.8 Chapter Summary  
While the SE research community is increasingly focusing on security and reliability, no 
comprehensive literature survey exists that studies how SVDBs are used and integrated in the SE 
life cycle. Knowing how researchers use SVDBs may also help future studies improve software 
security. In this study, we surveyed 94 articles from the SE literature that used SVDBs. We 
found that: 
 there is an increasing awareness of SVDBs in the research community in terms of papers 
being published describing the use and application of SVDBs in the SE domain; 
 the majority of the surveyed studies applied SVDBs only to a limited number of SE 
activities; 
 most studies relied on only one SVDB for their contribution. 
We have also discussed potential directions for future work on using SVDBs for different SE 
tasks, which also were the motivation for our research presented in Chapters 4–7 of this thesis.   
In the next chapter, we discuss in more detail the knowledge engineering process we applied 
to create a unified ontological representation for SVDBs, which forms the basis for a more 





Chapter 4  
4 A Unified Ontology-based Modeling 
Approach for Software Vulnerabilities 
Data Sources 
 
The ultimate goal of constructing a vulnerability’s knowledge base is to enable stakeholders 
(e.g., developers) to realize their tasks, through automatically linking SVDBs to allow for an 
effective use of software vulnerability information. Developing such a vulnerabilities’ 
knowledge base is a complex task, since the ontologies used for the data representation have to 
be sufficiently expressive and flexible to allow for knowledge reuse and sharing, as well as 
support for different SE tasks. In this chapter, we explain our knowledge engineering 
methodology which we applied to the construction of our unified vulnerability information 
knowledge base and the design decisions we made to address some of the open research 
challenges identified in our literature review (Chapter 3). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Vulnerabilities in software systems are one of the primary causes for security threats and 
breaches. These vulnerabilities not only affect the usability of these affected systems, but 
software productivity and competitiveness are also increasingly dependent on the successful 
management of vulnerability information. In order to address the removal and management of 
security threats, the security community has introduced several vulnerability knowledge sources, 
such as Security Vulnerabilities Databases (SVDBs) that capture information about software 
vulnerabilities. However, with the amount of security vulnerability data available and with this 
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information being spread across heterogeneous SVDBs, software developers are struggling to 
take full advantage of these SVDBs. The situation is further complicated by the fact that these 
SVDBs also introduce ambiguity into their datasets, not only in terms of what but also how this 
vulnerability information is modeled in the databases. The heterogeneity and ambiguity of 
SVDBs leads to diverse data modeling results and has become a major challenge for 
organizations managing both disclosure and access to vulnerability information. In addition, 
while individual SVDBs provide access to their information through APIs, RSS feeds, or 
notification services, the sharing and integration of the information across these resources 
remains an open challenge.  
The Semantic Web (SW) and its enabling technology stack have been introduced to address 
knowledge sharing across heterogeneous data resources using ontologies. Such a unified 
ontological representation forms the basis for queries and data analysis across knowledge 
boundaries, removing some of the traditional information silos that existing vulnerability 
knowledge resources have maintained. However, the security domain currently lacks ontologies 
that can be readily reused, shared, and deployed to conceptualize and standardize the domain of 
software vulnerabilities. The few existing ontologies (e.g., [170]–[172]) are limited in terms of 
their modeling, by focusing mostly on modeling system level (proprietary) vulnerability 
information related to a particular information resource rather than trying to capture software 
vulnerability information as a domain of discourse.  
In this chapter we introduce a semi-automated approach for the development of a software 
security vulnerabilities domain ontology, which is based on the discovery, reuse, and integration 
of knowledge from existing vulnerability SVDBs. More specifically, our methodology takes 
advantage of Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) [34] to guide knowledge engineers during the 
modeling process. We also deal with the ambiguity and inconsistencies found in existing 
vulnerability information by introducing a set of primitive operations to support the ontology 
alignment. In our modeling approach, we furthermore take advantage of SW inference services 
to infer implicit vulnerability information. We illustrate the applicability of our modeling 
approach by instantiating a vulnerability ontology for unifying vulnerability information from 
several open source SVDBs. 
The main contributions of our work are as follows: 
 A literature review of existing security vulnerability ontologies. 
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 Existing SVDBs can be considered as information silos which only allow limited data 
and knowledge sharing across SVDB boundaries. We propose a semi-automated 
methodology using FCA to create a unified ontological knowledge model that supports 
knowledge sharing, linking, and inference across SVDB boundaries. 
 We present alignment rules to facilitate knowledge integration and improve our overall 
knowledge design. 
 We illustrate the applicability of our modeling approach by providing examples of how 
our modeling approach supports vulnerability analysis across individual SVDBs. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
In what follows, we present a detailed literature review on the use of ontologies to model 
software vulnerabilities. Our literature review focused on two core aspects: (1) research articles 
that propose, create, or use software security ontologies; and (2) articles that propose ontology 
development and integration using formal methods (e.g., formal concept analysis).  
 
4.2.1 Software Security Ontologies 
In this section, we review research involving software security ontologies by classifying software 
security ontologies based on their usage context, and the tools and methods used to develop these 
ontologies (i.e., the knowledge engineering they followed). The review is based on review 
guidelines suggested by Petersen et al. [50].  
While existing literature surveys have reviewed software security ontologies for particular 
applications (e.g., Souag et al. [173], Blanco et al. [174], and Sicilia et al. [175]), our survey 
focuses on the methodologies used by existing work for creating these ontologies and how these 
ontologies are then applied in the software engineering domain. 
 
Data collection. For the data collection process, we defined a set of inclusion criteria which 
papers had to meet to be included in our survey. The main selection criterion was that a paper 
must discuss the use of software security vulnerabilities ontologies. Among the other criteria 
which we applied during the selection process were that an article be written in English and 
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published as a conference paper, journal paper, technical report, or book in a reputable venue. 
For our survey we only considered articles published between January 2005 and December 2017, 
more than a full decade of research results.  
For our survey we conducted two online searches: (1) we used existing library and scholarly 
search engines (e.g., ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore Digital Library, Google Scholar, etc.), 
and (2) we performed an additional manual inspection of selected venues and papers published at 
these venues to identify additional papers not covered by the search engines.  
For the two online searches we used the following search terms: "vulnerability", "security", 
"software", and "ontology". The results of the online search left us with a total of 70 unique 
articles. As part of our data cleaning, we manually reviewed the title and abstract (and in some 
cases the introduction) of the paper to verify that an article met our main inclusion criteria—a 
paper must discuss the use of software security ontology. Papers not meeting our inclusion 
criteria where omitted from further processing. After completing this manual review process, 44 
of the initial 70 articles were considered for a more detailed review.  
During the detailed review we manually verified that each paper actually discussed the use of 
security ontologies. Papers which did not explicitly describe the use of security ontologies for SE 
were removed from the set, leaving us with a total of 22 articles to be included in our final 
dataset. For these 22 publications we extracted and published online [176] the meta-data for each 
article. The extracted meta-data includes: the author(s) names, article title, publication year, 
publication type (academic, industry, or both), the ontology artifact created (OWL files or URL 
links if exist), the vulnerability data source used (i.e., SVDBs), information on the venue the 
paper was published, and keywords used by the article.  
 
Results: Most papers describe different aspects of modeling, integrating, and applying software 
security ontologies. We classified the papers into the following categories: 
(1) Software security ontologies applied in software development: This category uses 
security ontologies to capture and integrate empirical knowledge about vulnerabilities in 
the system development process.   
(2) Ontologies for software cybersecurity: Cybersecurity domain ontologies are used to 
support information integration and cyber situational awareness in cybersecurity systems.  
69 
(3) Ontologies for information security management: Discuss the use of ontologies in the 
iterative process of identifying, classifying, remediating, and mitigating vulnerabilities.  
While other classification criteria exist (e.g., software versus hardware 46  security 
vulnerabilities), we consider such classification categories outside the scope of our work since 
we are only focused on software vulnerabilities. 
 
4.2.1.1 Category 1: Software security ontologies applied in software 
development  
A significant body of work exists that discusses how ontologies in general can be integrated into 
software development processes. In [177], a systematic review of the application of ontologies in 
SE has been introduced. In [178], the authors reported on the use of ontologies in SE for 
different phases of the software development process (e.g., the use of ontologies to reduce 
ambiguity, and inconsistency in requirements). In [24], the use of ontologies to support software 
evolution is presented. The authors created ontologies for different software artifacts.  
However, only very few papers discussed how security ontologies (knowledge) can be 
integrated in software engineering processes. 
Kang et al. [179] presented a security ontology for identifying security requirements using an 
approach that combines MDA (Model-Driven Architecture) and ontologies. In their work, the 
authors introduced ontologies to provide security analysis at the PIM (Platform Independent 
Model), PSM (Platform Specific Model), and source code level. 
Elahi et al. [180] proposed a vulnerability modeling ontology to integrate empirical 
knowledge about vulnerabilities into the system development process. The paper identifies basic 
concepts for modeling and analyzing vulnerabilities and their effects on the system, and uses 
these criteria to compare and evaluate security frameworks (such as CORAS [181] and Tropos 
[182]). 
Souag et al. [183] introduced an ontology to support security requirements elicitation based 
on an earlier conducted survey [173]. The authors evaluated their approach using 10 security 
experts to determine whether their ontology is sufficient to support security requirements 
                                                     
46 Currently, hardware vulnerabilities modeling are not in the scope of this work. 
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elicitation. Their study showed that providing just a security ontology might not be sufficient and 
that additional traceability links between requirements and a security ontology are needed. 
Khoury et al. [184] presented an approach to detect security patterns using ontologies. The 
authors proposed a security pattern approach based on ontological mappings between 
requirement and design, as well as at the implementation level between threat models and bugs 
in the source code. 
 
4.2.1.2 Category 2: Ontologies for software cybersecurity 
In what follows, we discuss the use of ontologies as a modeling language for the cybersecurity 
domain. Cybersecurity is concerned with technologies, processes, and practices designed to 
protect networks, computers, programs, and data from attacks, damages, or unauthorized access 
[185].  
Undercoffer et al. [186] and [187] introduced an ontology for intrusion detection systems. 
The proposed ontology was created based on the evaluation of 4000 vulnerabilities and the attack 
strategies used to exploit them. The ontology was specified using the DARPA Agent Markup 
Language (DAML47) and prototyped using DAMLJessKB [188]. The authors included several 
use case scenarios based on common attacks such as: Denial of Service – Syn Flood48, the 
Classic Mitnick Type Attack49, and Buffer Overflow Attack50. 
More et al. [189] presented a situation-aware intrusion detection model that integrates 
systems security data sources (e.g., networks logs) to create a semantically rich knowledge-base 
for the detection of cyber threats/vulnerabilities. The authors collected data streams from 
network monitors, host monitors, sensor data, and other Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) 
modules, which are asserted as facts in their knowledge base (introduced by [186] and [187]). 
For the intrusion detection, the authors take advantage of SW reasoning services to infer whether 
there is an indication of an attack.  
Joshi et al. [171] extracted cybersecurity-related entities, concepts, and relations, and 
captured them in their IDS ontology (introduced by [186] and [187], and further enhanced by 
[189]). As part of their approach, the authors also mapped these concepts to objects in the 
                                                     





DBpedia51 knowledge base using DBpedia Spotlight [190]. The approach creates a RDF linked 
data representation of cybersecurity concepts and vulnerability descriptions. The security 
information is extracted from both structured vulnerability databases and unstructured text. Their 
approach supports vulnerability identification and vulnerability mitigation efforts.  
Syed et al. [191] introduced the Unified Cybersecurity Ontology (UCO) to support 
information integration and cyber situational awareness. The ontology integrates data and 
knowledge schema from both cybersecurity systems and commonly-used cybersecurity standards 
to allow for data exchange among these resources. The UCO ontology has also been mapped to a 
number of other existing cybersecurity ontologies ([186] and [187]) and resources on the Linked 
Open Data cloud ([189] and [171]). 
Iannacone et al. [192] extended the existing cybersecurity ontologies from [186], [187], and 
[191] to provide a schema to incorporate additional information from a variety of structured and 
unstructured data sources.     
Kamongi et al. [193] introduced VULCAN, a vulnerability assessment framework for cloud 
computing systems. The framework consists of two main components: an Ontological 
Vulnerability Assessment introduced by [194] and an Ontology Vulnerability Database [195] 
component. These two components provide access to known vulnerability information published 
by NVD. For the vulnerability assessment, the approach takes advantage of advanced reasoning 
capabilities to support a semantic search for vulnerabilities.  
Gyrard et al. [196] and [197] introduced an ontology-based Security Toolbox for Attack and 
Countermeasure (STAC) to guide software developers in selecting the appropriate security 
mechanisms to secure Internet of Things (IoT) applications (more specifically, securing ETSI52 
Machine to Machine [M2M] architecture).  
 
4.2.1.3 Category 3: Ontologies for information security management 
Information security management approaches often rely on security ontologies for risk 
management, which can include automated security controls based on the Security Control 
Automation Protocol (SCAP53) to verify security compliance and security configurations. 





Wang et al. [172] and [198] proposed a vulnerability impact analysis using an ontology for 
vulnerability management (OVM). The ontology establishes the relationships between IT 
products, vulnerabilities, attackers, security metrics, countermeasures, and other relevant 
concepts. The authors illustrated the advantages of their ontologies in terms of being able to 
model, manage, and reason over the vulnerability information.   
Wang et al. [199] and [200] proposed an approach to measure and assess how secure 
software products are by analyzing if they meet certain security requirements. For the 
assessment, the authors reused the vulnerability management ontology introduced in ([172] and 
[198]) to calculate an overall environmental score54 for software products.  
Wang et al. [201] introduced a ranking approach for attack patterns, which analyzes CAPEC 
(Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification) associated with 14 types of CWEs. 
The vulnerability information is extracted from the OVM knowledge base ([172], [198]) which is 
populated with vulnerabilities published by NVD. 
Wang et al. [202] proposed a vulnerability similarity measurement that compares different 
vulnerabilities based on the similarity of structural hierarchies and dependencies. The 
information is extracted from the NVD and OVM [198] knowledge base. The similarity measure 
can be applied as part of different vulnerability management applications such as vulnerability 
classification, mitigation, and patching. 
Kotenko et al. [203] and Fedorchenko et al. [204] introduced a hybrid modeling approach 
which extracts relationships between parts of vulnerabilities databases to create a domain 
ontology.  
Montesino et al. [205] provided an analysis of the automation possibilities in information 
security management. The analysis takes into account the potential of using (i) security 
ontologies in risk management, (ii) hard- and software systems for the automatic operation of 
certain security controls, and (iii) SCAP for automating to check for compliance and security 
configurations. 
 
4.2.1.4 Discussion  
Literature surveys are an important aspect to understanding state of the art research in a given 
area, while at the same time providing directions for further studies. Our survey shows that many 
                                                     
54 Environmental score represents the characteristics of a vulnerability that are relevant and unique to a particular user’s environment.   
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such potential avenues exist for advancing the software vulnerability domain in ontology 
engineering. In what follows, we provide a comparison of the ontologies in the reviewed articles, 
using the following three comparison criteria: (1) availability of ontologies, (2) the use of a 
systematic knowledge engineering process for developing the ontology, and (3) the use of 
existing vulnerability knowledge sources (i.e., SVDBs) during the ontology development 
process.  
Table 11: Summary of recent works on software security domain ontologies engineering 
Category Reference   Available 
Knowledge engineering 
process 





[179] no no no 
[180] no no no 
[184] yes no no 







yes no yes 
[192] yes no yes 
[193] yes no yes 







no no yes 
[203], [204] no no yes 
[205] yes no yes 
 
Our comparison (Table 11) shows that only 50% of the reviewed ontologies are publicly 
available online via URL links (e.g., IDS55 owl by Joshi et al. [171]) or as a repository (e.g., 
cybersecurity56  ontology by Syed et al. [191]). Based on our review, none of the surveyed 
ontologies specified that they used a systematic knowledge engineering approach while 
developing their ontologies. Most of the presented ontologies are based on the authors 
experience in the vulnerability domain. Our survey also shows that most papers refer to public 
advisories (e.g., SVDBs) as their main source of vulnerability information. However, none of the 
papers explain in detail how the SVDB(s) is used in their knowledge engineering methodology. 
Our survey also shows that SVDBs in general are not integrated in software development. 
                                                     
55 http://ebiquity.umbc.edu/ontologies/cybersecurity/ids/v2.3/IDSOntology.owl  
56 https://github.com/Ebiquity/Unified-Cybersecurity-Ontology 
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Articles only refer to SVDBs indirectly, while describing their background section. On the other 
hand, SVDBs are actively used for conceptualizing software vulnerability ontologies and 
ontologies involved in vulnerability management. However, they are only concerned with the 
integration of data from different SVDBs and not on the reuse and inference of new knowledge, 
therefore limiting their potential applicability.  
 
4.2.2 Ontology Development Using FCA 
While work exists on describing knowledge engineering approaches using FCA for creating 
ontologies, these approaches have been applied to domains other than the software vulnerability 
domain. For example, context-based ontology building support in clinical domains using FCA 
[206], FCA-based ontology development for environment data integration (e.g., utility 
infrastructure) [207], products management and purchases control [208], information system 
management [209], [210], etc.  
In addition, many of these formal knowledge engineering approaches either focus on 
knowledge reuse, knowledge integration, or just conceptualization of a domain discourse. For 
example, the surveyed FCA knowledge modeling approaches (e.g., [208] and [207]) are used to 
extract sharable knowledge in the form of upper ontologies, while our approach focuses also on 
the integration of software vulnerability knowledge across knowledge resource boundaries and at 
different abstraction levels. 
 
4.3 Development of an Initial Software sEcurity 
Vulnerability ONTology (SEVONT) 
Different knowledge engineering methodologies have been discussed in the literature (e.g., Noy 
et al. [211] and Uschold et al. [21]). For our knowledge modeling approach, we adopt a similar 
modeling methodology as the one presented by Noy et al. [211]. In their knowledge-engineering 
approach for ontology development they propose the following seven core steps: (1) determining 
the domain and scope of the ontology, (2) considering the reuse of existing ontologies, (3) 
enumerating essential terms in the ontology, (4) defining the classes and class hierarchy, (5) 
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defining the properties of class-slots, (6) defining the facets of the slots, and (7) creating 
instances.  
Similarly, we first conducted a thorough review of existing work on ontologies in the 
software vulnerability domain to help us define and determine the domain and scope of our 
knowledge model. As part of this review we identified and extracted key concepts from existing 
software vulnerability ontologies discussed in the 22 papers of our dataset using the same 
classification as in Section 4.2.1. Table 12 summarizes the core concepts used by the authors to 
construct their software security domain ontologies. 
Our analysis shows that articles in the software development process category include mostly 
concepts related to software security requirements and requirements elicitation (e.g., 
dependability, confidentiality). There are cybersecurity ontologies mostly focused on Internet 
attacks, which typically involve different software assets that can be exploited by vulnerabilities. 
Ontologies used mainly for vulnerability management focus on modeling vulnerabilities 
knowledge sources (e.g., vulnerability databases, malware activities datasets, intrusion detections 
tools results, etc.) to enrich and link these knowledge resources [175]. 
For establishing our initial domain ontology for software vulnerabilities, we further manually 
identified shared (common) concepts used by these reviewed ontologies (Table 12). For 
example, a more detailed analysis of the ontologies and their supporting documentation shows 
that the security and vulnerability concepts share a similar meaning across the surveyed 
ontologies. These concepts are used to describe security vulnerability issues affecting software 
products. Also, threat, attack, weakness, and risk are concepts commonly found in these 
ontologies to classify software security vulnerability attacks. Based on these common concepts, 





Table 12: Core concepts (classes) defined in the surveyed vulnerabilities ontologies 
Category Reference Core concepts 
Software security 
ontologies applied in 
software development 
[179] 
Security concerns, attack, frauds, asset, prevention, threats, 
auditing 
[180] 
Vulnerability, effect, security impact, malicious action, 
attacker, attack, malicious goal 
[184] 
Security requirements terms (confidentiality, integrity, 
dependability, availability, authenticity, non-repudiation, ...), 
security exploits, bugs, attack models 
[183] 
Asset, location, organization, person, threat, vulnerability, risk 
severity, impact, threat agent, attack tool, attack method, 
security goal, security criterion, security requirement, control 







Vulnerability, vulnerability source, product, software, 
hardware, operating system, web browser, consequences, 
means, weakness, other terms 
[192] 
Software, vulnerability, malware, attack, flow, attacker, user, 
account, host, address, IP, port, domain name, service, address 
range 
[193] 
Vulnerability, CVSS metric, consequences, countermeasure, IT 
product category, IT product, IT vendor, software, hardware, 
privileged program, unprivileged program, cloud type, attacker, 
attack intent, attack mechanism, attack 
[196], 
[197] 
Security mechanism, security tool, security protocol, 










Active location, introduction phase, vulnerability, IT product, 
IT vendor, attacker, attack, countermeasure, consequence, 
attack intent, attack mechanism 
[203], 
[204] 
Weakness, attack, vulnerability, platform, countermeasure, 
configuration, exploit 
[205] 
Control type, organization, asset, security attribute, standard 
control, control, threat, threat source, severity scale, 

























- Release date,...,etc 
has
 
Figure 11: Initial software security vulnerability domain ontology (high-level overview). 
 
Vulnerability. In software security, a vulnerability refers to “an instance of a flaw, caused by a 
mistake in the design, development, or configuration of software such that it can be exploited to 
violate some explicit or implicit security policy” [212]. Software vulnerabilities are introduced in 
a system by adopting a vulnerable software product, inadvertent coding mistakes by developers 
(e.g., bad coding practices), executing vulnerable external services (e.g., libraries), etc.  
 
Product. This concept is used for eliciting software vulnerability information. Software product 
is an Asset—“anything that has value to the organization” [213], including stakeholder, 
information, hardware, and artifacts. 
 
Attackers (or malicious actor) can be considered either internal or external entities of the system 
who attack a product. They perform malicious Actions which attempt to break the security of a 
software system or its components. Security databases are capturing a Vulnerability that has an 
associated Action and Impact, with an attacker exploiting a vulnerability to produce an Action 
which has an Impact on the system. 
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An Attack is a set of intentional unwarranted (malicious) actions designed to compromise and 
violate software security policies [214]. By analyzing such an attack or vulnerability pattern, 
analysts can study the behavior of attackers, estimate the cost of attacks, and determine their 
impact on overall system security.  
 
Security analysts often rely on References found in SVDBs to identify vulnerable system 
components and to evaluate the potential Impact of such vulnerabilities on other parts of an 
ecosystem. This information is used to decide on cost-effective Countermeasures to eliminate a 
risk. When the risk of an attack is higher than the risk tolerance of stakeholders, analysts need to 
take an adequate Countermeasure to mitigate such risks.  
 
A countermeasure therefore is a protection mechanism employed to secure a software system 
[197] (e.g., patch development, encryption/decryption enhancement, and updated system security 
configurations). Available information about the Author of a vulnerability can be used by 
security analysts to develop countermeasures to protect the system. 
 
Weakness has been proposed as a concept to evaluate the impact of such an attack on the 
software system. Score is used to capture the probability of a successful attack and its severity on 
the system.  
 
Finally, incorporating the concept of Date as part of a vulnerability analysis knowledge base 
allows for modeling the sequence of actions and exploits employed by attackers. Security 
analysts can take advantage of this information when designing and evaluating adequate 
countermeasures. 
 
4.4 SEVONT: Knowledge Modeling and Engineering 
Next, we will illustrate how our knowledge engineering approach extends on our initial 
SEVONT domain ontology by focusing on the reuse of existing ontologies, enumerating 
essential terms in the ontology, and defining classes and class hierarchies of software 
vulnerability concepts, relations, and properties. The outcome of this knowledge modeling 
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process is a comprehensive ontology, capturing the domain of software vulnerability knowledge 
to facilitate not only the integration of heterogeneous resources but also allows for its seamless 
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Figure 12: An overview of our knowledge modeling methodology. 
 
Overview: Our methodology consists of five major steps (Figure 12), based on the modeling 
steps presented by Noy et al. [211]. First, we extract vulnerabilities reports and meta-data 
published by SVDBs based on an Internet search we conduct. We then refine the scope of our 
model to include only “software” security vulnerabilities, therefore excluding hardware and 
configuration vulnerabilities from our model. As outlined, our knowledge modeling follows a 
bottom-up approach for which we take advantage of FCA to identify and abstract shared 
concepts from the different SVDBs. Next, we extract meta-data (attributes) from each surveyed 
SVDB (e.g., IDs, types, patch, timeline, etc.). For the extraction, we manually inspect concepts 
and properties for each SVDB and create their initial system-specific ontologies. After creating 
these initial system-specific ontologies, we use a combination of FCA and ontology mapping to 
identify and extract shared vulnerability concepts and attributes from these system-specific 
ontologies by creating a context table. Given this formal context table, we can now generate a 
concept lattice graph to visualize formal concepts which can be used by a knowledge engineer to 
identify shared and reusable concepts among system level ontologies. In addition, we apply a 
stability measure to be used by a knowledge engineer (domain expert) when deciding if a 
concept should remain at the system level or should be promoted to the upper levels (e.g., 
domain level). Finally, during the last step of our methodology, we populate our newly created 
knowledge base.  
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The model itself is based on a meta-meta model approach (e.g., Object Management Group 
(OMG)57), where the top layer captures the core elements, which are extended and refined 
throughout the abstraction hierarchy. Figure 13 presents an overview of the different ontology 
abstraction layers in SEVONT. For a complete description of these ontologies, we refer the 
reader to [215]. 
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Figure 13: The software security vulnerability analysis ontology.  
 
Within our knowledge hierarchy, the General Concepts layer captures the omnipresent core 
concepts related to software evolution and software vulnerabilities. The Domain-Spanning 
Concepts layer builds upon the General Concepts layer and captures concepts that span across a 
number of subdomains in our model (e.g., security databases, version control systems, and 
source code). The concepts at the Domain-Specific layer are common to resources in a domain, 
such as software security advisory concepts. Finally, the System-Specific layer’s concepts 
represent knowledge that is specific to a given data source or system and not commonly shared 




across the domain. In Chapter 5, we discuss in detail how SEVONT can be integrated with other 
SE knowledge sources such as version control systems, build systems, and source code 
ontologies with vulnerabilities ontologies.  
In what follows, we describe in detail the five steps of our knowledge modeling approach. 
Note, ontologies and FCA both use ‘concepts’ as part of their terminologies. In order to avoid 
ambiguity between these terms, we refer to FCA concepts as “formal concept” and concepts used 
in ontology designs as “class”. 
 
4.4.1 Step 1: Vulnerabilities Information Acquisition and Pruning   
Since the objective of this research is to identify and model information relevant to software 
security vulnerabilities; we conducted another survey of publicly (and free of charge) available 
SVDBs that model software vulnerabilities from different vendors and systems. The SVDBs 
were identified through an Internet search using the following two keywords, ‘vulnerability’ and 
‘database’. We then manually inspected the top 100 search results returned by the search engine, 
to verify that they actually reference available SVDBs and to eliminate duplicate results. After 
the analysis of the search results we found 11 SVDBs that met our selection criteria. The 
selection criteria were: (1) the database host software known vulnerabilities, and (2) the 
vulnerability entry in the database is in the English language.  
An overview of these 11 SVDBs is provided in Table 13 and Table 14, which include general 
statistics of these SVDBs and report on the vulnerability identification scheme used by these 
SVDBs. 
While all surveyed SVDBs use some form of a vulnerability ID generation scheme, only the 
NVD dataset (Table 14 - D1) relies on a standardized identifier ID format (CVE-ID). The 
remaining SVDBs generate their own proprietary vulnerability IDs, with some SVDBs including 
the CVE-ID in their proprietary vulnerability ID generation.  
Some SVDBs list affected products using the global standard naming scheme CPE, as shown in 
D1 and D9 where both use CPE’s well-formed name (WFN) (e.g., wfn:part="a", 
vendor="Microsoft", product="internet_explorer", version="8.0", update="beta"). The remaining 
SVDBs rely on unstructured text descriptions to identify and describe products affected by a 
vulnerability.
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Table 13: 11 Security vulnerability databases 
ID# Name Maintainer URL 
# archived 
entries 
D1 National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD) NIST https://nvd.nist.gov/  94,657 
D2 Exploit Database (ED) Offensive Security https://www.exploit-db.com/  38,415 
D3 SecurityFocus (SF)  Security Focus http://www.securityfocus.com/bid  95,460 
D4 Vulnerability Notes Database (VND) CERT/CC http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls  94,735 
D5 World Laboratory of Bugtraq (WLB) CXSecurity https://cxsecurity.com/wlb/about/ 2,839 
D6 Packet Storm Security (PSS) Packet Strom https://packetstormsecurity.com/ N/A* 
D7 Vulnerability Lab (VL) Evolution Security GmbH https://www.vulnerability-lab.com/ 882 
D8 rapid7 Rapid7 https://www.rapid7.com/db/vulnerabilities  121,128 
D9 VulDB Scip AG https://vuldb.com/  109,956 
D10 Skybox Vulnerability Database (SVD) Skybox Security https://www.vulnerabilitycenter.com/#home  73,838 
D11 Snyk Vulnerability DB  Snyk https://snyk.io/vuln?packageManager=all  3,684 
* The database presents the vulnerabilities information as HTML pages on the website, and does not provide a downloadable link to 
their archived entries. 
 
Table 14: Vulnerabilities databases ID schemas and standards usages 
ID# Vulnerability ID scheme CVE CWE CVSS CPE 
D1 CVE-{YYYY}-{NNNN...} (4 digit year, Variable length arbitrary digits) yes yes yes  yes 
D2 EDB-ID:{NNNNN} (5 fixed digits) yes no no no 
D3 NNNNN {5 fixed digits} yes no no no 
D4 VU#{NNNNNN} (6 fixed digits) yes yes yes  no 
D5 WLB-{YYYYMMNNNN} (4 digit year, 2 digit month, 4 fixed digits yes yes no no 
D6 {NNNNNN} (6 fixed digits) yes no no no 
D7 VL-{NNNN} (4 digits) yes no yes no 
D8 {SSSS...} (Variable length arbitrary strings) yes no yes no 
D9 {NNNNNN} (6 fixed digits) yes yes yes yes 
D10 VUL={NNNN…} (Variable length of digits) yes no yes no 
D11 SNYK-{L-P-NNNN..} (Programming language - product name -variable length digits) yes yes no no 
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A commonality of the surveyed SVDBs is that they include the release date of a 
vulnerability. D7 also provides a popularity indicator for disclosed vulnerabilities (in terms of 
number of views), and 6 out of the 11 SVDBs include information about the person/organization 
who discovered a vulnerability. Also six SVDBs (D1, D4, D7, D8, D9, and D10) use the 
vulnerability scoring system (CVSS) to indicate the criticality of a reported vulnerability, while 
three other SVDBs rely on their own proprietary benchmarks (D5, D7, and D11).  
Among other information provided by SVDBs are links to detailed vulnerability descriptions 
(D2, D3, D5, D7, D8, and D9), and status indicators (D2 and D7) showing if a vulnerability has 
been addressed and fixed (e.g., a software update availability). Mitigation measurements are 
provided by D2, D3, and D7-D10. All reviewed SVDBs include cross-references to entries in 
other SVDBs as well as links to software vendors describing a vulnerability. Descriptions to 
resolve the vulnerability are often references to patches provided by the vendor of the vulnerable 
software. 
Accessibility to these public SVDBs and their vulnerability data is provided through web 
interfaces, with some of these SVDBs also including XML feeds (e.g., D1). Most of the 
databases update their vulnerabilities information on a daily basis, except for D3 and D4 which 
provide only weekly/monthly updates. 
 
4.4.2 Step 2: Initial System-Specific Ontologies  
Next, we apply different types of manual data pre-processing steps to identify and extract 
concepts and their attribute definitions from the raw data extracted from the 11 SVDBs. A main 
challenge we had to deal with was the heterogeneity and ambiguity of the SVDBs data in terms 
of the underlying data models. Figure 14 (NVD - D1) and Figure 15 (ED - D2) illustrate 
















Figure 14: NVD vulnerability entry - CVE-2017-10932 attributes. 
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Figure 15: Vulnerabilities entries’ attributes and information from exploit-database website. 
 
As part of this knowledge modeling step, we extracted system-specific ontologies for each 
SVDB using their schemata and documentation. Figure 16 shows an example of the two system-
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Figure 16: The main classes extracted from D1 (left) and D2 (right) to create their system-
specific ontologies. 
 
It should be noted that each class can include sub-classes that are extracted based on 
descriptions provided by the SVDB, such as original release date and modification date, which 
will become subclasses of the date class. Similarly, we extract properties for all classes/sub-
classes which are used to describe the system-specific ontologies. In total, we extracted 131 
classes and 201 properties from the 11 SVDBs (see Figure 17). 
The quite large number of classes and properties are due to the fact that the same class or 
property may exist several times under different names in these SVDBs. For example, the 
representation of vulnerability modification date information varies across the SVDBs; in D1 and 
D8 it is referred to as modified date, whereas in D3 update date, in D4 date last update, and in 
D10 last modified date are used to capture modification date. In the following section, we 
describe the process which we applied to remove some of this ambiguity during the mapping of 
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Figure 17: Manually identified vulnerabilities concepts from 11 SVDBs. 
 
4.4.3 Step 3: Ontology Mapping Using FCA 
In this step of our knowledge modeling approach we used the extracted system level ontologies 
data from the previous modeling step to create and update our initial software vulnerability 
domain ontology. More specifically, we focus on classifying any attribute (e.g., concept, 
property, or relation) that can be promoted in our knowledge model from the System to the 
Domain layer. The Domain layer not only promotes such reuse of concepts across system level 
ontologies, but also improves traceability among system level ontologies by unifying the overall 
knowledge representation. In our modeling approach we take advantage of FCA for identifying 
potential domain concepts using (1) context formation and (2) context composition. For the 
context formation we use the vulnerability information of the system-specific ontologies as input 
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to generate a one valued context table for each SVDB. These generated contexts are then 
combined during the context composition step to create a new merged formal context table for 
all SVDBs. In what follows, we describe each of these two processing steps using our dataset D1 
and D2 (from Table 13) as an illustrative example. 
 
Context formation: The input data for the FCA algorithm is a cross-table, which describes the 
relationships between objects (represented by table rows—in our case, the SVDBs data sources) 
and attributes (represented by table columns—in our case, all elements from the system-specific 
ontology). For example, in Table 15 the “x” for K1.A8 indicates that data source D1 uses CVE-
ID in its data model.  
 
Table 15: D1 context table K1 
Context K1.A1 K1.A2 K1.A3 K1.A4 K1.A5 K1.A6 K1.A7 K1.A8 K1.A9 
D1 x x x X x x x X x 
K1.A1: Original release date K1.A2: Modified date K1.A3: Change history 
K1.A4: Description summary K1.A5: URL links K1.A6: Uses CPE 
K1.A7: Uses CWE K1.A8: Uses CVE-ID K1.A9: Uses CVSS 
 
Table 16: D2 context table K2 
Context K2.A1 K2.A2 K2.A3 K2.A4 K2.A5 K2.A6 K2.A7 K2.A8 K2.A9 K2.A10 K2.A11 K2.A12 
D2 x x x x x X x x x x x x 
K2.A1: Title K2.A2: Platform K2.A3: Exploit – vendor-id K2.A4: Author 
K2.A5: Date added K2.A6: Vulnerable app link 
K2.A7: Exploit type – ‘remote, 
local’ 
K2.A8: Verification status 
K2.A9: Text report K2.A10: Related CVE-ID K2.A11: References K2.A12: Tags 
 
Context Composition: Given the two contexts 𝐾1: = (𝑂1, 𝐴1, 𝑅1) and  𝐾2: = (𝑂2, 𝐴2, 𝑅2), the 
integrated context 𝐾 ≔ (𝑂, 𝐴, 𝑅) is computed by performing a disjoint union of object sets of the 
two contexts:  
O =  O1  ∪
∗ O2                                                              (1) 
A and R are assigned 𝐴1  and 𝑅1 from 𝐾1  at this stage, i.e., A = 𝐴1 and R = 𝑅1. Table 17 shows 
the context K after the above operations. 
Table 17: The context table after object union operation 
Context K1.A1 K1.A2 K1.A3 K1.A4 K1.A5 K1.A6 K1.A7 K1.A8 K1.A9 
D1 x x x X x x x X x 
D2          
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K1.A1: Original release date K1.A2: Modified date K1.A3: Change history 
K1.A4: Description summary K1.A5: URL links K1.A6: Uses CPE 
K1.A7: Uses CWE K1.A8: Uses CVE-ID K1.A9: Uses CVSS 
 
For the mapping process we introduce three integration rules to guide the domain expert while 
incrementally combining the individual system-level context tables into our new merged context 
table for all 11 SVDBs. 
 
Rule #1 Identical attributes: If 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴1 AND 𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝐴2 AND 𝑎𝑖 ≡ 𝑎𝑗 . For example, date added 
(K2.A5 in K2—see Table 16) is identical in its semantic meaning to the original release date 
(K1.A1 in K1—see Table 15). By applying rule #1, both attributes will be merged under a new 
common name (i.e., label) entry_release_date (as shown in Table 18—K.A1 in K) which has a 
relation (x) for both (D1 and D2) in the context table K. Table 18 displays the results after 
applying rule #1, showing the unified attributes K1.A1 and K1.A5 from context K1, and K2.A5 
and K2.A6 from context K2, which become K.A1 and K.A5 in the merged context K.   
 
Table 18: The context table K after an equivalent match 
Context K.A1 K1.A2 K1.A3 K1.A4 K.A5 K1.A6 K1.A7 K1.A8 K1.A9 
D1 x x x x x x x x x 
D2 x    x     
K.A1: entry_release_date K1.A2: Modified date K1.A3: Change history 
K1.A4: Description summary K.A5: entry_URL links K1.A6: Uses CPE 
K1.A7: Uses CWE K1.A8: Uses CVE-ID K1.A9: Uses CVSS 
 
It should be noted these new attributes are labeled with entry_ (as shown in Figure 18) followed 
by the actual attribute name. 
 
D1 – change history
D5 – history
D7 – report timeline
D9 – timeline
entry_change_history





Figure 18: Example of unifying the attributes names from the system-specific data sources. 
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Rule #2 Attribute subsumption hierarchies: If (𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴1 AND 𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝐴2) AND ( 𝑎𝑖 ⊃ 𝑎𝑗 OR 𝑎𝑖 ⊂
𝑎𝑗). For example, Description summary (K1.A4 in K1) is a super-class of Text report (K2.A9 in 
K2). By applying rule #2, the two attributes will be included in the combined context table K, 
entry_description_summary as a common attribute name (K.A4) and entry_text_report (K.A10) 
reflecting the extension used in K2. The updated context table K (Table 19) after applying this 
rule is as follows: 
Table 19: The context table after the second mapping type 
Context K.A1 K1.A2 K1.A3 K.A4 K.A5 K1.A6 K1.A7 K1.A8 K1.A9 K.A10 
D1 x x x x x x x x x  
D2 x   x x     x 
K.A1: entry_release_date K1.A2: Modified date K1.A3: Change history  
K.A4: entry_description summary K.A5: entry_URL links K1.A6: Uses CPE  
K1K1.A7: Uses CWE K1.A8: Uses CVE-ID K1.A9: Uses CVSS  
K.A10: entry_text_report    
 
Rule #3 Unique attributes. If 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐴1 AND 𝑎𝑗 ∈ 𝐴2 AND 𝑎𝑖 ≢ 𝑎𝑗. In the case that neither rule 
#1 nor rule #2 are applicable, then both attribute instances will be automatically inserted into the 
combined context table K (Table 20). 
 
Table 20: The context table after the third mapping type 
Context K.A1 K1.A2 K1.A3 K.A4 K.A5 K1.A6 K1.A7 K1.A8 K1.A9 K.A10 K2.A11 K2.A12 … 
D1 x x x x x x x x x     
D2 x   x x     x x x … 
K.A1: entry_release_date K1.A2: Modified date K1.A3: Change history     
K.A4: entry_description 
summary 
K.A5: entry_URL links K1.A6: Uses CPE     
K1.A7: Uses CWE K1.A8: Uses CVE-ID K1.A9: Uses CVSS     
K.A10: entry_text_report K2.A11: Title K2.A12: Platform      
 
This incremental mapping between individual context tables and the combined context table 
continues until a complete merged context table for all 11 SVDBs is created (see Table 21). As a 
result of this integration process, we obtain a final context table with 23 attributes of which 16 
are shared among different SVDBs and 7 (K7.A4, K2.A5, K1.A8, K3.A12, K6.A16, K7.A25, 
and K4.A28) are unique by being only used in individual SVDBs.  
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Table 21: Final context table K 
  K.A1 K.A2 K.A3 K7.A4 K2.A5 K.A6 K.A7 K1.A8 K.A9 K.A10 K.A11 K3.A12 K.A13 K.A14 K.A15 
D1 x x x 
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4.4.4 Step 4: Establishing Concept Hierarchy Using FCA Lattice 
After having established our merged context table K for all SVDBs, we can now create an FCA 
lattice for Table 21. This lattice can provide knowledge engineers with some additional visual 
guidance while classifying concepts into system and domain level concepts (see Figure 19).  
 
Designers










 Concepts Relations 
Domain Specific Concepts 











of Bugtraq (WLB) ...
 
Figure 19: Concept lattice for the merged context table to guide classification of concepts in 
domain and system level concepts. 
The main challenge for this modeling step is to determine what constitutes a good domain 
concept/attribute. Ideally any domain concept/attribute should be shared among all system level 
ontologies, therefore providing maximum reuse of this concept and improving traceability 
among the system level ontologies. However, when dealing with multiple system ontologies, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to identify such concepts. We therefore relax our original 
objective of a domain concept by allowing a concept to be promoted from a system level concept 
to the domain level concept if it: (a) captures the core of the domain of discourse, (b) is a formal 
concept that is further extended by other concepts, and (c) is a formal concept in the FCA lattice 
that is shared by other formal concepts. In our modeling approach, we therefore introduce a 
semi-automated approach which (1) uses a stability measure to identify potential domain level 
concepts, and (2) a domain-expert who makes the final modeling decision by determining which 
concept should be promoted to the domain level or should remain at the system level. 
The FCA stability measure assesses how close a concept’s intent depends on other objects it 
extents. In other words, it reflects the probability of preserving its intent after removing an 
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arbitrary number of objects. Thus, a high stability value indicates that a concept represents a 
cohesive set of resources or, equally, it can represent a concept that occurs commonly in a 
domain. The stability measures we apply were first introduced by [216], and later extended to 
formal concepts [217]. We use Equation (2) to calculate the stability of a given formal concept, 
according to the definition in Kuznetsov et al. [217], as shown. Given a concept C, concept 
stability Stab(C) is defined as 
 
Stab(C) =
|{s ∈ ℘(Ext(C)) | s′ = Int(C)}| 
2|Ext(C)|
                                                              (2) 
 
Where the relative number of subsets of the concept extent (denoted by  Ext(C) ), whose 
description (i.e., the result of (. )′ ) is equal to the concept intent (denoted by Int(C)) where ℘(𝑃) 
is the power set of P.  
 
Figure 20: Stability measure applied on the combined concept lattice. 
For generating the FCA lattice and the computation of the stability measure we use the 
ConExp58 tool for our SVDBs context table (Table 21). Figure 20 shows the lattice graph and the 
stability values produced by the tool. The stability measure values are 1 (minimum) and 2 
(maximum), with only 7 out the 159 formal concepts having the maximum stability value of 2. 
We use a stability measure threshold to promote a system level to a domain level concept. The 
domain expert will then decide whether one of these seven formal concepts will be mapped to a 
                                                     
58 ConExp tool at http://www.sf.net/projects/conexp/ 
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new domain concept in our domain ontology or become an attribute of an existing domain 
concept (object or data property).  
 
Figure 21: Vulnerability related dates concepts and sub-concepts. 
 
Example: Why is the entry_release_date attribute promoted (based on the stability measure) to 
the domain-specific layer as a property for the vulnerabilities’ Date class?  
As shown in Figure 21, the entry_release_date is shared among all databases creating the 
formal concept ({D1,…, D11},{entry_release_date}). At the same time it has the highest 
stability value when compared with other date attributes in the lattice (Figure 21, e.g., 
entry_change_history, entry_modified_date, and entry_first_release_date). However, 
entry_release_date will be promoted to the upper levels (domain layer), and the other attributes 
entry_change_history, entry_modified_date, and entry_first_release_date will remain in the 
system-specific layer.  
 
4.4.5 Step 5: A Unified Knowledge Representation   
The last step of our approach is to instantiate our knowledge model, with each of its layers 
corresponding to a separate ontology artifact (OWL file). Table 22 provides an overview of key 
statistics of these layers, including the number of axioms (#of axioms), number of classes (#of 
classes), number of object properties (#of object-properties), and number of data properties (# 
data-properties) found in each abstraction layer. 
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Table 22: Ontologies artifacts metrics 
Layer Ontology Name # Axioms # Classes # Object Properties # Data Properties 
General main.owl 130 10 14 11 
Domain-spanning 
vulnerabilitis.owl 41 17 6 0 
measurement.owl 55 10 5 0 
Domain-specific securityDB.owl 176 28 18 19 
System-specific  
securityDB-nvd.owl 41 9 0 9 
securityDB-exploitdb.owl 26 5 2 8 
securityDB-SF.owl  4 5 0 0 
securityDB-VND.owl 7 5 2 0 
securityDB-WLB.owl 6 3 0 0 
securityDB-PSS.owl 12 4 0 3 
securityDB-VL.owl 15 7 2 1 
securityDB-rapid7.owl 2 2 0 0 
securityDB-VulDB.owl 2 2 0 0 
securityDB-SVD.owl 0 0 0 0 
securityDB-SnykVDB.owl  8 4 0 2 
Total 525 111 49 53 
 
Ontologies at the system level can now extend classes from the upper layers either directly 
(Domain layer) or indirectly (from the Domain-spanning and General layers). For example, D1 
(securityDB-nvd.owl) can now extend higher-level classes such as the domain-specific 
(securityDB.owl), domain-spanning (vulnerabilities.owl and measurement.owl), and the general 
layers (main.owl). In some cases (e.g., D10 - securityDB-SVD.owl) all vulnerability concepts are 
already covered by the domain-specific ontology and no system-specific ontology extensions are 
needed; the securityDB-SVD.owl will be empty. 
Given our ontological modeling approach and the support for inference services, we can now 
use rules (see Listing 1) to infer missing information (through implicit relations). For example, 
given an exploit attack published in D259 which states: 
“The Enterprise version of SyncBreeze is affected by a Remote Denial of Service vulnerability. 
The web server does not check bounds when reading server request in the Host header on 
making a connection, resulting in a classic Buffer Overflow that causes a Denial of Service. To 
exploit the vulnerability only is needed use the version 1.1 of the HTTP protocol to interact with 
the application”.  
While most of the relevant vulnerability information is provided, other information such as 
severity score, attack impact, and attack classification are not mentioned in the D2 record for this 
                                                     
59 https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/43344/ 
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attack. However, D1 60  contains this additional vulnerability information (e.g., has attack 
classification, Buffer Errors (CWE-119), and vulnerability impact, CVSS score 7.5 out of 10 - 
high). Using the semantic rule in Listing 1, we can now infer the missing information in D2 from 
D1. 
IF (𝐷𝑥 has CVE-ID && CWE-ID && CVSS) AND (𝐷𝑦 has CVE-ID) THEN 𝐷𝑦has CWE-ID, CVSS 
IF (𝐷𝑥 has CVE-ID && Author) AND (𝐷𝑦 has CVE-ID) THEN 𝐷𝑦 has Author 
IF (𝐷𝑦 has CVE-ID && exploit code) AND (𝐷𝑥 has CVE-ID) THEN 𝐷𝑥 has exploit code 
 
Listing 1: Semantic rules to infer vulnerabilities representations standards. 
 
4.5 Use Cases Scenarios 
In this section, we illustrate the applicability of our knowledge model through examples that take 
advantage of our unified ontological representation. The results demonstrate that our knowledge 
model cannot only unify these heterogeneous vulnerability data-sources but can also enable new 
and more flexible types of vulnerability analysis. 
 
Implementation: For both of our examples, we reuse again our previous NVD (D1) and 
Exploit-DB (D2) datasets. NVD is arguably the world’s largest database of publicly known 
vulnerabilities in software systems [38], and Exploit-DB61 is a CVE compliant archive of public 
exploits and software being affected by these exploits. Exploit-DB is mainly used by penetration 
testers and vulnerability researchers. Common to both data sources is that they can be considered 
to be information silos, with no unified representation that would allow for a seamless 
information exchange or exploration facilities across these two SVDBs. For example, when a 
CVE designation is assigned to a reported vulnerability in D1, details about this vulnerability are 
often not published until a technical review of the vulnerability is completed. Such a review 
typically also includes assigning a severity score and additional CWE classification information. 
On the other hand, D2 publishes the CVE-ID of a vulnerability together with its description and 
a proof of concept exploit. These information differences can not only result in situations where 
the same vulnerability (CVE-ID) might be published with a different reporting date, but also 
each SVDB provides different information details about the same vulnerability. In what follows, 
we show how our unified knowledge representation can eliminate the traditional information 




silos these SVDBs have preserved and improve the accessibility and traceability of information 
among these SVDBs. 
 
Data collection, extraction, and population: For the data collection, we downloaded and 
parsed all available XML data feeds from D1 and populated them in our D1-system-specific 
ontology. For the D2 dataset, we implemented a Java script to scrape D2’s website to extract the 
meta-data for each published exploit (CVE-IDs if exist, author, links, etc.) and populated the 
downloaded facts in our D2-system-specific ontology. It should be noted that for all of our 
system- and domain-specific ontologies we use the same URI generator to create unique, 
dereferenceable URIs for each fact in our knowledge base (Figure 22 shows the URIs 









Figure 22: Overview of namespaces and nomenclature used. 
 
The results of our fact extraction and population step are two system-ontologies, which consist of 
94,657 vulnerabilities (D1) and 38,415 exploit entries (D2) ; see Table 23.  
 
Table 23: Dataset statistics 
ID Name Total entries # triples 
D1 National Vulnerabilities Database (NVD) 94,657 1,793,393,3 
D2 Exploit Database (ED) 38,415 453,236 
 
Next, we illustrate how our modeling approach can benefit SVDB users by: (1) identifying 
inconsistency among disclosure dates of vulnerabilities, and (2) enriching SVDB system level 
ontologies with missing vulnerability information from other SVDBs.  
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4.5.1 Use Case Scenario #1: Identifying Inconsistencies in 
Vulnerability Public Disclosure Dates 
Determining the public disclosure date of a vulnerability is vital to understanding the life cycle 
of a vulnerability. Previous studies (e.g., [102], [167], [168], [106], and [169]) have relied in 
their analysis on only a single SVDB (e.g., NVD) as their information source. While the CVE 
publication date used in these studies corresponds to the publication date in NVD, it is not 
necessarily the date the vulnerability was publicly disclosed [218]. In our approach we compare 
the publication dates of vulnerabilities in different SVDBs to identify inconsistencies among the 
dates and to provide security engineers with more accurate reporting date results. 
 
Results and discussion: For our analysis, we take advantage of our ontological representation 
which allows us to create a simple SPARQL query (Listing 2) that links all exploits based on 
their CVE-IDs from the two databases (D1 and D2) and returns the release date for each 
vulnerability recorded in the individual dataset.  
 
PREFIX[…] 
SELECT DISTINCT ?exploit ?expDate ?vulnerability ?vulDate 
WHERE{ 
    ?exploit rdf:type sevont:Exploit. 
    ?vulnerability rdf:type sevont:Vulnerability. 
    ?exploit sevont:hasEntryReleaseDate ?expDate. 
    ?vulnerability sevont:hasEntryReleaseDate ?vulDate. 




Listing 2: Query to retrieve publish (Release) dates between vulnerabilities (D1) 
The query results show that 21,654 CVEs appear in both datasets and that of these 16,337 
(75%) are disclosed in D2 prior to being published in D1 (with a median number of seven days 
between the two reports). On the other hand, 3,848 (18%) of vulnerabilities were published first 
in D1 before they were included in D2. Only 7% of the vulnerabilities show the same publication 
date in both SVDBs. Table 24 shows an example of the retrieved data from our knowledge base 
for the vulnerabilities publication dates for D1 and D2.  
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Table 24: Example information retrieved from our Knowledge Base for NVD and Exploit-DB as 
denoted in Query 1 
Exploit-DB entry Release Date NVD entry Release Date 
Exploit-DB: 43376 20/12/2017 NVD: CVE-2017-17692 21/12/2017 
Exploit-DB: 43363 14/12/2017 NVD: CVE-2017-17411 21/12/2017 
Exploit-DB: 43378 20/12/2017 NVD: CVE-2017-17752 20/12/2017 
Exploit-DB: 18818 01/05/2012 NVD: CVE-2012-2576 20/12/2017 
Exploit-DB: 43377 20/12/2017 NVD: CVE-2017-17759 19/12/2017 
Exploit-DB: 43355 18/12/2017 NVD: CVE-2017-15048 19/12/2017 
Exploit-DB: 43354 18/12/2017 NVD: CVE-2017-15049 19/12/2017 
Exploit-DB: 43344 15/12/2017 NVD: CVE-2017-17088 19/12/2017 
 
For example, CVE-2012-2576 is a vulnerability in SolarWinds Storage manager 5.1.0 and 
earlier 62   that was first discussed and assigned a CVE-ID in D2 in May 2012. The same 
vulnerability was not published in D1 until December 2017. Our results show that users who rely 
only on D1 and are unaware of exploits reported in D2 will not receive any alerts from D1 until 
December 2017. However, once a vulnerability becomes public (in this case May 2012), its 
likelihood for being exploited increases significantly, since the vulnerability is now publicly 
announced. 
4.5.2 Use Case Scenario #2: Enriching Vulnerability Data  
As we discussed earlier, SVDBs are a rich data source that can be used for mining and analysis 
of security issues and their fixes. However, the level of details, the completeness, and the quality 
of vulnerability information may differ significantly among SVDBs. For example, a security 
engineer relying only on D2 would have to rely on CVE-ID to identify a vulnerability. While 
CVE-IDs are widely used to describe reported vulnerabilities, alternative or supplementary 
information might exist in other SVDBs. 
 
Results and discussion: Query 2, an extension of the SPARQL query (Listing 2), establishes a 
semantic link between D1 and D2 using the CVE-ID captured by both SVDBs. Given SPARQL 
query (Listing 3), we can now automatically infer missing vulnerability information in D2 such 
as the exploit type (described by CWE standard) and the exploit severity score (described by 
CVSS standard).  





SELECT DISTINCT ?exploit ?vulnerability ?weakness  
                ?severityLevel ?CVSSscore  
WHERE{ 
    ?exploit rdf:type sevont:Exploit. 
    ?vulnerability rdf:type sevont:Vulnerability. 
    ?vulnerability sevont:hasExploit ?exploit. 
    ?vulnerability sevont:hasSeverity ?severityLevel. 
    ?vulnerability sevont:hasWeakness ?weakness. 




Listing 3: Query to retrieve the missing vulnerability information between vulnerabilities (D1) 
and related exploits (D2). 
 
Figure 23: Distribution of CVSS severity scores, which are on a scale of 0 to 10, rounded to the 
nearest integer. 
CVSS scores assigned to D2 exploits. The results from query (Listing 3) can now, for example, 
be used to classify exploits in D2 based on their CVSS severity scores. CVSS severity scores 
range from 0 to 10. Our query results (see Figure 23) show that vulnerabilities reported in D2 
data consist mostly of vulnerabilities with a severity score of 5-10 (medium to high severity).  
CWEs information assigned to D2 exploits. Based on Listing 3, we can now use the CWE 
standard (captured in D1) for an additional classification of software exploits in D2 using the 
CVE-ID link we established among the two datasets. The results of our query show that for 54% 
of exploits a CWE-ID can be identified and classified based on the CWE standard. Table 25 lists 
the most common software weaknesses, including the frequency with which they occur in D2. 
SQL injection, buffer overflow errors, and cross-site scripting vulnerabilities are among the top 
three weaknesses.    
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Table 25: Top 10 CWE software weaknesses by the number of Exploits (D2) 
 CWE-ID Weakness Summary Num. Exploits 
1. 89 SQL Injection 2825 
2. 119 Buffer Overflow 2075 
3. 79 Cross-site Scripting 1775 
4. 94 Code Injection 1033 
5. 22 Path Traversal 927 
6. 20 Improper Input Validation 703 
7. 264 Access Control Error 647 
8. 399 Resource Management Error 301 
9. 200 Information Disclosure 249 
10. 352 Cross-Site Request Forgery 222 
 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter we have presented a semi-automated method for developing a unified 
vulnerability knowledge base, i.e., SEVONT: a pyramid of software security vulnerabilities 
analysis ontologies, which allows us to reconcile and integrate heterogeneous vulnerability data 
from several SVDBs. Our knowledge modeling approach takes advantage of FCA to guide 
knowledge engineers in abstracting and reusing concepts across system level ontologies, while at 
the same time improving knowledge integration and reuse. We illustrated the applicability of our 
knowledge model through two examples that take advantage of our unified representation to 
verify the consistency of data in these SVDBs and to enrich existing SVDB knowledge resources 
by linking them to other resources. 
In the next chapter we introduce SV-AF, a framework for integrating SEVONT with other 
SE ontologies (e.g., source code, build repositories, issue tracker). The objective of SV-AF is to 





Chapter 5  




While software vulnerabilities databases (SVDBs) are knowledge rich resources, they have often 
remained information silos, disconnected from other knowledge in the software development 
domain, such as code or issue tracker repositories. Several reasons exist for these information 
silos: (1) A lack of standardized formalism for representing knowledge in the SE domain. (2) 
The inability to integrate seamlessly heterogeneous knowledge resources that would allow for 
both establishing semantic links across existing knowledge and inferring new knowledge. (3) No 
uniform resource identifiers across knowledge resources that support fact and analysis results 
sharing for consumption by either humans or machines.  
Given the growing importance of IS for the software domain and the challenges the software 
community faces in integrating heterogeneous knowledge resources, this chapter introduces a 
modeling approach that addresses this traceability challenge. More specifically, our approach 
takes advantage of the SW and its supporting technologies (e.g., ontologies, Linked Data, 
reasoning services) to establish a unified representation that supports knowledge integration 
across repository boundaries. In addition, by using ontologies and Linked Data we can now 
enrich these repositories with explicit and implicit semantic links and take advantage of SW 
reasoning services to create true information hubs. 
In this chapter, we introduce a Security Vulnerabilities Analysis Framework (SV-AF) which 
not only establishes traceability links between SVDBs and SE repositories, but also enables 
practitioners to be notified about potential security vulnerabilities introduced due to the indirect 
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dependencies within their systems. Two case studies are presented to illustrate the applicability 
of our presented approach. In these case studies we link the NVD vulnerability databases and the 
Maven build repository to trace vulnerabilities across repository and project boundaries. In our 
analysis, we identify that 750 Maven project releases are directly affected by known security 
vulnerabilities and by considering transitive dependencies, an additional 415,604 Maven projects 
can be identified as potentially affected by these vulnerabilities.  
 
Related work: In a related study, Ilo et al. [63] presented their Software Relationship Ontology 
(SWREL) to model information about software interrelationships across different ecosystems. 
However, their ontology design focuses on the conceptualization rather than the inference of new 
knowledge. In addition, the semantic linking in SWREL is based on the dependencies relations 
existing in the Maven repository and Debian63 package repository. In contrast, our approach has 
more abstracted and generalizable features which can capture knowledge of different build-
systems and package management repositories.   
Mircea et al. [164] introduced their Vulnerability Alert Service (VAS) tool to notify users if a 
vulnerability is reported for a software system. VAS depends on the OWASP Dependency-
Check tool which we compare with our SV-AF approach in Section 5.4. VAS reports the 
vulnerable projects identified by the OWASP tool without further investigation; and just like 
OWASP, VAS does not support transitive dependencies analysis of vulnerable components. 
 
Note: Earlier versions of the work have been published in the 27th IEEE International 
Symposium on Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE 2016) [44] and in the journal Science of 
Computer Programming, Volume 121, 2016 [165]. 
 
5.2 A Security Vulnerability Analysis Framework 
5.2.1 Knowledge Modeling 
One of the key premises of the SW is its ability to share and extend existing knowledge. Our 
knowledge modeling approach builds upon this premise by reusing and extending the SE 
                                                     
63 https://www.debian.org/distrib/packages 
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ontologies introduced in [20]. More specifically, we extend these ontologies by focusing not only 
on the semantic integration of additional traditional software repositories (e.g., build 
management) and specialized repositories (e.g., vulnerability databases), but also an ontology 
design that goes beyond the conceptualization of a domain of discourse by focusing on the 
inference of new knowledge. We followed a bottom-up modeling approach, where we first 
model system-specific concepts and iteratively abstracted higher-level shared concepts in upper-
ontologies (see Figure 24). The resulting four layer modeling hierarchy is similar to a metadata 
modeling approach introduced by the Object Management Group (OMG)64. Each of these layers 
differ in terms of their purpose and their design rationale. To improve the readability, we denote 
OWL classes in italic, individuals are underlined, and a dashed underline is used for properties. 
For a complete description of our ontologies, we refer the reader to [215]. 





























System Specific Concepts 
  
Figure 24: The SV-AF Ontologies Abstraction Hierarchies. 
 
General Concept Layer – Classes in the top-layer model correspond to meta-meta level 
concepts—core concepts shared and extended by the lower modeling layers. Examples of such 




core concepts are: Product, Reference, Activity, Stakeholder, and Artifact. All concepts in this 
layer are subclasses of the SeonThing class (a subclass of owl:Thing, which captures the set of all 
individuals within our framework). Similarly the datatype properties and object properties in this 
layer are generic and shared across the abstraction layers. For example, the dependsOn object 
property captures the generic relationship between things—one Product dependsOn another 
Artifact.   
 
Domain-Spanning Concepts – In this layer, concepts describe knowledge that is typically 
inferred from two or more ontologies. For example the measurements ontology acts as a general 
linking mechanism between ontologies. The ontology provides two basic concepts, BaseMeasure 
or DerivedMeasure. Adequate BaseMeasure instances are the size and numberOfDependencies 
in a Product. DerivedMeasure captures an aggregation of values from different subdomains. For 
example, the DerivedMeasure class includes the numberOfVulnerabilitiesPerApi instance, which 
is computed from measures collected from the source code, history, build system, and the 
vulnerability ontologies. SimilarityMeasure, which is a subclass of DerivedMeasure, captures the 
similarity ([0,1]) between any two SeonThing instances.  
 
Domain-Specific Concepts – The third layer in our knowledge model captures domain-specific 
aspects—concepts that are common and reused across resources in a particular domain (e.g., 
domain of issue trackers). At the core of the domain specific layer we have several domain 
ontologies: (1) SEVONT, (2) Software Evolution ONtologies (SEON) [20], and (3) Software 
Build Systems ONtologies (SBSON). For example, security databases are capturing a 
Vulnerability that has an associated Event. An event often can be further divided into Action and 
Impact—an attacker exploits a Vulnerability to produce an Action, which has an Impact.  
 
System-Specific Concepts – The bottom layer defines system-specific concepts by extending 
the domain specific concepts to capture knowledge specific to a particular knowledge resource. 
For example, the system specific ontology for NVD extends the general SEVONT ontology with 
NVD specific information on the severity of vulnerabilities by adding a Severity concept. 
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5.2.2 Knowledge Engineering and Integration 
The SW is characterized by decentralization, heterogeneity, and lack of central control or 
authority. These new features have greatly contributed to the success of the SW, but at the same 
time they have also introduced several new challenges.   
 
Knowledge base engineering: In contrast to the top-down approach often used by knowledge 
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Figure 25: Knowledge engineering process to support result integration. 
 
When modeling a new knowledge resource or integrating new analysis results, during the 
interception phase we first conceptualize the domain of discourse by identifying its major 
concepts and relations. Before adding a concept to the knowledge base, we verify that a similar 
concept has not been previously modeled in any of the upper SV-AF’s layers (e.g., the domain-
specific layer) and re-use the existing concepts whenever possible. If no similar concept exists, 
we temporarily add the concept to its system-specific ontology before considering consolidating 
it with other existing concepts. This consolidation process usually is postponed until we reach a 
sufficient understanding of the problem domain.  
For the knowledge modeling and integration of SE resources, we follow a similar approach 
as we used for SEVONT. For example, given two similar concepts found in different SE 
repositories (e.g., issue tracker and build systems), we will first create two distinct system-
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specific concepts in both ontologies. We then compare these system ontologies and move 
commonalities to the domain-specific layer, in order to improve knowledge reuse and 
traceability. Concepts modeled in more than one domain are promoted from the domain-specific 
to the domain-spanning layer. 
 
5.2.3 An Example Scenario: Modeling global vulnerability impacts 
using bi-directional dependencies 
Currently, there are a number of build systems which provide users with support for managing 
both internal components and external API dependencies. However, while such a unidirectional 
dependency model works well for managing build dependencies, it restricts a user’s ability to 
further reason upon this knowledge. For example, using Maven, it is currently not possible for a 
user to identify all components or projects that depend either directly or indirectly on a specific 
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Figure 26: Unidirectional vs. bi-directional dependencies. 
 
To overcome this challenge, we take advantage of the SW and its standardized knowledge 
modeling approach by introducing our SBSON ontology to capture the dependencies in the 
Maven repository. 
Using SBSON we are now able to create a global bi-directional project dependency graph 
which supports extra semantic analysis by taking advantage of semantic reasoning services. For 
example, in Figure 26, using SBSON we can extend the Maven supported impact analysis on 
project C by not only identifying all components on which project C depends on (projects D and 







































































































Figure 27: SV-AF’s ontologies and concepts involved in software vulnerability dependencies 
analysis. 
 
As discussed before, our SV-AF knowledge modeling approach allows analysis approaches 
to take advantage of the bi-directional dependencies in our knowledge model. In what follows, 
we not only illustrate how the Maven repository can be seamlessly integrated with NVD by 
modelling relevant concepts and their relations across the different abstraction layers in our 
knowledge modeling approach, we also provide a concrete usage scenario showing how our 
unified representation can now support, for example, impact analysis of known vulnerabilities 
across heterogeneous software repositories (NVD and Maven). The OWL classes and object 
properties used for the impact analysis example are shown in Figure 27 (data properties have 
been omitted to improve readability of the figure). 
Modeling Vulnerable Release Dependencies: A VulnerableRelease is a software Release 
within the NVD database with a known Vulnerability. A BuildRelease is a software release 
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within the Maven ecosystem. Using our ontology alignment process, we infer that a given 
VulnerableRelease is sameAs a specific BuildRelease. As such, the VulnerableRelease inherits 
the properties of the original BuildRelease, for example, the VulnerableRelease now dependsOn 
other BuildRelease. Given the support for bi-directional links in our model, a Project hosted in 
an ecosystem’s Repository can now be identified as being potentially affected by a vulnerability 
when it directly or indirectly reuses a VulnerableRelease. 
 
5.3 Methodology 
5.3.1 Overview  
Next, we introduce in more detail our overall methodology (Figure 28) which consists of three 
major steps: (i) fact extraction and population, (ii) ontology alignment, and (iii) tracing 
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Figure 28: SV-AF system overview. 
 
 
5.3.2 Fact Extraction and Population 
Our SV-AF framework depends on several endogenous and exogenous data sources. 
Endogenous data sources, such as source code, issues trackers, and build repositories, are 
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internal to a software development environment. In contrast, exogenous data sources, such as 
vulnerability databases and Q&A sites, are external to a software development environment.   
The fact extraction process itself consists of extracting facts from the Maven POM files and 
the NVD XML update feeds (see Figure 28–B). For the ontology population, we use the Jena65 
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Figure 29: Instances matching approach. 
 
5.3.3 Ontology Instances Alignment 
For the alignment of instance in our ontologies, we take advantage of the Probabilistic Soft Logic 
(PSL) framework [219] which establishes weighted links between ontologies (Figure 29).  
PSL uses continuous variables to represent truth values, relaxing the standard Boolean values 
[219] traditionally used. The resulting probability distribution over literals is captured in a graph 
model which can then be reasoned upon. The majority of the rules in PSL are soft-weighted 
rules, like rules stating that instances are similar if their names or their classes are similar (see 
Listing 4).  
  




1.  𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 − 1: 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝐴, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∧ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝐵, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∧ 𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒(𝐴, 𝑋)
∧ 𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒(𝐵, 𝑌) ∧ 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐼𝐷(𝑋, 𝑌)
∧ 𝐴. 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 ≠ 𝐵. 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 
⇒ 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝐴, 𝐵) wight: 0.5
 
2.  𝑅𝑢𝑙𝑒 −  2: 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝐴, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∧ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒(𝐵, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒) ∧ 𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒(𝐴, 𝑋)
∧ 𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒(𝐵, 𝑌) ∧ 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐼𝐷(𝑋, 𝑌)
∧ 𝐴. 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 ≠ 𝐵. 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 
∧ 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐴, 𝑍) ∧ 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐵, 𝐾)
∧ 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝐼𝐷(𝑍, 𝐾)
⇒ 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟(𝐴, 𝐵) wight: 0.8
 
 
Listing 4: PSL rules. 
For example, in Listing 4 – Rule 1, the rule states that two instances A, B with similar names 
defined in different source ontologies are likely to be similar. “similarID” is a similarity function 
implemented using the Levenshtein similarity metric. Rules in PSL are labeled with non-
negative weights. In Listing 4 – Rule 2, the rule weights are used to indicate that projects with 
same names and versions are more likely to be similar than projects with same names only 
(Listing 4 – Rule 1).  
Using PSL we can establish owl:sameAs relations between similar instances found in the 
SEVONT and SBSON ontologies. In this example, two system-specific ontologies, NVD and 
Maven, and their corresponding instances |𝑁𝑉𝐷| and |𝑀𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛| are used as data sources. The 
number of possible instance pairs for these two ontologies is |𝑁𝑉𝐷| × |𝑀𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑛|. In our example, 
similarity among instance pairs is determined based on the extracted literal information such as 
name, version, and vendor. We used the PSL framework classifier to compute the similarity 
weights for the owl:sameAs links. For training purposes, we created a training dataset with 
manually labeled instance links to train the PSL classifier to establish the weights for the pre-
defined rules. Having derived the semantic similarity weights for each instance pair, we can now 
assign these weights to the owl:sameAs (see Figure 30) links between the aligned instances and 
then materialize the alignment results to our knowledge base. Having the weighted alignment 
links between the two ontologies, a SPARQL query can now be written to retrieve the 
vulnerability information from the NVD ontology and their corresponding instances in Maven 
ontology based on a given similarity threshold. For this query, we take advantage of RDFS++66 
                                                     
66 http://franz.com/agraph/support/learning/Overview-of-RDFS++.lhtml 
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reasoning to not only retrieve explicit but also infer implicit facts from the knowledge base. 
More specifically, our ontology design not only supports transitive but also subsumption 
















Figure 30: Weighted similarity modeling. 
 
5.3.4 Knowledge Inference and Reasoning 
A key feature of many triples-stores is to provide scalability reasoning by materializing 
reasoning results. In this section, we discuss how such reasoning capabilities are used in our 
approach to trace vulnerabilities across knowledge boundaries. 
owl:sameAs inference: A commonly used predicate for inferring new knowledge is 
owl:sameAs, which is used to align two concepts. An example from our SBSON and SEVONT 
ontologies is shown in Listing 5. 
 
𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑛𝑡: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝐴               𝑟𝑑𝑓: 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒                                   𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑛𝑡: 𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒
𝑠𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑛: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝐵                 𝑟𝑑𝑓: 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒                                   𝑠𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑛: 𝐵𝑢𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒
𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑛𝑡: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝐴               𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑛𝑡: ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦   𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑛𝑡: 𝐶𝑉𝐸 − 𝐼𝐷 
𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑛𝑡: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝐴               𝒐𝒘𝒍: 𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒆𝑨𝒔                           𝑠𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑛: 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝐵.
 
Listing 5: owl:sameAs rules example 
 
Given is the following SPARQL query (Listing 6), which takes advantage of the owl:sameAs 
predicate if inference is enabled 
  





SELECT ?vulnerability ?release 
WHERE{  
    ?release rdf:type sbson:BuildRelease. 




Listing 6: SPARQL query returning same as projects vulnerabilities 
 
 Without inferencing, the query result set would be empty since no triple has as subject 
sbson:ProjB and predicate sevont:hasVulnerability. However, with inference enabled, it can now 
be inferred that ProjB has a vulnerability (CVE-ID67) through the reasoner being able to establish 
a link between sbson:ProjB and sevont:ProjA using the owl:sameAs property. 
owl:TransitiveProperty inference: A relation R is said to be transitive if R(a,b) and R(b,c) 
implies R(a,c); this can be expressed in OWL through the owl:TransitiveProperty construct. We 
define seon:dependsOn to be a bi-directional transitive property of type owl:TransitiveProperty 
(e.g., seon:dependsOn rdf:type owl:TransitiveProperty). Through this transitive construct we are 
now able to retrieve a list of all projects that have a direct and transitive dependency on the 





    ?release rdf:type sbson:BuildRelease. 
    ?release sevont:hasVulnerability ?vulnerability. 




Listing 7: SPARQL query returning transitive vulnerable dependencies. 
 
5.4 Case Studies 
This section introduces the two case studies we use to evaluate the applicability of our 
knowledge modeling approach. More specifically, in case study #1 we identify semantically 
                                                     
67 Every CVE-ID is uniquely identified by the letters ’CVE’, followed by eight digits. For example, CVE-2015-0235. 
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similar software projects that exist in Maven and contain known security vulnerabilities 
disclosed in the NVD database. The objective of this case study is to evaluate the applicability of 
our alignment process by comparing it against a specialized, existing dependency analysis tool 
[42]. For the second case study, we illustrate how semantic reasoning can enable semantic richer 
analysis services. More specifically, we show that our semantic rules can infer explicit and 
implicit security vulnerabilities by inferring transitive dependencies by traversing the bi-
directional links. 
5.4.1 Case Studies Data 
For the data collection and extraction in our case studies, we relied on two data sources: the 
NVD database and the Maven build repository. We downloaded the latest version of the 
repository from the Maven.org website (Table 26) and downloaded all NVD vulnerability xml 
feeds from 1990 and 2016 (Table 27). For case study #1, the number of releases and unique 
vulnerable products were used to evaluate our alignment approach for integrating these two 
ontologies. 
Table 26: Maven Repository statistics 
Repository Projects Releases Last Update 
Maven [220] 130,895 1,219,731 2016-01-28 16:34:07 UTC 
 
 
Table 27: Maven Repository statistics 
Repository # unique vulnerabilities # unique vulnerable products Period  
NVD [221] 74945 109212 1990 - 2016 
 
For case study #2, the objective was to identify the potential transitive impact set of some 
vulnerable components on other systems. For this study we selected five Apache projects (Table 
28) hosted in the Maven repository. The main criteria for selecting these projects was that at least 
some of their releases contain known vulnerabilities (identified in case study #1) and the 
functionalities these products provide are widely reused by other projects. These five subjects 
vary in size (classes and methods) and application domain. Wss4J68 is a Java implementation of 
the primary security standards for Web Services, Httpclient 69  is responsible for providing 
reusable components for client-side authentication, HTTP state management, and HTTP 




connection management. Apache Derby70 is an open source relational database implemented 
entirely in Java, Hibernate Validator71 allows expression and validation of application constraints 
using annotation-based constraints, and Apache OpenJPA72 is a Java persistence project that can 
be used as a stand-alone plain old Java object (POJO) persistence layer or can be integrated into 
any Java EE compliant container. 
Table 28: Subject systems and sizes for transitive dependencies analysis 
ID Subject Systems Version 
Size 
Classes Methods 
P1 Wss4j  1.6.16 167 1610 
P2 Httpclient  4.1 209 1180 
P3 Derby  10.1.1.0 967 16354 
P4 Hibernate-validator  4.1.0.Final 325 2642 
P5 Openjpa 1.1.0 1201 18640 
 
5.4.2 Case Studies Results  
Case Study 1: Identifying open source components that are directly susceptible to known 
security vulnerabilities. 
 
Objective: The goal of this study is to evaluate the performance of our semantic similarity 
linking approach used to align two domain specific ontologies. 
 
Approach: In order to align (link) these two ontologies (SEVONT and SBSON), we use the PSL 
framework to align project specific information found in both ontologies. We trained PSL using 
a corpus of 500 randomly selected project instance pairs for which we manually created links. 
We then executed our PSL alignment rules on this training dataset to train our approach. As a 
result of this training, two concept instances in these ontologies can now be aligned with a 
degree of certainty, if A and B, with same names are defined in different ontologies 
( ¬𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒 ) and have similar Vendors and same Version numbers. SameName, 
SimilarVendor, and SameVersion are similarity functions implemented using a Levenshtein 
distance metric. In this example, the SameProject(A,B) is given a weight of 0.9 (Listing 8), 
which is based on results from the PSL training set. Figure 31 shows the PSL inference results 





for our training dataset, with the weights for the 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐴, 𝐵) alignment ranging from a 
minimum of 0.04 to a maximum of 0.42. 
Using the semantic rule (Listing 8), PSL can now perform maximum a posteriori (MPE) 
reasoning [219] to infer the most likely values for a set of propositions and observed values for 
the remaining (evidence) propositions. 
 
𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒(𝐴, 𝑆𝑛𝐴) ∧ 𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒(𝐵, 𝑆𝑛𝐵)
∧ ¬𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑆𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒(𝑆𝑛𝐴, 𝑆𝑛𝐵)
∧ 𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒(𝐴, 𝑋1) ∧ 𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒(𝐵, 𝑌1)
∧ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑁𝑎𝑚𝑒(𝑋1, 𝑌1)
∧ 𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑟(𝐴, 𝑋2) ∧ 𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑟(𝐵, 𝑌2)
∧ 𝑆𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑉𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑟(𝑋2, 𝑌2)
∧ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐴, 𝑋3) ∧ 𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝐵, 𝑌3)
∧ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑉𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑋3, 𝑌3)
⇒ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐴, 𝐵) weight: 0.9
 
 
Listing 8: SameProject Rules. 
 
For a full discussion on MPE reasoning, we refer the reader to [219]. The results of the PSL 
inference are a set of 𝐴 × 𝐵 SameProject weights that range from [0..1], with 0 two concept 
instances having no similarity and 1 corresponding to 100% similarity among instances.  
 
Figure 31: PSL similarities results. 
 
As part of our knowledge modeling approach, we materialized the inferred semantic instance 
links (owl:sameAs) between the SEVONT and SBSON ontology, making this inferred 
knowledge a persistent part of our knowledge model. We add weights for each link based on the 
inferred similarity values using the domain spanning similarity measure (SimilarityMeasure) 
class in our model (Section 5.2.1). 
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Findings. Our study showed that 0.062% of all Maven projects contain known security 
vulnerabilities that have been reported in the NVD database. An example for such a vulnerability 
is shown in Table 29. 
Table 29: Example of linked vulnerability 









A further results analysis showed that projects might often suffer from multiple 
vulnerabilities. We also observed that 48.8% of the 750 identified vulnerable project releases 
suffer from multiple security vulnerabilities, with PostgreSQL 7.4.1 being the most vulnerable 
project in our dataset, containing 25 known vulnerabilities. Providing this additional insight can 
guide system update decisions and help avoid the reuse of APIs/components with known security 
vulnerabilities or components that might be prone to these types of vulnerabilities.  
For example, in December 2010, Google released its Nexus S smartphone73. The phone was 
originally running on Android 2.3.3—an Android version that already contained the security 
vulnerability discussed in Table 30. While the Nexus S received regular Android OS updates up 
to Android Version 4.2, an actual fix of the reported vulnerability (CVE-2013-4787) was only 
introduced with Android 4.2.2. However, this new Android version is not supported and 
distributed for the Nexus S, leaving existing users of the phone susceptible to attacks. Our 
analysis also showed that the same vulnerability can affect multiple releases of a product. For 
example, security vulnerability CVE-2013-478774 has been reported for five different Android 
versions (Table 30). For product maintainers this information can help to ensure consistent 
patching and regression testing across product lines or different versions of a product. 
Table 30: Critical Vulnerabilities for Android Project 
Android Version CVE-IDs # of direct dependencies 
SBSON#com.google.android:android:2.2.1 CVE-2013-4787 360 
SBONS#com.google.android:android:2.3.1 CVE-2013-4787 176 
SBSON#com.google.android:android:2.3.3 CVE-2013-4787 351 
SBSON#com.google.android:android:3.0 CVE-2013-4787 34 
SBSON#com.google.android:android:4.2 CVE-2013-4787 1 




Evaluation: We evaluate the linking accuracy when aligning project instances (owl:sameAs) 
between our Maven and NVD ontologies.  
During the first step of our evaluation, we compared the impact of the similarity weight 
thresholds (w = 0.1, w = 0.2, w = 0.3, and  w = 0.4 ) in terms of precision, recall, and F1 
measure on the inferred links created by the PSL alignment process. Precision is calculated with 
true positives being the number of project instance pairs correctly classified as similar, while 
false positives correspond to the number of non-similar instance pairs that are incorrectly 
classified as same projects. For Recall, false negatives correspond to the number of non-similar 
instance pairs that are incorrectly classified as being similar projects. The F1-score is the 
harmonic mean of precision and recall, giving equal weight to both measures.  
Table 31: owl:sameAs link (w) evaluation 
 Precision 
Data Size  w=0.0 w=0.1 w=0.2 w=0.3 w=0.4 
500 
0.77 0.88 0.98 0.93 0.75 
Recall 
0.77 0.68 0.30 0.03 0.01 
F1-score 
0.77 0.77 0.46 0.05 0.01 
 
Our analysis (Table 31) showed that an increase in the similarity threshold from 0.1 (low 
similarity) to 0.4 (higher similarity) had limited effect on the precision (decrease from 0.98 to 
0.75), recall was significantly lower (down from 0.68 to 0.01).  
A manual inspection of the inferred links showed that the low recall for the higher threshold values is 
due to the inconsistent capturing of vendor information within the two ontologies. NVD relies on the 
common name to identify a vendor, whereas Maven uses the fully qualified package name as the vendor 
name. For example, using a w=0.0, org.apache.cxf:cxf:3.0.1,org.apache.geronim.configs:cxf:3.0.1 and  
org.apache.geronimo.plugins:cxf:3.0.1 in SBSON will be considered the same instance as 
apache:cxf:3.0.1 in SEVONT and therefore correctly linked. However using a higher similarity threshold, 
these instances will no longer be linked. We use the similarity weight of w = 0.1 in all subsequent 
experiments due to its high F1-score. 
We further evaluated the link quality by comparing our approach against the OWASP 
Dependency-Check tool [42], a specialized tool which identifies direct dependencies between 
projects and publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. For the study, we apply the OWASP dependency 
check tool as our gold standard and compare the detected dependencies against the links 
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generated by our approach (Table 32). The low OWASP recall is because OWASP requires JAR 
files to be available to be able to map the files to the vulnerabilities. However, not all projects 
hosted in Maven are distributed with their JAR files.  
Table 32: SV-AF vs. OWASP Dependency Check tool accuracy evaluation 
Data Size 
SV-AF w=0.1 OWASP 
Precision Recall F1-score Precision Recall F1-score 
500 0.88 0.68 0.77 0.81 0.26 0.40 
 
Case Study 2: Identifying open source components that are directly and indirectly dependent on 
vulnerable components. 
Objective: In this study we evaluate how our framework can support the analysis of potential 
security vulnerability impacts on dependent software components. Furthermore, the case study 
illustrates the flexibility of our knowledge modeling approach and highlights how additional 
knowledge resources can be seamlessly integrated and reasoned upon.  
Approach: For this case study, we extend our analysis to include transitive closure dependencies 
(Figure 32) that not only identify components that are directly but also indirectly affected by 
known vulnerabilities. For this impact analysis, we selected 5 open source Java projects (Table 
28) with known security vulnerabilities for which we do not distinguish if a component actually 
makes use (calls) a vulnerable component or not. 
 
Project #1 Project #2 Project #3 Project #ndependsOn dependsOn
Level #1 Level #2
dependsOn
Level #n
Inferred relation Declared relation
dependsOn
 
Figure 32: Inferred project dependencies in SBSON. 
 
 
Findings: In what follows, we summarize the findings from our case study. We report on our 
transitive dependency analysis which highlights also the benefits of our knowledge modeling 
approach, the ability to integrate knowledge resources while taking advantage of inference 
services provided by the SW. Given the bi-directional links we established between the NVD 
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and the Maven repository, our analysis is no longer limited to identifying whether a project 
depends on a vulnerable component. Instead, given a vulnerable component we can now also 
provide a more holistic analysis by identifying in a global context which other projects 
potentially directly or indirectly depend on this vulnerable component. 
Table 33 provides a summary of our analysis. In order to keep the results simple and 
readable, we consider only three levels of transitivity. For example, the vulnerable project 
Hibernate-validator 4.1.0 (P4) has a potential impact set of 3,805 direct dependent projects (level 
1) and 128,109 dependent projects when we consider an additional two levels of transitivity 
(level 3). 
Table 33: Transitive dependencies on vulnerable components 




Number of dependent components 
based on transitivity level (L) 







336 639 73 
P2 Httpclient 4.1 2 
CVE-2011-1498 
CVE-2014-3577 
685 4,961 41,326 








1 CVE-2014-3558 3,805 39,295 128,109 
P5 Openjpa 1.1.0 1 CVE-2013-1768 74 49,460 141,303 
 
 
Figure 33 illustrates a typical usage scenario for our modeling approach. While the Geronimo-
jetty6-javaee5 (version 2.1.1) itself has no known vulnerabilities reported, the project depends on 
several components (level 1 dependencies) with known security issues (5 Java projects with a 
total of 15 known security vulnerabilities), thus potentially making Geronimo-jetty6-javaee5 a 
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Figure 33: Geronimo-jetty6-javaee5 uses 5 projects (external APIs) from level 1 dependency and 
each project suffers from security vulnerabilities. 
 
5.5 Discussion and Threats to Validity 
As our experiments illustrate, a unified and formal knowledge model can indeed help eliminate 
existing information silos by seamlessly linking and integrating knowledge resources. For the 
linking, we take advantage of a probabilistic semantic similarity measure to link instances in our 
ontologies (e.g., projects in SEVONT and SBSON). Moreover, unlike traditional mining 
software repositories techniques, our approach allows for analysis results and inferred knowledge 
to become part of the knowledge base and allow for their later consumption (processing) by 
either humans or machines. In addition, rather than relying on proprietary analysis solutions, our 
modeling approach takes advantage of the SW technology stack, including standardized 
knowledge representation and inference services. 
 
5.5.1 Case Study 1 
Identifying known security vulnerabilities in software projects has been widely discussed in the 
literature [43], [164], [165], [222]. However, our approach differs from these existing works in 
that: (1) it unifies two heterogeneous knowledge resources (software security repositories and 
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build system repositories) using a standardized knowledge representation; (2) it supports 
semantic relationships (e.g., owl:sameAs) and RDFS++ reasoning to infer new knowledge (e.g., 
identify vulnerable transitive dependencies) which is not explicitly found in any of these 
resources; and (3) given the bi-directional links, our analysis can go beyond traditional inter-
project dependencies and include intra-project dependencies. The results from our case study 
show that the problem of depending on vulnerable third party components with known security 
vulnerabilities is a common and widespread problem [165]. 
 
5.5.2 Case Study 2 
The case study illustrates that vulnerabilities can no longer be treated in a project specific 
context. With the globalization of the software industry promoting the sharing and integration of 
knowledge across knowledge borders, vulnerabilities might have a wide spread impact on the 
software ecosystem. In our second experiment, the use of transitive properties and reasoning 
capabilities allow the transformation of a typical proprietary analysis implementation into a 
simple, customizable (SPARQL) query approach which offloads much of the processing to the 
semantic reasoners. For example, the query in Listing 7 will not only return all projects that 
directly depend on a vulnerable component, but also those that are indirectly dependent on that 
component.  
 
5.5.3 Threats to Validity  
A threat to the internal validity of the study is that the instance pair matches for our training set 
were manually created and thus potentially prone to human error. In order to mitigate this, we 
conducted a cross validation of the annotation, where the links were evaluated by another person. 
Finally, the size of the dataset used to evaluate our approach might not be considered large 
enough. To mitigate this threat, we evaluated our approach on dataset sizes to study the effect of 
the dataset size on our results. Table 34 shows a standard deviation of 0.04 and 0.09 for the 
precision and recall, respectively. With the exception of the smallest evaluation size (50 instance 
pairs), our precision and recall for the various evaluation sizes are very close to the mean, 
indicating that increasing the dataset size will most likely have little adverse effect on our results. 
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Table 34: Dataset size evaluation 
Data Points 
SV-AF (w=0.1) 
Precision |Distance from Average| Recall |Distance from Average | 
50 0.76 0.11 0.38 0.26 
100 0.87 0.00 0.62 0.02 
150 0.88 0.01 0.69 0.05 
200 0.9 0.03 0.69 0.05 
250 0.89 0.02 0.68 0.04 
300 0.86 0.01 0.63 0.01 
350 0.87 0.00 0.66 0.02 
400 0.87 0.00 0.68 0.04 
450 0.88 0.01 0.67 0.03 
500 0.88 0.01 0.68 0.04 
Avg: 0.87 - 0.64 - 
SD (σ) 0.04 - 0.09 - 
 
Other threats to validity related to the ontology’s design quality are discussed in detail in Chapter 
8.  
 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we introduced a Security Vulnerabilities Analysis Framework (SV-AF) which 
introduces a unified ontological representation to establish bi-directional traceability links 
between security vulnerabilities databases and traditional software repositories. This framework 
not only eliminates some of the traditional information silos in which data resources have 
resided, but also enables different types of dependency analysis. More specifically, our 
framework currently supports the linking of vulnerabilities reported by NVD to projects captured 
by the Maven build repository. Given the expressiveness of our ontological knowledge 
representation, we can now take advantage of semantic inference services to determine both 
direct and transitive dependencies between reported vulnerabilities and potentially affected 
Maven projects. Through two experiments we showed the applicability of our framework, 
highlighting the potential impact of reusing vulnerable components in a global software 
ecosystem context. We also provided a discussion on how our framework differs from related 
work in the domain.  
In the next chapter, we discuss how SV-AV supports the recovery of traceability links 
between APIs and vulnerability information.  
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Chapter 6  
6 Recovering Semantic Traceability 




Vulnerabilities found in APIs no longer affect only individual projects but instead might spread 
across projects and even the global software ecosystem. Tracing such vulnerabilities at a global 
scale becomes an inherently difficult task since many of the resources required for such analysis 
still rely on proprietary knowledge representation. A report [43] shows that 88% of the code in 
today’s applications comes from OSS libraries and frameworks; with 26% of these OSS 
frameworks/libraries having known vulnerabilities which often remain undiscovered. In 2017, 
“Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities” [223] was ranked 9th in the OWASP Top Ten 
[224] list of software security flaws.  
Current approaches for ensuring secure software fall into two main categories. The first 
category requires organizations to create barriers that prevent developers and end-users from 
performing potentially risky actions, e.g., runtime protection. While this approach can reduce 
exposure to vulnerabilities, it does not address the fundamental cause of such vulnerabilities. The 
other category involves techniques that avoid or reduce the introduction of potential 
vulnerabilities already at the development stage, by introducing and applying best secure coding 
practices, e.g., black-box testing and static analysis. Unfortunately, most of these analysis 
techniques are limited to artifacts created within a project context and do not consider in their 
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analysis the reuse and sharing of third party components outside their original development 
scope.  
In our research, we introduce a novel approach for automatically tracing source code 
vulnerabilities at the API level across project boundaries. More specifically, we take advantage 
of the SW and its technology stack (e.g., ontologies, Linked Data, reasoning services) to 
establish a unified knowledge representation that can link and analyze vulnerabilities across 
project boundaries. Through this unified representation we can eliminate information silos that 
current analysis approaches must contend with and introduce new types of vulnerability analysis 
at a global scale. 
In Chapter 5 we introduced SV-AF, our modeling approach to establish traceability links 
between SE repositories and SVDBs. In this chapter, we extend our previous SV-AF with 
knowledge from version control systems (VCS) repositories to provide additional analysis 
services such as: (1) identifying and tracing the use of vulnerable code in APIs to projects; and 
(2) provide notifications about vulnerabilities found in APIs (and their dependent component) 
that can affect a specific project.  
 
Related work: Several approaches for static vulnerability analysis and vulnerability detection in 
source code exist (e.g., [156], [133]). Plate et. al [156] proposed a technique that supports the 
impact analysis of vulnerability based on code changes introduced by security fixes. Their 
approach relies on dynamic analysis to determine if a vulnerable code was executed within a 
given project. While our approach relies on static analysis and might be less precise, it delivers a 
more holistic approach which not only considers all possible executions but also supports a more 
general intra- and inter-project dependency analysis. Furthermore, our approach allows us to take 
advantage of semantic reasoning services to infer implicit facts about vulnerable code usages and 
supports bi-directional dependency analysis —including impacts to external dependencies.  
Nguyen et. al [133] proposed an automated method to identify vulnerable code based on 
older releases of a software system. Their approach scans the code base of each prior version for 
code containing vulnerable code fragments. In contrast our approach takes advantage of multiple 
knowledge resources, providing a greater flexibility in the analysis. 
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6.1.1 Motivating Example 
Existing research on recommending APIs to developers (e.g., [225]) has focused on 
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Figure 34: Integrating code and build information with knowledge from other heterogeneous 
resources.  
 
For example, in [225] the authors explicitly recommend developers use an older version of 
Apache Derby (version 10.1.1.0) due to its widespread usage/popularity. However, like any other 
software project, Apache Derby is also susceptible to security vulnerabilities. By recommending 
this particular older version of Derby, the authors in [225] actually recommended a version of 
Apache Derby which has two known security vulnerabilities (Table 35). These known 
vulnerabilities had already been published in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
repository. 
Table 35: Sample Derby Versions with Reported Vulnerabilities 
Derby version Release Year Reported vulnerabilities in NVD 
10.1.1.0 2005 3 
10.5.3.0 2009 1 
 
As the example illustrates, the authors of the paper were most likely unaware of these reported 
vulnerabilities since this information is not readily available to developers. Making this 
information readily available to maintainers and security experts would allow for seamless 
knowledge integration and sharing. Furthermore by using standardized and formal knowledge 
representation techniques (e.g., SW and its technology stack), novel analysis approaches across 
knowledge boundaries at both the intra- and inter-project level can be introduced.  
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For example, Figure 34 shows an example of an IDE with an open Maven 75  POM 
(ProjectX.pom) and Java file (A.java). In our approach, we extend a developer’s accessible 
knowledge from local project’s pom and Java files to knowledge resources outside the current 
project boundaries. Using an ontology-based knowledge modeling approach we can now 
integrate, share, and reason upon these heterogeneous resources (even at a global scale). In this 
example, such a knowledge base includes project-specific resources (e.g., issue tracker, 
versioning repositories) as well as resources external to the project, such as NVD and Maven 
build dependencies from other projects. Using the reasoning services provided by the SW, we 
can now infer direct and indirect dependencies for the local project (ProjectX in Figure 34). In 
addition, giving the bi-directional links in our modeling approach, we can expand our analysis to 
a global scale to answer questions like: Which projects might be directly or indirectly affected by 
a vulnerable component/library? In our example, ProjectX has an indirect dependency on 
ProjectZ (via ProjectY’s transitive dependencies) and makes use of a vulnerable ProjectZ 
component using method X.bar() within that component.  
As our example illustrates, integrating source code information with other knowledge 
resources (e.g., vulnerability and build repositories) can support new types of analysis even at a 
cross-project boundary (global) scale. In addition, these analysis results can now be used to 
further enrich existing analysis tools. For example, existing tools can be extended to not only 
recommend suitable APIs but to now recommend suitable APIs with no known direct/indirect 
vulnerabilities or to automatically notify developers when an already used API becomes exposed 
to a potential vulnerability. 
 
Note: An earlier version of the work done in this chapter was published in the 10th IEEE 
International Conference on Software Testing, Verification and Validation (ICST 2017) [166]. 
 
6.2 Modeling API Vulnerabilities 
It is generally accepted that inadvertent programming mistakes can lead to software security 
vulnerabilities and attacks [43]. Mitigating these vulnerabilities can become a major challenge 
                                                     
75 http://search.maven.org/ 
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for developers since not only their own source code might contain exploitable code, but so might 
the code of third-party APIs or external components used by their system. In what follows, we 
introduce a methodology to guide developers in identifying the potential impact of vulnerabilities 
at both the system and global levels (Figure 35). Our methodology consists of three major steps: 
knowledge modeling, alignment of ontologies, and knowledge inferences and reasoning.  
 















Figure 35: System overview. 
 
6.2.1 Knowledge Modeling 
A key premise of ontologies is their ability to share and extend existing knowledge. Our 
approach builds upon this premise by reusing and extending the integrated software security and 
engineering ontologies introduced in Chapters 4 and 5. In our modeling approach we extend 
these ontologies through semantic integration (linking) with other repositories (e.g., code 
repositories, VCS systems). We then further enrich the semantics of our model by not only 
capturing domains of discourse but also including semantic relations and properties that allow us 
to take advantage of inference services provided by the SW.  
For our model we followed a bottom-up modeling approach, where we first extracted system 
specific concepts and then iteratively abstracted shared concepts in upper ontologies (see Chapter 
5).  
To improve the readability of the chapter, we denote OWL classes in italic, individuals are 
underlined, and a dashed underline is used for properties. For a complete description of our 
ontologies, we refer the reader to [215]. Figure 36 provides an overview of our knowledge model 
used for tracing API vulnerabilities. The core concepts used for our vulnerability analysis are 
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Vulnerabilities, SecurityPatches, and APIs. Whenever a Project is identified to be affected by a 
Vulnerability, a SecurityPatch is developed by its project vendors. A Committer commits a new 
Version of a VersionedFile containing the security patch through a version system (e.g., SVN). 
VersionedFiles are Files managed by a version control system. Files are among the Artifacts that 
are produced when software is created. A project version which is released to the public or 
customer is referred to as a BuildRelease (a BuildRelease can dependOn APIs from other 
BuildReleases). A SecurityPatch corresponds to code changes introduced to fix some existing 
VulnerableCode, which is part of a CodeEntity such as ComplexType (i.e., a Class, Interface, 
Enum, etc.) or a Method. For example, if a class or method is modified during a security patch, 
then this code change can be used to locate the original VulnerableCode. The OWL classes, 
SecurityPatch and VulnerableCode, are linked in our model through the object property 
identifies. 
6.2.2 Ontologies Instances Alignment 
For further knowledge integration among the individual ontologies, we take advantage of 
ontology alignment techniques to establish semantic traceability links. These links allow us to 
reduce the semantic gap between ontologies and are essential pre-requisites for supporting 
















































































































Figure 36: The SV-AF’s ontologies concepts involved in an API. 
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Alignment of SEVONT and SBSON Ontologies. In uncertain graphs [226], edges are 
associated with uncertainties; edges measure the strength of connectivity between nodes and/or 
edges. An uncertain directed graph is defined as 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸, 𝜔), where 𝑉 is a set of nodes, 𝐸 is a 
set of edges (x, y), and ω: E → [0, 1] is the weight assignment function (e.g., ω(x, y) = 0.3 means 
the associated value on edge (x, y) is 0.3). Uncertainty values are interpreted as probabilities.  
In our model the knowledge base is treated as an uncertain graph, where 𝑉 represents the 
modeled projects from security vulnerability databases and build repositories, 𝐸  represents 
𝑜𝑤𝑙: 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐴𝑠 relations (edges) between projects’ instances, and ω: E → [0,1] is the weight 
assignment function used by Probabilistic Soft Logic (PSL) framework [219]. For example, in 
Figure 37, the project instance 𝑉𝑚from SBSON graph is similar to vulnerable product instance 









Project details (name, vedor, and version)
 
Figure 37: SV-AF knowledge base similarity graphs. 
Note that 𝑚 and 𝑛 represent the projects original data sources, Maven and NVD respectively. 
Additional explanations of how the 𝑜𝑤𝑙: 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐴𝑠  weights are created and how PSL is 
implemented and tested to establish the sematic links are discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Alignment of SEVONT and SEON Ontologies. For this alignment, we extend the process 
discussed in Chapter 5 to also include information from our versioning ontology. Disclosed 
vulnerabilities often contain references to patch information, such as explicit revisions/commits 
in which the vulnerability has been fixed. Having this information available, we can perform 
terminology matching to align instances from both data sources. For the alignment process, we 
take advantage of reasoning services provided by the SW to infer implicit relationships between 
vulnerabilities and commits. More specifically, for the alignment we take advantage of Semantic 
130 
Web Rule Language (SWRL)76 rules (Listing 9) to establish links between vulnerability and 
commit instances. This alignment will take place if any of the following two semantic rules will 
be satisfied: 
 
Rule 1: Vulnerability ID is explicitly mentioned in a commit message.  
Rule 2: Commit/revision ID is explicitly mentioned in the patch reference of a vulnerability.  
 
SWRL rule 1: 
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡(? 𝑐), 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑁𝑉𝐷𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒(? 𝑐, ? 𝐼𝐷),
𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(? 𝑣), ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐼𝐷(? 𝑣, ? 𝐼𝐷)
→ 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑛(? 𝑣, ? 𝑐)
 
SWRL rule 2: 
𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(? 𝑣), ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ(? 𝑣, ? 𝑝),
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛(? 𝑝, ? 𝐼𝐷), 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡(? 𝑐),
ℎ𝑎𝑠𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝐼𝐷(? 𝑐, ? 𝐼𝐷) → 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑛(? 𝑣, ? 𝑐)
 
 
Listing 9: SWRL rules for aligning CVE facts with the version ontology. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that there is no guarantee that any two ontologies in the same domain 
will align through shared concepts, due to ambiguity or lack of such shared concepts [44].  
 
6.2.3 Knowledge Inferencing and Reasoning 
The SW stack includes a scalable, persistent knowledge storage infrastructure. Triple-stores77 not 
only provide data persistence but also support some basic scalable inference on big data (e.g., 
RDFS, RDFS++) [44]. In this section, we discuss how we take advantage of such inferences to 
(a) trace APIs and their vulnerabilities across knowledge boundaries, and (b) infer implicit 
knowledge from these links. It should be noted that we omitted the ontology namespace prefixes 
(summarized in Table 35) from our illustrative queries and rules to improve their readability. 
Table 36: Ontology Namespaces 






                                                     
76 https://www.w3.org/Submission/SWRL/ 
77 Triple-store or RDF store is a purpose-built database for the storage and retrieval of triples through semantic queries. A triple is a data entity 
composed of subject-predicate-object [13]. 
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Same-As inference: As we discussed in Chapter 5 (section 5.3.4), having the weighted 
alignment links between two ontologies, a SPARQL query can now be used to retrieve 
information across ontology boundaries. We align vulnerability information from the SEVONT 
ontology and their corresponding instances in SBSON ontology based on a similarity threshold. 
Using the following SPARQL query (Listing 10), we can now take advantage of the 
𝑜𝑤𝑙: 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒𝐴𝑠 predicate (if inference is enabled): 
 
PREFIX[…] 
SELECT ?vulnerability ?release 
WHERE{  
    ?release rdf:type sbson:BuildRelease. 
    ?release sevont:hasVulnerability ?vulnerability 
} 
 
Listing 10: SPARQL query returning same as projects vulnerabilities. 
 
Transitive closure inference: The transitive closure of a binary relation 𝑅 on a set of concepts 𝐶 
is the minimal transitive relation 𝑅′ on 𝐶 that contains 𝑅. Thus 𝑎 𝑅′𝑏 for any instances 𝑎 and 𝑏 
of 𝐶  provided that there exist 𝑚0, 𝑚1, … , 𝑚𝑘  with 𝑚0 = 𝑎 , 𝑚𝑛 = 𝑏 , and 𝑚𝑟 𝑅 𝑚𝑟+1  for all 
0 ≤ 𝑟 < 𝑘 . The transitive closure 𝐶(𝐺) of a graph is a graph which contains an edge {𝑢, 𝑣} 
whenever there is a direct path from 𝑢 to 𝑣 [227], [228]. However, this can be expressed in OWL 
through the owl:TransitiveProperty construct. We define code: invokesMethod to be a bi-
directional transitive property of type owl:TransitiveProperty (e.g., code:invokesMethod rdf:type 
owl:TransitiveProperty). Through this transitive construct we are now able to retrieve a list of all 
methods that have a direct and transitive invocation dependency to a specified method, and vice 





    ?method rdf:type code:Method. 
    ?method code:invokesMethod <subjectMethodURI> option(transitive). 
} 
 
Listing 11: SPARQL query returning transitive method calls. 
Subsumption inference: A crucial aspect of an ontology model is the availability of a 
subsumption hierarchy between its concepts [229]. For example, a Method or Class is a sub-
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concept of a CodeEntity. Subsumption hierarchies add significant power to ontologies in global 
source code (APIs) analysis [25] because many of the attributes of an entity (concept or instance) 
are attached to its super concepts. Given a set of concepts C, the goal of the inference engine is 
to discover all subsumption relationships among pairs of concepts in C. More formally, we can 
denote that concept 𝑐1 is a subconcept of 𝑐2 by 𝑐1 ⊑  𝑐2. Subsumption is directional [229]: if 
𝑐1 ⊑  𝑐2, then 𝑐2 ⋢  𝑐1unless 𝑐1 and 𝑐2  are synonyms. A similar subsumption can be inferred 
from OWL properties that can subsume each other.  
In our approach, we create a simple hierarchy of object properties to support such 
subsumption inference. Figure 38 shows the property hierarchy we use to model source code 
dependencies. Given this property hierarchy and the subsumption inference, a simple query 
(Listing 12) can now identify all code entities that transitively depend on a given code entity 
independent of their type (property) (e.g., method invocations, interface implementation). Note, 
subsumption differs from the IsA relationship that typically holds between an instance and a 


















    ?entity rdf:type code:CodeEntity. 
    ?entity main:dependsOn <subjectEntityURI> option(transitive). 
} 
 
Listing 12: dependsOn subsumption query. 
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6.3 Case Study 
In the next sections, we discuss the applicability of our modeling approach in tracing and 
analyzing known vulnerabilities at intra- and inter-project levels.  
 
6.3.1 Case Study: CVE-2015-0227 
Objective: The objective of our case study is to show how our modeling approach can support 
the analysis and tracing of potential security vulnerability impacts across software components 
(APIs). Furthermore, the study also highlights the flexibility of our modeling approach in terms 
of its seamless knowledge and analysis result integration, as well as the use of SW reasoning to 
infer new knowledge.  
 
Approach: For the case study, we take advantage of same-as and transitive inferences to identify 
projects that are directly and indirectly affected by known security vulnerabilities. In addition, 
we also take advantage of transitive and subsumption inferences applied at the source code level 
to identify vulnerable APIs and trace their impact to external dependencies. The inferences 

























Figure 39: Inferred project dependencies in SBSON. 
 
Case study setting: We use a publicly disclosed vulnerability which has been reported in the 
NVD repository as CVE-2015-0227 and describes the following vulnerability for Apache 
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WSS4J78: “Apache WSS4J before 1.6.17 and 2.x before 2.0.2 allows remote attackers to bypass the 
requireSignedEncryptedDataElements configuration via a vectors related to ‘wrapping attacks’”. 
This vulnerability affects the management of permissions, privileges, and other security 
features that are used to perform access control to Apache WSS4J versions before 1.6.17 and to 
version 2.x before 2.0.2.  
Apache WSS4J is an API which provides a Java implementation of the primary security 
standards for Web Services and is commonly used by projects as an external component. In this 
example, a vulnerability is disclosed for this API. Developers using Apache WSS4J in their 
project must now determine whether their application is affected by this vulnerability or not. 
Existing source code analysis tools are capable of identifying whether a vulnerable code 
fragment (e.g., code fragment or variable), which has been reported in the NVD vulnerability, is 
used directly within a project. However, they are not capable of identifying whether the external 
libraries used by the developer’s project might have been affected by this vulnerability.  
In what follows, we discuss how our approach takes advantages of originally heterogeneous 
knowledge resources, NVD, VCS (for only Apache WSS4J), and Maven, and integrates these 
resources to determine direct and indirect dependencies to vulnerable components. In the 
process, we extract and populate facts from (a) NVD: information for the CVE-2015-0227 
vulnerability (including patch references); (b) VCS: source code and commit messages for 
Apache WSS4J (version 1.6.16 and 1.6.17); and (c) Maven repository: all build dependencies on 
Apache WSS4J 1.6.16 (242 dependencies).  
 
Tracing vulnerability patch information to commit: Security databases provide descriptions of 
vulnerabilities, their potential effects, and corresponding patches (if applicable). The objective of 
our study is to establish a traceability link between the unique vulnerability identifier (CVE) and 
the commit which fixes this vulnerability. For establishing these links we apply a two-step 
process by first mining the NVD repository for patch links that include a reference to an entry in 
a versioning repository. We then extract all commit logs within the versioning repository that 
have a reference to a CVE-ID. Figure 40 shows an example of such a commit log message entry: 
“[CVE-2015-0227] Improving required signed elements detection.” 
                                                     
78 https://ws.apache.org/wss4j/ 
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 (a) Report detail for CVE-2015-0227 from NVD
 (b) A Wss4j bug-fix commit detail for CVE-2015-0227 from SVN  
 
Figure 40: Extracting patch relevant information from NVD and commit messages. 
 
Identify vulnerable code fragments in APIs: A vulnerable code fragment corresponds to a set of 
lines of code (LoC) which has been modified to fix a vulnerability [133]. In our approach, we 
use the standard diff command to identify the vulnerable code fragments by comparing it with its 
unpatched version. Figure 41 shows an excerpt of the diff output for WSSecurityUtil.java 
revisions r1619358 and r1619359. The example shows that method verifySignedElement 
can be identified to contain the vulnerable code fragment. Using the same approach we can now 
populate any method or class that has been either deleted or modified as part of a vulnerability 











     
-    public static void verifySignedElement(Element elem, Document doc, Element securityHeader)
+    public static void verifySignedElement(Element elem, WSDocInfo wsDocInfo)
         throws WSSecurityException {
-        final Element envelope = doc.getDocumentElement();
-        final Set<String> signatureRefIDs = getSignatureReferenceIDs(securityHeader);
             ...
     
old revision
new revision
start line index and number of lines of 
the old, and new revisions
added line is 
preceded by a `+`
deleted line is 
preceded by a `-`
 
 
Figure 41: Diff output for WSS4J r1619358 and r1619359. 
 
Given our populated ontologies, we can now infer a similarity link between instances of the 
vulnerable product (e.g., Apache WSS4J 1.6.16) in SEVONT and SBSON (Build repository), 
and links between the vulnerability patch reference (CVE-2015-0227) and SEON (using the rules 




















 (a) vulnerabilities.owl (b) code.owl & versioning.owl





Figure 42: Inferred links between vulnerabilites.owl, code.owl, and versioning.owl. 
 
Based on the inferred links (see Figure 42) and using the SPARQL query in Listing 13, we 
can now further restrict our transitive dependency analysis to include only those components that 





SELECT ?project ?code 
WHERE{  
    ?project rdf:type <sevont:VulnerableRelease>. 
    ?project code:containsCodeEntity ?code. 
    ?vulnerableCode rdf:type <code:VulnerableCode>. 
    ?code main:dependsOn ?vulnerableCode. 
} 
 
Listing 13: Query to retrieve vulnerable code fragments across project boundaries. 
 
Findings: Table 36 summarizes the results from our case study for CVE-2015-0227. We report 
on the manually verified results obtained from executing our SPARQL queries (Listings 12 and 
13). Table 37 shows that 15 of the 242 crawled dependent projects actually use the API from our 
vulnerable project. The results highlight that there are still systems (6.19%) that rely on libraries 
with known security vulnerabilities. Moreover, 10 of these 15 dependent projects not only 
include the API but also call the class WSSecurityUtil, which contains the vulnerable code. 
However, it should be noted that for our specific case study none of the projects actually called 
and executed the vulnerable method (verifySignedElement) within the WSSecurityUtil.  
Table 37: Results 
Project Crawled Dependencies Actual usage  Vuln. Classes usage  Vuln. Methods usage 
Apache WSS4J 1.6.16 242 15 10 0 
 
In order to evaluate if our approach is capable of correctly identifying calls to vulnerable 
methods, we conducted an additional controlled experiment. For this experiment, we manually 
seeded a method call in Apache CXF-bundle 2.6.15 that invokes the vulnerability in Apache 
WSS4J API. More specifically, we downloaded the source code for Apache CXF-bundle 2.6.15 and 
modified its org.apache.cxf.ws.security.wss4j. policyhandlers package. Figure 43 
shows the partial class diagram of the modified packages. We modified the includeToken method 
of the AbstractBindingBuilder class to include a direct call to the vulnerable 
WSSecurityUtil.verifySignedElement method. We also added the 
SVAFSymmetricBindingHandler and SVAFAsymmetricBindingHandler to extend 
SymmetricBindingHandler and AsymmetricBindingHandler to be able to see if our 
approach also supports the transitive call dependency analysis correctly. We then re-populated 
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the source code ontologies with the new (modified) code facts and again invoke the same query 





























Figure 43: Class diagram for our modified package. 
  
The results of this query are shown in Table 38 which includes the classes within our 
modified project that directly or indirectly invoke the vulnerable method 
WSSecurityUtil.verifySignedElement.  
 






Indirect Vulnerable Methods 
AbstractBindingBuilder.java 4 
handleSupportingTokens(.SupportingToken,boolean,Map, Token, Object) 
getSignatureBuilder(TokenWrapper, Token, boolean, boolean) 
getSignatureBuilder(TokenWrapper, Token, boolean) 
doSVAFAction() 
Main.java 1 test1() 
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For the sake of simplicity and readability, we only include public and protected methods in the 
result set. We observed that the vulnerability introduced in 
AbstractBindingBuilder.includeToken propagates through several methods. More 
specifically, the doSVAFAction method in this example is indirectly affected due to its usage of 
the getSignatureBuilder method. SVAFAsymmetricBindingHandler extends 
AbstractBindingBuilder and overrides the getSignatureBuilder method. When the 
method doSVAFAction is invoked from test2, the overridden method from subclass 
SVAFAsymmetricBindingHandler is called and method test2 is correctly identified by 
our approach as not being affected by the vulnerability. 
 
6.3.2 Comparison Against Existing Tools 
We further evaluated our approach by comparing it against existing tools that detect known 
security vulnerabilities in source code across project boundaries. For our comparison we 
consider the following tools: OWASP Dependency-Check (DC) [42], which is an open source 
tool, and a closed-source tool from SAP labs [156].  
OWASP DC performs a static dependency analysis to determine if libraries with known 
vulnerabilities are included in an application. During the analysis, the tool collects information 
about the vendor, product, and version. The information is then used to identify the Common 
Platform Enumeration (CPE). If a CPE is identified, a listing of associated Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposure (CVE) entries are reported.  
 
  <entry id=" CVE-2016-9878 "> 
  ... 
    <vuln:vulnerable-software-list> 
      <vuln:product> cpe:/a:pivotal_software:spring_framework:3.2.2 </vuln:product> 
      <vuln:product> cpe:/a:pivotal_software:spring_framework:3.2.3 </vuln:product> 
      <vuln:product> cpe:/a:pivotal_software:spring_framework:3.2.4 </vuln:product> 
      ... 
 
The SAP tool relies on a dynamic source code level analysis to identify if a vulnerable piece 
of code is either used directly or indirectly. The tool uses execution traces which are collected 
after instrumenting the code and all bundled libraries. Since we did not have direct access to the 
SAP tool, we replicated their experiments to compare our results with the ones reported in [156]. 
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Given that the OWASP DC tool does distinguish whether a vulnerable library code is used or 
not, we limit our comparison to: “identify if a project depends on libraries with disclosed 
vulnerabilities independent of the use of the vulnerable source code”. Table 39 reports the 
results from our comparison, which include true positives (TP), false negatives (FN), false 
positives (FP), and true negatives (TN). The results show that for CVE-2013-2186, both our 
approach and OWASP DC did not report the vulnerable API. This miss is due to the fact that 
NVD did not include FileUpload 1.2.2 in the list of affected products. The vulnerability, 
however, is reported in several JBoss projects which make use of the DiskFileItem class in 
Apache FileUpload. Our approach currently models only products explicitly mentioned to be 
affected in NVD. 
 
OWASP DC reported CVE-2014-9527 as a vulnerability in POI 3.11 Beta 1. A manual 
inspection of the patch showed that the class “org.apache.poi.hslf.HSLFSlideShow” contains the 
patch for the vulnerable code but is not used by “poi-3.11.beta1.jar”. Instead, this patch is 
distributed as part of the POI-HSLF component. 
 
For the vulnerability CVE-2013-0248, the patch is located in the default configuration file 
“using.xml” and the comment of the Java class “DiskFileItemFactory” (but not any executable 
code). As a result, the SAP tool does not identify the archive as being affected by vulnerable 
code. 
Table 39: Comparison of Analysis Results 
Vulnerability Library Our Approach SAP tool OWASP DC 
CVE-2014-0050 
Apache FileUpload 1.2.2 
TP TP TP 
CVE-2013-2186 FN TP FN 
CVE-2013-0248 TP FN TP 
CVE-2012-2098 Apache Compress 1.4 TP TP TP 
CVE-2014-3577 Apache HttpClient 4.3 TP TP TP 
CVE-2014-9527 
Apache POI 3.11 Beta 1 
TN TN FP 
CVE-2014-3574 TP TP TP 




As our case study illustrates, our ontology-based knowledge modeling approach can integrate 
information originating from different heterogeneous knowledge resources. Next, we discuss 
how our approach overcomes a number of challenges identified with the OWASP and SAP tools.  
 
Data integration challenges. Vulnerability and dependency management make use of different 
naming schemes and nomenclatures. There exist many language-dependent approaches for 
referencing entities, often making the linking of entities across knowledge resources a difficult 
task. Consider the following example: Mapping the Spring Core 4.0.3.RELEASE between Maven and NVD. 
Maven GAV identifier represents this component as groupId=org.springframework; artifactId=spring-core; 
version=4.0.3.RELEASE, while the CPE for the same component in NVD is: vendor=pivotal; 
product=spring_framework; version=4.03 
As a result of this identifier naming inconsistency, the automatic mapping between GAV 
identifiers in Maven with their corresponding CPE in NVD becomes a major challenge, e.g., the 
vendor in our example should be Pivotal and not springframework. While a human can 
easily recognize the correct mapping, this is not the case for an automated solution. Both 
OWASP DC and the SAP tool compute the SHA-1 of the archives and perform a lookup in 
Maven central to address this problem. While this approach improves the recall (number of 
correct mappings found), it also introduces many false positives and false negatives which affect 
the accuracy of these tools. Moreover, both tools are limited in their ability to match 
vulnerabilities and CPEs, making them not only prone to errors but also limit the scope of the 
analysis to direct dependencies. In contrast, our approach addresses these challenges by taking 
advantage of the PSL alignment framework. This eliminates the need for one-to-one assignments 
and establishes weighted links between instances of different modeled ontologies for different 
data sources. Moreover, our semantic approach takes advantage of semantic reasoning to infer 
transitive dependencies.  
 
Flexibility. While the use of run-time information (traces) can improve precision (e.g., SAP 
tool), this type of analysis depends on the quality and coverage achieved by these traces. 
Furthermore, the SAP tool focuses on intra-project analysis, whereas our approach also supports 
inter-project analysis. As we further show in our case study, by taking advantage of automated 
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reasoning we are able to infer sub-properties (subsumption) and transitive closure dependencies. 
Using these inferences, we can transform often complex and proprietary source code analysis 
tasks to simpler and easy to write SPARQL queries. For example, the isSubClassOf, 
isSubInterfaceOf, invokesMethod, and invokesConstructor are all sub-properties of the transitive 
dependsOn property. As such, a simple query (Listing 13) can now identify all code entities that 
transitively depend on a given vulnerable code entity independent of the type, method 
invocations, or inherited classes/interfaces (via subsumption). As we showed in our controlled 
study, vulnerable classes can create a backdoor (e.g., through inheritance) for the invocation of 
vulnerable methods if these methods are not overridden within the client. With the growing 
popularity of using 3rd-party APIs [230], the risk of such transitive vulnerable method 
invocations increases.  
 
Information silos challenges. Although both analysis tools SAP and OWASP DC link different 
data sources, these resources still remain information silos. They still lack the standardization, 
knowledge sharing, and analysis result integration required to make them true information hubs. 
In contrast, our approach introduces a unified standardized representation using ontologies which 
support seamless knowledge integration, interoperability, and sharing even on a global scale. 
RDF based triple-stores ensure not only persistence of the data but also provide scalability and 
the use of unique resource identifiers (URIs), facilitating integration with other knowledge 
resources, even at a global scale. 
 
6.5 Chapter Summary  
This chapter presented an ontological-based modeling approach that allows us to trace API 
security impact within application boundaries and its global dependencies. Using multi-layers of 
abstraction, our modeling approach can not only provide a generic analysis approach but also 
supports the seamless integration of other knowledge resources in the SE domain. This formal 
knowledge representation allows us to take advantage of inference services provided by the SW, 
providing additional flexibility compared to traditional proprietary analysis approaches. 
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In the next chapter we will present another application of using SV-AF; it is an extension 
contribution of this chapter, in which we propose a semantic trustworthiness model for 




Chapter 7  
7 API Trustworthiness: An Ontological 
Approach For Software Library 
Adoption 
 
This chapter introduces another application of our SEVONT model, this time focusing on 
assessing the trustworthiness of software systems. This Ontology-Based Trustworthiness 
Assessment Model (OntTAM) is a continuation of our previous SE-EQUAM assessment model 
[231]. For the context of this research we extend the original SE-EQUAM model for the domain 
of software library trustworthiness. More specifically, we show how the SV-AF can be extended 
to integrate with vulnerability trustwothiness measurement to assess libraries in terms of their API 




Traditional software development processes, with their focus on closed architectures, platform-
dependent tools, and software, restrict potential code reuse. With the introduction of the Internet 
these restrictions have been removed, allowing for global access, online collaboration, 
information sharing, and internationalization of the software industry [232]. Software 
development and maintenance tasks can now be shared amongst team members working across 
and outside organization boundaries. Code reuse through resources such as software libraries, 
components, services, design patterns, and frameworks published on the Internet have become an 
essential aspect of this global code reuse and sharing among developers and organizations within 
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the SE industry. Most of today’s software projects increasingly depend on the use of external 
libraries which allow software developers to take advantage of features provided by Application 
Programming Interfaces (APIs) without having to reinvent the wheel. Unfortunately, even though 
third-party libraries are readily available, developers are faced with new challenges with this new 
form of code reuse, such as being unaware of the existence of libraries, selecting the most relevant 
library among several possible alternatives, and how to use features provided by these libraries 
[233], [234].  
 Several software library recommendation approaches have been proposed to address these 
challenges. These approaches fall into two main categories: (1) recommendation systems for 
libraries and APIs based on characteristics such as popularity [230], frequency of migration [235], 
[236], and stability [237], without considering the context of use of these libraries; and (2) 
techniques that take a client’s context into account when recommending libraries (e.g., using the 
history of method usages by developers [238]).  
 However, reused software libraries should not only satisfy a client’s functional requirements; 
they must also satisfy non-functional requirements (NFR) such as security, safety, and 
dependability [239], which are critical to the success of software systems. NFRs are often referred 
to as system qualities and can be divided into two main categories: (1) execution qualities—
qualities which are observable at run time (e.g., performance and usability); and (2) evolution 
qualities, such as testability, trustworthiness, maintainability, extensibility, and scalability, which 
are embodied in the static structure of a software system. NFRs often play a critical role in the 
acceptance and trust users will have in a final software product. However, assessing and 
evaluating trustworthiness of today’s software systems and software ecosystems remains a 
challenge due to issues ranging from a lack of traceability among software artifacts to limited tool 
support.  
 Trustworthiness is also an inherently subjective and ubiquitous term since its interpretation 
depends on the assessment context of the stakeholder, which might be different among 
stakeholders, and the context of use in which the library is used. Assessment models, therefore, 
should provide the flexibility and customizability to take into account such specific application 
contexts and the particular assessment needs of stakeholders [231].  
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 The work in this chapter is a continuation of our previous work on semantic modeling and 
tracing of software security vulnerabilities (Chapter 5), semantic analysis (Chapter 6), and quality 
assessment (SE-EQUAM) [231]. In what follows, we present our Ontology-Based 
Trustworthiness Assessment Model (OntTAM) which is an instantiation and extension of our SE-
EQUAM assessment model [10] for the domain of software library trustworthiness. 
 More specifically, we illustrate how OntTAM can be instantiated to take advantage of our 
existing unified knowledge representation of different SE related knowledge resources and 
support an automated analysis and assessment of trustworthiness quality attributes of libraries. We 
argue that ontologies not only promote and support the conceptual representation of knowledge 
resources in software ecosystems, but also let us take advantage of semantic reasoning during the 
assessment of trustworthiness quality factors. Furthermore, our modeling approach allows for the 
customization of the trustworthiness assessment model to reflect specific assessment needs while 
at the same time facilitates the comparison of trustworthiness across projects by defining a 
standard set of measures and sub-factors. 
 
Our research is significant for several reasons:  
1) We introduce OntTAM, a novel trustworthiness assessment model that takes advantage 
of both our previous generic SE-EQUAM software assessment model [231] and our 
unified ontological knowledge representation of different SE related knowledge 
resources (discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and [231]), while supporting the customization of 
the model to meet a stakeholder’s assessment needs. 
2) We introduce, as part of OntTAM, novel trustworthiness measures which measure API 
breaking changes, security vulnerabilities, and license violations. These measures take 
advantage of our ontologies and semantic reasoning services to allow for a 
trustworthiness analysis across the boundaries of individual artifacts and projects. 
3) We report on a case study that illustrates how our approach can be applied to assess the 
trustworthiness of OSS libraries, and discuss the potential impact of these libraries on 
the trustworthiness of the overall system. 
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7.1.1 Motivation Example 
Here, we introduce a motivating example (Figure 44) which is an extension of our example used 
in Chapter 6, describing how our fictional software developer (Bob) attempts to re-use external 
libraries while facing several challenges in selecting the best library for his project and trying to 
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Figure 44: Motivating Example – How OntTAM can assist developers in trust assessment. 
 
Bob is currently developing an application which requires an embedded database. Bob tries 
to reduce his development effort by searching the Internet for possible third-party libraries and 
components which meet his work context. His search leads return Apache Derby79, an open 
source embedded DBMS implemented entirely in Java. However, Bob is now faced with the 
dilemma of deciding upon which version of Derby he should use—the most recent (Derby 
version 10.11.1.1) or the most widely used one (Derby version 10.1.1.0). Following the 
recommendations published in existing research (e.g., Mileva et al. [225]), Bob decides to use an 
older version of Apache Derby (version 10.1.1.0) due to its widespread usage/popularity. 
However, this recommendation results in the reuse of a component which contains three known 
security vulnerabilities that are already reported in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) 
(Table 40). In contrast, the newer version of Derby (version 10.11.1.1) would not have contained 
any known vulnerabilities. 
 
                                                     
79 db.apache.org/derby/ 
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Table 40: Example of Derby versions and their depedent projects in Maven 
Derby version Release Year Reported vulnerabilities in NVD Direct dependencies in Maven Repository 
10.1.1.0 2005 3 382 
10.5.3.0 2009 1 0 
10.11.1.1 2014 0 36 
 
However, this is not the only risk Bob is susceptible to when selecting a library. Derby is 
licensed under the Apache 2 copyright license; for Bob not to introduce any license violation or 
incompatibility, he has to make sure that the selected library is compliant with his project 
license. For example, one cannot combine code released under the Apache 2 license with code 
released under the GNU GPL 2 [240]. 
As this example illustrates, several quality-related issues with the reuse of a third-party 
library can arise and they are often difficult to discover by the user since the relevant information 
is spread across multiple knowledge resources. The problem is further exaggerated by the large 
number of additional transitive dependencies which are introduced by these third-party libraries 
and their dependencies. A vulnerability or license violation might not only occur directly 
between Bob’s project and the Derby library, but also between Bob’s project and one of the 
libraries the Derby library depends on.  
 
7.2 Background  
7.2.1 External Library Re-Use and its Implications on Project 
Quality 
As previously discussed, reuse of functionality provided by third-party (external) software 
libraries is a growing trend in the software development industry. Automated dependency 
management features have been introduced in modern build systems to simplify the integration 
and reuse of external libraries during development. Developers no longer have to manually 
manage their dependencies on software libraries. Build systems and dependency management 
tools automatically download and manage all required dependent components (including 
transitive dependencies) and perform any necessary dependency mediation (conflict resolution) 
when multiple versions of a dependency are encountered. Although this relieves developers of 
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some dependency management, there remains an increasing risk of including libraries which can 
negatively affect a project’s overall quality and trustworthiness. In our research, we particularly 
consider the following quality risks introduced by software libraries: API breaking changes, 
security vulnerabilities, and license violations. In what follows, we briefly introduce background 
information about API breaking changes and license violations. 
 
7.2.1.1 API Breaking Changes 
Software libraries take advantage of visibility modifiers (e.g., public and protected modifiers in 
Java) to provide reusable and extendable APIs to other applications. However, these software 
libraries, as other software components, are subject to change as they evolve over time. 
Unfortunately, the cost of evolving libraries may become higher, since such changes might 
impact many external clients. API changes can be classified into breaking and non-breaking 
changes (see Table 41) and can be defined as follows [241]:  
 Breaking changes. Any change that breaks backward-compatibility through removal 
or modification of API elements, resulting in compilation errors in client projects after 
the API update.  
 Non-breaking changes. Changes that preserve compatibility and usually involve the 
addition of new functionalities to the library. Thus, allowing migration between API 
versions which include only non-breaking changes does not cause negative effects to 
client applications.  
 
Table 42 shows the top 10 breaking and non-breaking changes in the Maven repository as 
reported by [242]. These breaking changes are obtained from 126,070 pairs of current and next 
versions of software libraries hosted in the Maven repository. The most frequently observed 
breaking changes are method removals (177,480 observed occurrences). A method removal is 
considered to be a breaking change if the removal leads to compilation errors in places where 
this method is used. The most common non-breaking API changes are method additions, with 
518,690 occurrences. Although performing a change to a library might be a straightforward task, 
resulting breaking changes can have a significant ripple effect which often will not only affect a 
single dependent class but even the complete ecosystem.  
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Table 41: Breaking and non-breaking changes 
Category API Element List of Changes 
Breaking 
Type Removal, Visibility Loss, Super-type change 
Field 
Removal, Visibility Loss (e.g., public to private), Type change (e.g., double to integer), 
Default value change 
Method 
Removal, Visibility Loss, Return type change (e.g., boolean to void), Parameter list 
change, Exception list change 
Non-breaking All 
Addition, Visibility gain (e.g., from private to public or protected), Deprecation (e.g., 
deprecated method removal) 
 
Table 42: The most common breaking and non-breaking changes in the Maven Repository [242] 
Breaking changes Non-breaking changes 
# Change type Frequency # Change type Frequency 
1 Method removed 177,480 1 Method added 518,690 
2 Class removed 168,743 2 Class added 216,117 
3 Field removed 126,334 3 Field added 206,851 
4 Parameter type change 69,335 4 Interface added 32,569 
5 Method return type change 54,742 5 
Method removed, inherited still 
exists 
25,170 
6 Interface removed 46,852 6 Field accessibility increased 24,954 
7 Number of arguments changed 42,286 7 
Value of compile-time constant 
changed 
16,768 
8 Method added to interface 28,833 8 Method accessibility increased 14,630 
9 Field type changed 27,306 9 Addition to list of superclasses 13,497 
10 Constant field removed 12,979 10 Method no longer final 9202 
 
7.2.1.2 License Violations 
While dependency management tools such as RubyGems80, Maven81, or CocoaPods82 have been 
introduced to automate the downloading and importing of libraries into projects, these libraries 
still originate from various authors and come with a plethora of OSS licenses (horizontal 
increase). One library can utilize another library, leading to hierarchies of libraries and license 
dependencies. All of these libraries’ licenses must be compatible and compliant with each other. 
License violations and incompatibilities are an often-overlooked factor when recommending 
licenses and therefore can significantly impact the trustworthiness of software systems. When 
incompatible licenses are used together, a license violation occurs. A license violation is defined 





as “the act of making use of a (licensed) work in a way that violates the rights expressed by the 
original creator” [243]. That is, not following the legal terms and conditions set out in the source 
license. Software authors who commit a license violation open themselves up to the possibility 
of being sued; sometimes this risk can amount to millions of dollars.  
 
7.2.2 Evolvable Quality Assessment Metamodel (SE-EQUAM) 
Quality is a widely-used term to evaluate the maturity of development processes within an 
organization. Defining quality allows organizations to specify and determine if a product has met 
certain non-functional and functional requirements. However, as Kitchenham [244] states: 
“quality is hard to define, impossible to measure, easy to recognize.” Unlike functional 
requirements, where a single analysis technique (e.g., use case modeling) is sufficient to identify 
essentially all requirements, the same analysis is not appropriate for all quality requirements. 
Quality, as defined by ISO 9000:2000 [244], is the “degree to which a set of inherent 
characteristics fulfills requirements”, where a requirement is a “need or expectation that is 
stated, generally implied or obligatory”.  
Assessing the evolvability of software systems has been addressed in existing research 
through the introduction of software quality models, e.g., McCall [245], ISO/IEC 912683, and 
QUALOSS [246]. These models share a common, while informal (not machine-readable), 




Figure 45: Generic structure of quality assessment models[244]. 




While these models are capable of assessing qualities in a given context, they lack the 
required formalism and semantics to allow them to evolve to meet the modeling requirements of 
different assessment contexts. The ability to adjust to change assessment needs was a main 
motivation for SE-EQUAM, an Evolvable QUAlity Meta-model that derives a formal (machine-
readable) domain model that can adapt to changes in the assessment needs in terms of both: 
artifacts being assessed and their assessment criteria [231]. SE-EQUAM addresses these 
challenges by taking advantage of the SW and its supporting technologies. SE-EQAM uses 
ontologies to model and conceptualize quality factors, sub-factors, attributes, measures, weights, 
and relationships used to assess software quality. Input artifacts for the assessment model are 
various software artifacts such as version control system and issue tracker; and its outputs are 
quality assessment scores based on the different assessment criteria. Ontologies not only provide 
a formal way to represent knowledge but can also eliminate ambiguity, enable validation, and 
provide a consistency-checking approach [177]. SE-EQUAM uses semantic reasoners to infer 
hidden relationships between domain model attributes. Given its formal representation SE-
EQUAM allows for its reuse by simplifying the instantiation of new domain-specific instances of 
the model. More details about semantic reasoning are provided in [231].  
Figure 46 illustrates the reuse and instantiation of our SE-EQAM model. The generic 
syntactic meta-model, which is a generic model that forms the basis for all quality models, can 
be instantiated by a domain model (e.g., ISO/IEC 9126). Furthermore, SE-EQUAM allows for a 
semantic mapping between the syntactical meta-model and a semantic ontology meta-model, 
which can then be instantiated as domain model ontology based on user-defined assessment 
criteria. 
 
The SE-EQUAM Process. The general SE-EQUAM process (Figure 46) represents a set of tasks 
and activities which we followed to allow for deriving a generic quality assessment method that 
can be used to customize and instantiate the generic model to meet a stakeholder’s specific 




Figure 46: SE-EQUAM ontology meta-model reuse to instantiate a domain model ontology 
(OntEQAM)[231]. 
 
The inputs to the SE-EQUAM process are software artifacts and a set of core quality 
measurements applicable for these artifacts. In the next step, a common ontological 
representation for these artifacts has been established by re-using existing models or customizing 
existing models to meet the requirements of these artifacts. As part of the model adjustment 
activity, quality metrics and measurements included in the core model can be customized and 
extended to reflect a specific model context. The output of this process is an instantiated 
assessment model which meets specific user and project assessment requirements by providing 
quality assessment at both individual artifact and overall product levels. Figure 47 illustrates the 
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In the next section we introduce OntTAM, which illustrates a concrete instantiation of the 
SE-EQUAM process to create a semantic enriched trustworthiness quality assessment model for 
software libraries. 
 
7.3 Ontology-based Trustworthiness Assessment 
Model (OntTAM) 
OntTAM, an instantiation of the SE-EQUAM [231] ontology meta-model, illustrates how our 
modeling approach can take advantage of the unified ontological representation of both software 
artifacts and the generic SE-EQUAM quality assessment model. OntTAM instantiates a domain 
specific quality model to assess the trustworthiness of software projects and, more specifically, 
the trustworthiness of external libraries. OntTAM reuses SE-EQUAM’s core quality model 
structure which is based on quality factors, sub-factors, attributes, measures, weights, and 
relationships, and extends them with trustworthiness specific aspects. Inputs to OntTAM are 
knowledge resources such as: version control systems, build systems, project license 
information, and security vulnerabilities information. The output of OntTAM is a trustworthiness 
assessment score for either an individual metric or an aggregation of sub-factors and factors for 
the overall product/library quality. The model thereby takes advantage of the OWL 84  and 
RDF/RDFS 85  semantic reasoning capabilities to infer hidden relationships between domain 
model attributes and to ensure consistency among these attributes.  
Figure 48 provides an overview of the knowledge model framework and its organization in 
terms of ontologies and their abstraction levels. While these ontologies may be derived, modeled, 
and used independently, a key objective of our approach is knowledge integration across 
ontology boundaries, using both ontology alignments and semantic linking to create a unified 
ontological knowledge representation.  
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Figure 48: The Software Security and Trustworthy Ontology Hierarchy. 
 
In what follows, we present our OntTAM methodology to further demonstrate how we 
instantiate different trustworthiness sub-factors (i.e., security, reliability, and legality) to 
establish a trustworthiness assessment for OSS products (e.g., external libraries). More 
specifically, we discuss in detail the four major steps involved in instantiating our customized 
OntTAM trustworthiness assessment model (Figure 47): artifact selection, modeling, model 
adjustment, and the assessment process. 
 
7.3.1 Artifact Selection   
The inputs to OntTAM are artifacts relevant to the reuse of software libraries within projects. 
These software artifacts can be categorized into endogenous and exogenous data (discussed in 
Chapter 5, section 5.3.2). Extracting and populating facts from these artifacts is often based on 
techniques commonly used by the MSR community [247]–[249]. It should be noted that 
unstructured or semi-structured information (e.g., vulnerability descriptions and license 
information) often requires several preprocessing steps such as natural language analysis (NLP), 
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as well as data cleansing to improve the quality of the data prior to the ontology population. 
More details about our data preprocessing and ontology population process can be found in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
7.3.2 Model and Model Adjustment 
In this section, we discuss our knowledge modeling process in detail. It should be noted that in 
order to improve readability, we will be using the following prefixes as substitutes for the fully-
qualified names of our ontologies: 
 rdf: <http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#> 
 owl: <http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#> 













7.3.2.1 Modeling Project Trustworthiness 
Since OntTAM is based on the generic SE-EQUAM model, OntTAM is an extension and 
specialization of our core SE-EQUAM software quality assessment model. OntTAM is extended 
to provide a syntactical trustworthiness quality model that includes and defines a set of sub-
factors, attributes, and metrics required for the assessment of trustworthiness. Many of these 
trustworthiness factors, attributes, and metrics are derived from existing work on trustworthiness 
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assessment of open and closed source projects [231], [244]. The OntTAM specific 
trustworthiness assessment is based on the two general quality dimensions, the community and 
product dimension. The community dimension assesses the adoption of a software product by the 
community over an extended period of time by considering the popularity in terms of downloads, 
rankings, and activity of the development community. The product dimension assesses the 
internal structure of the product and the development processes that impact its reusability, which 
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Figure 49: Reuse of the SE-QUAM meta-model to instantiate the OntTAM domain model 
ontology. 
 
Figure 49 provides an overview of the complete model instantiation process which provides 
as its output a formal (machine redable) and semantic enriched trustworthiness assessment 
model. The process involves applying both a syntactic and semantic mapping from SE-EQUAM 
to OntTAM. While the syntactical model allows us to answer basic queries such as: What are the 
sub-factors associated with product trustworthiness? The semantic mapping enables the use of 
DL axioms (such as the property chain axiom) to infer new implicit relationships (dashed lines in 
Figure 49 – semantic OntTAM model) from explicitly modeled relationships in OntTAM (solid 








































Figure 50: An example defining the associated trustworthiness concepts and measures for a 
sample project. 
 
Figure 50 illustrates the main steps which are applied to associated trustworthiness concepts 
and measures for a sample project (ProjectX): 
1. Define the product and community dimensions. 
<onttam:ProductDimension><rdfs:type><sequam:Dimension> and 
<onttam:CommunityDimension><rdfs:type><sequam:Dimension>.  
2. Define reusability as a factor that is associated with the product dimension. 
<onttam:ProductDimension><sequam:hasFactor><onttam:Reusability> and 
<onttam:Reusability><rdfs:type><sequam:Factor>.  
3. Following the same approach, OntTAM defines reliability as a sub-factor of reusability 





4. Assuming that OntTAM assesses a product’s reusability through the popularity 




Finally, we enrich OntTAM’s syntactical model to become a semantic model by establishing 
additional semantic relationships by adding property chain axioms (e.g., hasDimension 
relationship with hasSubfactor and hasMeasure). The following are examples of OWL 2 property 
chain axioms which we added to be able to take advantage of RDFS reasoning during the 
assessment process. 
 Project-related OWL 2 property chain constructs:  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Project :hasFactor) :Factor )  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Project :hasSubfactor) :Subfactor )  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Project :hasAttribute ) :Attribute )  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Project :hasMeasure ) :Measure )  
 Dimension-related OWL 2 property chain constructs:  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Dimension :hasSubfactor) :Subfactor)  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Dimension :hasAttribute ) :Attribute )  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Dimension :hasMeasure ) :Measure )  
 Factor-related OWL 2 property chain constructs:  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Factor :hasAttribute ) :Attribute )  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Factor :hasMeasure ) :Measure )  
 Subfactor-related OWL 2 property chain constructs:  
o SubPropertyOf( ObjectPropertyChain( :Subfactor :hasMeasure ) :Measure )  
 
7.3.2.2 Integration with Other Knowledge Artifacts 
Assessing the overall trustworthiness of a software library requires us not only to instantiate 
OntTAM but also to integrate it with other ontological software knowledge artifacts to be able to 
derive and integrate novel trustworthiness measures. For the integration we take advantage of 
software artifact ontologies we have created and refined over the years [166], [250], [251], and 
reuse existing ontologies [20] that model different software artifacts. Figure 51 provides an 
overview of the unified ontological representation of software artifacts which we integrate with 
OntTAM. These artifacts include, but are not limited to: (a) Software Evolution Ontologies 
(SEON) which model SE repositories such as source code, version control systems, issue tracker 
systems, licenses, etc.; (b) the Build Systems ONtology (SBSON) which captures knowledge 
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about build management systems (e.g., Maven); and (c) the SEVONT for modeling software 
security vulnerability information such as severities, impacts, vulnerabilities types, and patch 
information found in different security databases.  
The integration of these heterogeneous knowledge resources allows us to introduce different 
trustworthiness measures related to the reuse of software libraries. More specifically, in this 
research we introduce the following three trust criteria: API breaking changes, security 
vulnerabilities, and license violations. Figure 51 shows the core concepts and object properties, 
distributed across the different abstraction layers of our knowledge modeling framework (Figure 











































































































Figure 51: Integrating OntTAM ontology into SV-AF model and reusing SE-QUAM concepts. 
 
Among the core concepts used from these ontologies are the BuildRelease from the SBSON 
build ontology, which is a subclass of the Release concept that also captures the fact that a 
project can have several releases (including library releases). A Release has a License, and 
defines its dependencies on other releases. Each release contains a set of CodeEntity elements 
such as Field, Method, and Class. A release can be affected by a Vulnerability, leading to the 
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release of a new version containing a SecurityPatch. A security patch corresponds to code 
changes introduced to fix some existing VulnerableCode, which is part of a CodeEntity. For 
example, if a class or method is modified during a security patch, then this code change can be 
used to locate the original VulnerableCode. The OWL classes, SecurityPatch and 
VulnerableCode, are linked in our model through an object property. For a complete description 
of the ontologies, how they are built, the alignment processes, and reasoning, we refer the reader 
to Chapters 5 and 6.  
All of these core concepts have metrics used by the OntTAM assessment process. Measures 
have a unit and are expressed on a scale, e.g., an ordinal or nominal scale. Information about 
units and scales can be used to perform conversions [252]. Many base measures, such as number 
of lines of vulnerable code (LOVC), number of known vulnerabilities, vulnerabilities severities 
(scores), and number of license violations, provide only limited insights when viewed in 
isolation. Additional derived measures are needed to support further analysis and assessment of 
software artifacts. These derived measures represent an aggregation of values from different 
subdomains, for example, the number of vulnerabilities per class is an aggregation of measures 
derived from source code and the vulnerability repositories. While the abstract measurement 
concepts are defined in the general upper layer of our integrated model (Figure 51), many Base 
Measures (e.g., Size) and Derived Measures (e.g., Weighted Vulnerability Density) are 
modeled in the domain-specific layer.  
 
7.3.3 Measures and Metrics 
An essential feature of our modeling approach is to allow users to customize the OntTAM model 
through user defined queries which might introduce different metrics, ranging from simple 
metrics to semantic rich metrics queries that take advantage of implicit knowledge inferred by 
ontological reasoners. Given our ontology based modeling approach, these analysis results can 
also be materialized to enrich our knowledge base and to promote reuse of existing analysis 
results. Next, we introduce some metrics to be used later for the assessment of the 
trustworthiness of systems. These metrics take advantage of not only our unified representation, 
but also inference services provided by the SW.  
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Weighted Vulnerability Density (WVD) Metric compares software systems (or their 
components) based on severity scores of known vulnerabilities. The objective of WVD is to 
measure the impact of known vulnerabilities on a product’s quality, with the most severe 
vulnerabilities having the greatest impact. The metric can be applied, for example, to prioritize 
the patching of vulnerabilities based on their severity. To account for both direct and indirect 
impacts of vulnerabilities, we introduce the WVDdirect and WVDinherit measures. Although a 
project can have a WVDdirect score of 0 since no known security vulnerability has been reported 
for the core project, it is still possible that the project is exposed to indirect vulnerability found in 
external (third party) dependencies (components) that are included in the parent project. Such a 
potential security risk will be assessed by the WVDinherit measure. 





                                                 (2) 
where S is the size of the software (in KLOC), 𝑤𝑖 is the weight (severity score) of a known 
vulnerability affecting the system, and 𝑉 is the number of known vulnerabilities in the system.  
 
𝑊𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) = ∑ {(
𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑖 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑑𝑖
) ∗ 𝑊𝑉𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑑𝑖)}
𝑛
𝑖=1             (3) 
where n is the number of dependencies used by release, and 𝑑𝑖 is the i
th dependency. 
 
𝑊𝑉𝐷𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) =  𝑊𝑉𝐷𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) +  𝑊𝑉𝐷𝑖𝑛ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒)                         (4) 
License Violation Count (LVC) is a measure that assesses the number of license violations that 
exist within a given project. This measure can indicate potential long-term risks associated with 
intellectual rights violations that exist within a project. A license violation occurs if any of the 
dependent components of a parent project include components with non-compatible licenses. 
Open source code license violations are often due to the fact that many software developers are 
simply neither aware nor well-versed in open source license compliance. For example, in 2008 
the Free Software Foundation (FSF) claimed that various products sold by Cisco under 
the Linksys brand had violated the licensing terms of many programs on which FSF 
held copyright86. These FSF programs were under the GNU General Public License, a copyleft 
license which allows users to modify a piece of software as long as the derivative work is under 
the same license.  
                                                     
86 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_Software_Foundation,_Inc._v._Cisco_Systems,_Inc. 
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In this work, we identify three main categories of license violations: simple violations, 
transitive violations, and compound violations (see Figure 52). LVCsimple, LVCtransitive, and 
LVCcompound are base measures associated with each category. Details on how license violations 
are identified are presented in Section 7.4.3.  
 𝐿𝑉𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑙(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) =  𝐿𝑉𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) +  𝐿𝑉𝐶𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒(𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒) +  𝐿𝑉𝐶𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑          (5) 
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Figure 52: Categories of license violations. 
 
Breaking Change Density (BCD) Metric is a normalized measure which represents the ratio 
between breaking and non-breaking API changes that are introduced in a project. API changes 
often occur as a project and its components evolve inconsistently, resulting in incompatibilities 
of APIs and API calls. This measure can be used to determine the stability of an API over time—
how often do breaking changes occur. Details on how we identify breaking changes are 
presented in Section 7.4.4. The BCD metric can be represented formally as follows:  
𝐵𝐶𝐷 =  
# 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐼 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠
# 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐼 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠
                                                            (6) 
Breaking Change Impact (BCI) measures the impact of breaking changes on client applications 
by assessing a  client application and its use of APIs with a changed contract. The impact of 
breaking changes on clients can be both direct and indirect. While there exists a significant body 
of work on the direct impact of changes ([253], [237], [242], [254], [255]), very little research has 
been conducted on indirect breaking changes. Indirect breaking changes occur, for example, 
when different versions of the same API are introduced by any of the client’s other 
dependencies. By default, the Java Virtual Machine is unable to differentiate between multiple 
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versions of the same API. In cases where multiple versions of a dependency are encountered, the 
first occurrence of an API version in a project’s class-path is chosen. We introduce two measures 
that capture both direct and indirect breaking changes. 
We represent the BCI metrics formally as follows:  
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐶, 𝐷) =  
# 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐼 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐷 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐶
# 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐼 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝐷
                                      (7) 
𝐵𝐶𝐼𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐶, < 𝐷1, … , 𝐷𝑛 >) =  
# 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐼 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 <𝐷1,… ,𝐷𝑛> 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐶
# 𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑃𝐼 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 <𝐷1,… ,𝐷𝑛>
                   (8) 
where C is the client project, D is the reused library, and <D1, …, Dn> is the set of (direct and 
transitive) different library releases being reused by the client. 
 
7.3.4 Assessment Process  
Given that assessment needs differ among stakeholders and assessment contexts, our OntTAM 
assessment process allows for the customization of trustworthiness assessment model in terms of 
sub-factors and attributes being assessed as well as the individual weights assigned to them. 
While the default weight for all sub-factors and attributes are equal, users can customize these 
weights to more closely match their assessment objective and context. Furthermore, while most 
existing assessment approaches rely on crisp boundaries (e.g., based on thresholds), this 
approach can lead to inaccuracy in the assessment process. It is not always feasible or desirable 
to use crisp values, especially when one deals with values which are close to crisp value 
boundaries. For example, let us assume a project X with a reported number of 5 known 
vulnerabilities, a binary scale for trustworthiness which is trustworthy or non-trustworthy, and a 
crisp value threshold of 4 known vulnerabilities. Based on this crisp boundary, the project will be 
assessed as being non-trustworthy, even if it can be considered almost borderline trustworthy. To 
further exemplify the problem, by using the crisp boundary values there would not be any 
difference between project X with 5 known vulnerabilities and project Y with 100 
vulnerabilities; both projects would be considered equally non-trustworthy. Furthermore, the 
problem can occur not only at the individual measurement level but also at other assessment 
levels (e.g., sub-factor, factor). To address this challenge we apply a fuzzy logic assessment and 
inference approach to eliminate the need for crisp value boundaries.  
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Figure 53 shows the set of transformation steps which are performed during the fuzzification 
of the assessment process, with details of each step discussed more thoroughly throughout the 
section. 




























Figure 53: Fuzzy Assessment Process Steps. 
 
 (1) Measure Calculation: Inputs to this step are raw values from the populated ontologies. 
Measures are calculated by querying our populated knowledge base for the base and derived 
measures introduced in the previous section (e.g., WVD).  
 
(2) Fuzzification: The extracted quality measures and weight values are used to create fuzzy 
scales in the fuzzification step. As part of the fuzzification step, fuzzy scales are created for the 
different measures, the assessment weights (provided by stakeholders of the assessment model to 
assign a level of importance to different measures), and the overall assessment result. These 
results are converted to linguistic variables, which are variables whose values are expressed as 
words or sentences (e.g., high, not very high, low) [256]. These linguistic variables are the 






Figure 54: WVD measure fuzzy scale and Weight Fuzzy Scale for WVD measure. 
  
Figure 54 shows an example of a fuzzy scale created for the WVD measure and its 
assessment weights. The x-axis represents the measurement results range and the y-axis the 
membership degree (range is 0–1). The higher the membership value, the stronger the 
measurement’s relation to its fuzzy result scales. The overlap between boundaries of categories 
in the fuzzy scale demonstrates the uncertainty in interpreting boundary measurement results.  
Since high WVD, LVC, and BCD measures lower the overall quality and trustworthiness 
score of a project, we made the following three assumptions to automate the fuzzy inference 
rules for these measures: (1) In cases when the user-specified weight is high then the individual 
measure score is one level lower. VeryPoor scores will keep their values (e.g., a high weight will 
change an Excellent score to VeryGood). (2) The opposite holds for low weights, which reflects 
that their scores are less relevant to the overall assessment, their scores are adjusted by one level 
higher. Excellent scores keep their values. (3) With medium weights, scores keep their values. 
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These assumptions reflect the fact that when a measure is of high importance to the assessment 
(high weight), its score should be more sensitive to a low measure value.  
 
(3) Inference and Assessment: Input for this step is the fuzzified measure and weight values in 
the form of linguistic variables. These linguistic results are now transformed into the final 
assessment score by executing a set of fuzzy inference rules. The de-fuzzification is based on a 
set of fuzzy inference rules, which are expressed in the Fuzzy Control Language (FCL)[257] 
using the JFuzzyLogic inferencing engine [258]. The inference engine fires the relevant fuzzy 
rules based on the provided input. Firing rules will calculate the final weighted overall 
measurement result which is a combination of all the different measures. Using the Center of 
Gravity (COG) method, considered one of the most popular de-fuzzification methods [259], the 
overall fuzzy measurement result is de-fuzzified back into a numerical assessment measurement 
result in order to be populated back to the knowledge base. As part of our assessment, we created 
a Fuzzy Control Language (FCL) file for each measure. The complete set of FCL files for all 
measures can be found online87. 
 
(4) Knowledge Enrichment: This optional step allows for the integration of the assessment 
results at the individual attribute, sub-factor, and overall assessment levels. Our ontological 
representation enables us to seamlessly integrate these assessment results into the knowledge 
base, therefore not only supporting reuse of analysis results but also allowing their use for further 
semantic analysis. 
 
7.4 Case Study 
The objective of this section is to demonstrate the applicability of our modeling approach to 
support the assessment of trust within OSS software libraries by highlighting the flexibility of 
our modeling approach, in terms of its seamless knowledge and analysis results integration, as 
well as the use of SW reasoning services to infer new knowledge (measures). In Section 7.4.1, 
we present the setup for our study, including the selection process for the 4 projects used to 
illustrate our approach; Sections 7.4.2 to 7.4.4 describe how we identify and measure security 
                                                     
87 https://github.com/segps/segps-code 
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vulnerabilities, license violations, and API breaking changes. Section 7.4.5 describes how these 
individual identified measures can be integrated for a holistic trustworthiness assessment.  
7.4.1 Study Setup 
For the data collection and extraction in our case study (see Figure 55), we rely on four data 
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Figure 55: Overview of case study setup process. 
 
For our study we downloaded the latest versions of the Maven and NVD repositories—which 
include 1,219,731 project releases in Maven and 74,945 vulnerabilities affecting 109,212 
releases in NVD. For our study, we limited the assessment scope to 4 projects. The projects were 
selected based on the following criteria: (a) at least some of their releases contained known 
vulnerabilities, (b) license details were provided, (c) releases varied in their major version 
numbers, and (d) the functionalities these products provide are widely reused by other projects 
(see Table 43 for details). The four subject systems vary in size (classes and methods) and 
application domain. Commons Fileupload88 adds file upload capabilities to web applications. 
CXF WS Security89 provides reusable components for client-side authentication, security, and 
encryption. Struts90 is an open source framework for creating Java web applications, and ASM91 
is a Java bytecode manipulation library. We further extract the complete source code and history 
information of these four projects. The extracts facts used to populate the corresponding 
ontologies and made persistent in our triple store.   






Table 43: Overview of selected case study projects 
Project # Releases analyzed # of Dependencies 
Commons Fileupload 6 68854 
Apache CXF WS Security 5 4570 
Struts 3 3170 
ASM 20 8109 
 
7.4.2 Identifying and Measuring Software Security Vulnerabilities 
Approach. In what follows, we show some of the main rules and queries used to derive the 
WVD measures (overall, direct, and inherited). These rules are of interest since they highlight 
the flexibility and power of our modeling approach, allowing users to define and customize their 
own derived measures without the need for any additional proprietary algorithms 
implementations or modelling.   
WVDdirect inference: In order to derive the WVDdirect score for the projects, we define rules using 
the Semantic Web Rule Language (SWRL), similar to the one shown in Listing 14. The rule 
states that if some project release has a LOC and OverallSeverityScore measure, then the release 
has a WVDdirect score (obtained by dividing the overall severity score by LOC). 
 
 
Listing 14: The rules to infer the direct WVD measure. 
 
WVDinherit inference: For us to be able to infer the WVDinherit measure of a project release, we 
had to first determine the raio of vulnerable APIs that are reused in a particular release. The 
OntTAM knowledge model not only captures the required information to derive this measure, 
but also includes all semantics to be able to take advantage of the SW reasoners to infer the 
measure value. More specifically, once the required ontologies (e.g., SEVONT, SEON, 
OntTAM) are populated, a SPARQL query can be created to retrieve the number of vulnerable 
API elements in a given release (see Listing 15).  
Release(?r), hasLOC(?r, ?loc), hasOverallSeverityScore(?r, ?score), 




Listing 15: SPARQL query for inferring the total number of vulnerable code entities in a project. 
 
Using Listing 16 we can also determine the number of such vulnerable API elements being 
reused in client applications. For a more detailed description on how we detect vulnerable code 




Listing 16: The SPARQL query for inferring the vulnerable code entities used by different 
dependent projects. 
The SPARQL query (Listing 17) exemplifies how we take advantage of analysis results from 
the inference rules in Listing 14 to infer the final WVDinherit measure for a particular release of a 
component. 
 
CONSTRUCT{?release sevont:hasVulnerableCodeCount ?totalVulnerableCodeCount} 
WHERE{ 
{ 
  SELECT ?release count(?vulnerableCode) as ?totalVulnerableCodeCount 
  WHERE{ 
    ?vulnerableCode rdf:type code:VulnerableCode. 
    ?release code:containsCodeEntity ?vulnerableCode 
  }GROUP BY ?release 
}} 
CONSTRUCT{?link sevont:hasReusedVulnerableCodeCount ?usedVulnerableCodeCount} 
WHERE{ 
{ 
  SELECT ?link count(?vulnerableCode) as ?usedVulnerableCodeCount 
  WHERE { 
   #?link represents the ?client dependency on ?release 
   ?link a build:DependencyLink. 
   ?link build:hasDependencySource ?client. 
   ?link build:hasDependencyTarget ?release. 
   ?client code:containsCodeEntity ?codeEntity. 
   ?codeEntity main:dependsOn ?vulnerableCode. 
   { 
      SELECT ?vulnerableCode 
      WHERE { 
         ?vulnerableCode rdf:type code:VulnerableCode. 
         ?release code:containsCodeEntity ?vulnerableCode. 
       } 
    } 




Listing 17: SPARQL query for inferring inherited WVD measures in clients’ projects. 
 
Findings and Discussion. Table 44 provides the analysis results for our case study in terms of 
known vulnerabilities, size, and WVD scores for selected project releases. Using the WVD 
measure we can now compare two releases of the same project in terms of their weighted 
vulnerability density. For example, based on the WVD measure, we can consider Struts 1.2.9 to 
be more trustworthy than earlier versions of Struts (e.g., version 1.2.4 and 1.2.8, which both have 
higher WVD scores). 
Table 44: Vulnerability densities of selected projects 
Project # vulnerabilities Aggregated Vuln.  Scores Size (Kloc) WVD 
commons-fileupload 1.0 2 10.8 1.23 8.78 
commons-fileupload 1.1 2 10.8 1.28 8.46 
commons-fileupload 1.2 2 10.8 1.78 6.05 
commons-fileupload 1.2.1 2 10.8 1.97 5.49 
commons-fileupload 1.2.2 2 10.8 2.04 5.31 
commons-fileupload 1.3 1 7.5 2.39 3.14 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.1 4 23.6 18.92 1.25 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.4 4 23.6 21.30 1.11 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.6 5 27.9 23.10 1.21 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.6.3 8 39.4 26.43 1.49 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.7.0 10 49.4 26.43 1.87 
Struts 1.2.4 5 30 24.04 1.25 
Struts 1.2.8 8 49.6 24.61 2.02 
Struts 1.2.9 4 25.7 24.76 1.04 
 
We further analyzed the WVD results to see whether developers actually migrate their 
applications to library versions which are less vulnerable (e.g., a newer version of the same 
library with patched vulnerabilities). Table 45 provides an overview of the number of dependent 
CONSTRUCT{?client sevont:hasInheritWVD ?inheritWVD } 
WHERE{ 
{ 
  SELECT ?client count(?indirectWVD) as ?inheritWVD 
  WHERE { 
   ?link a build:DependencyLink. 
   ?link build:hasDependencySource ?client. 
   ?link build:hasDependencyTarget ?release. 
   ?client sevont:hasReusedVulnerableCodeCount ?usedVulnerableCodeCount. 
   ?release sevont:hasVulnerableCodeCount ?totalVulnerableCodeCount.  
   ?release sevont:hasDirectWVD ?directWVD. 
   BIND((?usedVulnerableCodeCount/?totalVulnerableCodeCount) AS ?vulnerableCodeRatio).  
   BIND((?vulnerableCodeRatio * ?directWVD) AS ?indirectWVD). 
  }  
}} 
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applications which change their build dependency to a more trustworthy release (based on the 
lower WVD score). Our analysis results show that 45.1% of client applications switched their 
library dependencies and of these, 63.29% switched to a more trustworthy library release. 
Surprisingly, the remaining 36.71% switched to library releases which are either equal or less 
trustworthy (higher WVD score), even if more trustworthy library versions were available.   











switched to a 
release with 




29.36% 74.26% 25.74% 
commons-fileupload 1.1 6.28% 58.33% 41.67% 
commons-fileupload 1.2 70.54% 100.00% 0.00% 
commons-fileupload 1.2.1 38.97% 97.55% 2.45% 
commons-fileupload 1.2.2 46.79% 99.99% 0.01% 
commons-fileupload 1.3 40.62% 0.00% 100.00% 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.1 
CVE-2013-0239 
94.93% 100.00% 0.00% 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.4 95.00% 0.23% 99.77% 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.6 95.24% 63.10% 36.90% 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.6.3 98.08% 85.29% 14.71% 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.7.0 92.75% 97.26% 2.74% 
Struts 1.2.4 
CVE-2016-1181 
0.00% n/a n/a 
Struts 1.2.8 44.44% 100.00% 0.00% 
Struts 1.2.9 0.00% n/a n/a 
 
7.4.3 Identifying and Measuring License Violations 
Approach. License violations originating from external libraries and components can cause a 
major long-term liability for client applications in terms of intellectual property and the 
trustworthiness of these libraries. In our study we first evaluate if such license violations (non-
compliances) occur in general in project dependencies managed by the Maven repository. In the 
second part of our study we revisit our 4 projects used in our trustworthiness assessment study to 
assess their trustworthiness in terms of license violations. For the study we created SPARQL 
queries that analyze all dependency relationships in Maven and identified three (3) main 
categories of license violations: simple violations, transitive violations, and compound violations 
(see Section 7.3.3). The queries take advantage of both our open source license ontology and the 




Listing 18: SPARQL query for inferring the total number of breaking changes in a project. 
 
 
Listing 19: SPARQL query for inferring the total number of breaking changes in a project. 
 
 
Listing 20: SPARQL query for inferring the total number of breaking changes in a project. 
Findings and Discussion. This section presents and discusses the results obtained in our license 
violation experiment for the Maven repository. Figure 56 shows the distribution of common 
SELECT distinct * 
WHERE { 
 ?link a build:DependencyLink. 
  ?link build:hasDependencyTarget ?project2.  
  ?link build:hasDependencySource ?project1. 
  ?project1 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license1. 
  ?project2 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license2. 
  ?license1 markosCopyright:incompatibleWith ?license2. 
} 
SELECT distinct * 
WHERE { 
 ?linkA a build:DependencyLink. 
  ?linkA build:hasDependencyTarget ?project2. 
  ?linkA build:hasDependencySource ?project1. 
  ?linkB a build:DependencyLink. 
  ?linkB build:hasDependencyTarget ?project3. 
  ?linkB build:hasDependencySource ?project2. 
  ?project1 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license1. 
  ?project2 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license2. 
  ?project3 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license3. 
  ?license1 markosCopyright:compatibleWith ?license2. 
  ?license2 markosCopyright:compatibleWith ?license3. 
  ?license1 markosCopyright:incompatibleWith ?license3.  
} 
SELECT distinct * 
WHERE { 
 ?linkA a build:DependencyLink. 
  ?linkA build:hasDependencyTarget ?project2. 
  ?linkA build:hasDependencySource ?project1. 
  ?linkB a build:DependencyLink. 
  ?linkB build:hasDependencyTarget ?project3. 
  ?linkB build:hasDependencySource ?project1. 
  ?project1 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license1. 
  ?project2 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license2. 
  ?project3 markosLicense:coveringLicense ?license3. 
  ?license1 markosCopyright:compatibleWith ?license2. 
  ?license1 markosCopyright:compatibleWith ?license3. 
  ?license2 markosCopyright:incompatibleWith ?license3.  
} 
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project licenses in the Maven repository. Table 46 reports on the license violations, classified by 
the type of violation, which we observed in our study of the Maven repository.  
 
 
Figure 56: License distribution in the 
Maven repository. 
Table 46: Totals of each type of violation 
found by querying the data store 
License Violation Types  Count 
Type 1 - Simple Violations 131 996 
Type 2 - Embedded Violations 288 153 
Type 3 - Compound Violations 654 964 
 
 
Our study identified over 131,000 simple violations and numerous transitive license 
violations of various types. We note that Type 3 is seemingly the most popular type of violation, 
followed by Type 2, then Type 1. In what follows, we report on some of the license violations or 
incompatibilities which we observed in our study.  
Figures 57, 58, and 59 summarize the most common license violation pairs which occurred 
for all three license violation categories. The most common, Type 1, violation which we 
observed is code published under the Apache 2 license being incorporated into GPL 2 licensed 
code. This violation is not surprising for two reasons. First, many software developers are simply 
not aware nor well-versed in open source license compliance, and as these are two of the most 
popular licenses in the world, this pairing reflects their usage in the wild. Second, there is likely 
some confusion about Apache 2’s compatibility with the GPL. On the GNU website, the Free 
Software Foundation publishes a list of licenses that are compatible with the GPL. This page 
shows Apache 2 in green (meaning compatible), but in the license discussion the authors explain 
















Figure 57: Most Popular Type 1 License Violation Pairs. 
 
 



























0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000 70000
EUPL 1.1 ► GPL 3 
MPL 1 ► LGPL 2.1 
MPL 1.1 ► LGPL 2 
AGPL 3 ► GPL 2 
Apache 2 ► MPL 1 
MPL 1 ► AGPL 3 
Artistic 1 ► GPL 3 
CPL 1 ► GPL 3 
Apache 1.1 ► GPL 2 
MPL 1 ► GPL 2 
EUPL 1.1 ► Apache 2 
MPL 1.1 ► GPL 2 
Apache 1.1 ► GPL 3 
GPL 3 ► GPL 2 
MPL 1.1 ► LGPL 3 
MPL 1.1 ► GPL 3 
AGPL 3 ► Apache 2 
Apache 2 ► MPL 1.1 
MPL 1.1 ► AGPL 3 
MPL 1.1 ► LGPL 2.1 
EPL 1 ► GPL 2 
EPL 1 ► GPL 3 
GPL 2 ► Apache 2 
GPL 3 ► Apache 2 
Apache 2 ► GPL 2 















0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000 300000
Apache 2 ► MPL 2 ► MPL 1 
GPL 3 ► LGPL 3 ► Apache 2 
CPL 1 ► Apache 2 ► GPL 3 
Apache 2 ► MPL 2 ► GPL 2 
Apache 1.1 ► Apache 2 ► GPL 3 
MPL 1.1 ► Apache 2 ► GPL 3 
EPL 1 ► Apache 2 ► GPL 3 











Figure 59: Most Popular Type 3 License Violation Pairs. 
A more detailed analysis of the reasons why the number of transitive license violations is 
significantly larger compared to direct violations revealed: (1) Type 1 license 
compatibility/incompatibility are easier to verify/detect. That is, it is much more likely that a 
developer will check for license compliance, when only two licenses are involved. (2) Transitive 
violation types on the other hand, have not been considered in the research community prior to 
this work, and may very well be acceptable or be clearly identifiable as such. For example, the 
European Union Public License (EUPL) explicitly states which licenses it is compatible with. 
This is a known compatibility. Whereas for transitive interactions, the EUPL may then be 
imported into an intermediary project, say a project under the Licence Libre du Québec – 
Réciprocité (LiLiQ-R), which is then imported into a tertiary project under Common 
Development and Distribution License (CDDL). Each step (EUPL to LiLiQ, and LiLiQ to 
CDDL) is known to be compatible. But the EUPL does not explicitly state that it is compatible 
with the CDDL. This chain of licenses may be flagged as a violation by our approach. Yet this 
chain could in fact be perfectly lawful (a false-positive, verifiable by a lawyer). Our approach 
will however flag such a dependency chain as a potential violation. This triple is neither a known 
compatibility nor known incompatibility, and thus is one of the reasons why there are more Type 
2 violations found.  
Identification of Type 3 violations becomes even more difficult to detect since their detection 
largely depends on how licenses define derivative works and conditions for reusing these 
libraries. Libraries can be used by either including the actual source code or through linking (e.g. 
through a jar file). Linking of a library can be static (compile-time) or dynamic (run-time). For 











0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 600000
Apache 1.1 + MPL 1 ► Apache 2 
Apache 2 + MPL 1 ► MPL 2 
Apache 2 + MPL 1.1 ► MPL 2 
MPL 1 + LGPL 2.1 ► Apache 2 
Apache 1.1 + MPL 1.1 ► Apache 2 
GPL 2 + Apache 2 ► GPL 3 
Apache 2 + GPL 2 ► GPL 3 
MPL 1.1 + LGPL 3 ► Apache 2 
AGPL 3 + Apache 2 ► GPL 3 
MPL 1.1 + LGPL 2.1 ► Apache 2 










includes no source code from [the other].” In this scenario, however, it is perfectly acceptable to 
combine compiled code [260]. So basically, the question is whether a derivative work is created 
or not when combining dependencies into a new project. Derivative works come into play only 
when the licensed software is copied, distributed, or modified. Additional research is needed to 
further clarify legal and license compliance issues when using these open source licenses. 
However, as can be noted, all three types of violations can exist in projects. Thus, simple, 
transitive, and complex license violations are a problem that occur in open source projects and 
can potentially affect the trustworthiness of components and libraries being reused in software 
projects.  
Next, we report on license violations results which we observed for the selected 4 projects of 
our trustworthy study. Table 47 provides an overview of the number of license violations 
detected in these projects. Only four (4) releases of Commons-Fileupload introduced violations 
in client applications. No license violations are reported for the projects due to the lack of license 
information in the analyzed client applications. Results, although incomplete, confirm our 
previous claim that violations are problems that occur in open source projects.  








commons-fileupload 1.0 0 0 0 
commons-fileupload 1.1 0 0 0 
commons-fileupload 1.2 4 0 0 
commons-fileupload 1.2.1 14 0 0 
commons-fileupload 1.2.2 19 0 0 
commons-fileupload 1.3 4 0 0 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.1 0 0 0 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.4 0 0 0 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.4.6 0 0 0 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.6.3 0 0 0 
Apache CXF WS Security 2.7.0 0 0 0 
Struts 1.2.4 0 0 0 
Struts 1.2.8 0 0 0 
Struts 1.2.9 0 0 0 
 
7.4.4 Identifying and Measuring API Breaking Changes  
Approach. As previously mentioned in our study setup (Section 7.4.1, Figure 55), we extract the 
source code and versioning information of the four projects from GitHub and SVN. For each 
successive pair of releases of a given project, we then identify the introduced breaking and non-
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breaking changes using the VTracker92 tool. In order to be able to reuse the analysis results for 
further analysis, we take advantage of our ontological knowledge modeling approach and extend 
our knowledge base to include the analysis results. Developers can now access this information, 
using SPARQL queries, to derive potential direct and indirect impacts of breaking changes on 
their client applications. In what follows, we show some of the main rules and queries used to 
derive the BCD and BCI measures. 
BCD inference: For computing the BCD scores of the projects in our dataset, we define a SWRL 
rule (see Listing 21) which infers the BCD score from the breaking and non-breaking change 
counts. Listings 22 and 23 detail the queries for computing the breaking and non-breaking 
change measures of a project.  
 
 
Listing 21: The rules to infer the BCD measure. 
 
 
Listing 22: SPARQL query for inferring the total number of breaking changes in a project. 
                                                     
92 https://users.encs.concordia.ca/~nikolaos/vtracker.html  
Release(?r), hasBreakingChangeCount(?r, ?bcc), 
hasNonBreakingChangeCount (?r, ?nbcc), divide(?bcd, ?bcc, ?nbcc) 
→ hasBCD(?r, ?bcd) 
CONSTRUCT{?release code:hasBreakingChangeCount ?totalBreakingChanges } 
WHERE{ 
{ 
  SELECT ?release count(?breakingChange) as ?totalBreakingChanges 
  WHERE{ 
    ?breakingChange rdf:type code:BreakingChange. 
    ?breakingChange code:hasCurrentAPI ?api.  
    ?release code:containsCodeEntity ?api.  




Listing 23: SPARQL query for inferring the total number of non-breaking changes in a project. 
 
BCIdirect and BCIindirect inference: The queries in Listings 24 and 25 take advantage of the 
inference services to deriv both the direct and indirect BCI scores from a project and its 
dependencies. The query in Listing 22 first identifies two unique releases of the same project for 
which breaking changes have been populated into the triple-store. It then identifies any usage of 
the found binary incompatible APIs within the client. These queries are based on Equations 7 
and 8 in Section 7.3.3. 
 
 
Listing 24: SPARQL query for inferring the BCIdirect measure in a project. 




  SELECT ?release count(?nonbreakingChange) as ?totalNonBreakingChanges 
  WHERE{ 
    ?nonbreakingChange rdf:type code:NonBreakingChange. 
    ?nonbreakingChange code:hasCurrentAPI ?api.  
    ?release code:containsCodeEntity ?api.  
  }GROUP BY ?release 
}} 
CONSTRUCT{?release code:hasDirectBCI ?directBCI } 
WHERE{ 
{ 
  SELECT ?release ?directBCI 
  WHERE { 
    BIND((?usedBreakingChanges/?bcc) AS ?directBCI). 
    { 
      SELECT ?release count(?breakingApi) as ?usedBreakingChanges ?bcc 
      WHERE{ 
        ?breakingChange rdf:type code:BreakingChange. 
        ?breakingChange code:hasCurrentAPI ?breakingApi.  
        ?dependent code:containsCodeEntity ?breakingApi.  
        ?dependent code:hasBreakingChangeCount ?bcc.  
        ?client code:containsCodeEntity ?api.  
        ?api main:dependsOn ?breakingApi. 
      }GROUP BY ?release 
    } 




Listing 25: SPARQL query for inferring the BCIindirect measure in a project. 
 
Findings and Discussion. Figure 60 shows an example of a bug93 reported in Eclipse Orbit94. 
Orbit depends on ASM95 , a Java bytecode manipulation library. ASM introduced breaking 
changes in its later releases, such as ClassVisitor being changed from an interface (version 3.X) 
to a class in version 4.0. This change is a major change in the API and therefore breaking the 
older 3.X API releases.  




CONSTRUCT{?client  code:hasIndirectBCI ?indirectBCI } 
WHERE{ 
{ 
  SELECT ?client ?indirectBCI 
  WHERE { 
    BIND((?usedBreakingChanges/?bcc) AS ?indirectBCI). 
    { 
      SELECT ?client count(?clientAPIEntity) as ?usedBreakingChanges count(?breakingChange) as ?bcc 
      WHERE{ 
        #identify use of breaking change entity in clien 
        ?client code:containsCodeEntity ?clientAPIEntity. 
        {?clientAPIEntity main:dependsOn ?currentAPIElement} UNION  
        {?clientAPIEntity main:dependsOn ?priorAPIElement}. 
        { 
          SELECT ?client, ?dependency ?asm1, ?asm2 
          WHERE { 
            #Identify different releases of the same project for which breaking changes exist 
            ?client build:hasBuildDependencyOn ?dependency1; build:hasBuildDependencyOn ?dependency2. 
            ?breakingChange a code:BreakingCodeChange. 
            ?breakingChange code:hasPriorAPI ?priorAPIElement; code:hasCurrentAPI ?currentAPIElement. 
            ?dependency1 code:containsCodeEntity ?currentAPIElement. 
            ?dependency2 code:containsCodeEntity ?priorAPIElement. 
            FILTER(?dependency1 != ?dependency2). 
          } 
        } 
      } 






Figure 60: An example of a reported bug showing how a breaking change in the ASM library 
impacts Orbit and its dependent projects. 
 
We illustrate how our ontology-based API dependency measures can aid developers in 
detecting and dealing with such breaking changes. For the analysis, we extract and populate facts 
about the breaking changes between different versions of ASM releases and the source code of 
all projects which depend on ASM releases (81,09 dependencies in total). Based on the extracted 
source code and dependency information, the earlier introduced SPARQL queries can now be 





(a) Number of breaking changes 
 
(b) Number of non-breaking changes 
 
(c) BCD of ASM libraries 
 
(d) BCI of the ClassVisitor API in ASM libraries 
Figure 61: Distribution of breaking changes and their impacts in the analyzed ASM libraries. 
 
Figure 61 shows the distribution of (a) breaking changes, (b) non- breaking changes, and (c) 
breaking change densities (BCD) across all selected 20 ASM releases. Figure 61(d) reports on 
the impact of the ClassVisitor API breaking change on client applications. Furthermore, this 
particular change can potentially affect on average 50 different API elements, and as many as 
225 elements in a single client application. The reported impact set returned by our approach 
would include clients which reuse the ClassVisitor API either directly (through an 
implementation of the interface) or indirectly (through transitive inheritance or method 
invocations). 
 
7.4.5 Assessment Process 
The above sub-sections described how we can identify and measure different attributes of 
trustworthiness by taking advantage of our unified ontological knowledge representation and SW 
reasoning services. The OntTAM assessment process further integrates these scores across 
attributes and sub-factors. For the actual assessment process, we first compute the fuzzy score for 
each measure individually and then aggregate these scores to calculate the attribute, sub-factors, 
factors, and dimension assessment scores. Figure 62 below gives a complete overview of how 
the sub-factors, attributes, and measures are related and used to derive our trustworthiness 
assessment. It should be noted that we do not report on actual trustworthiness scores, since these 
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scores would require a particular assessment context and an instantiation of our OntTAM 
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Figure 62: Overview of relations in the semantic OntTAM domain model.  
 
The effect of the fuzzification on the assessment scores typically increases with assessment 
abstraction levels (e.g., quality dimension scores vs attribute scores). Listing 26 shows the rules 
we used to create the fuzzified score for the WVD measure, and Listing 27 provides example 





   WVD_Measure: REAL; 
   WVD_Weight: REAL; 
END_VAR 
VAR_OUTPUT 
   WVD_Score: REAL; 
END_VAR 
FUZZIFY WVD_Measure  
   TERM VERYLOW := (0.0,1.0) (1.04,1.0) (2.11,0.0) ; 
   TERM LOW := (1.90,0.0) (2.975,1.0) (4.14,0.0) ; 
   TERM AVERAGE := (3.73,0.0) (4.91,1.0) (6.17,0.0) ; 
   TERM HIGH := (5.55,0.0) (6.845,1.0) (8.20,0.0) ; 




   TERM LOW := (0.0,1.0) (0.5,1.0) (2.69,0.0) ; 
   TERM MEDIUM := (2.56,0.0) (4.75,1.0) (7.05,0.0) ; 
   TERM HIGH := (6.69,0.0) (9.0,1.0) (12.0,1.0) ; 
RULEBLOCK WVD_SCORE_RULES 
RULE 0 : IF WVD_Measure IS VERYLOW AND 
WVD_Weight IS LOW      THEN   WVD_Score IS 
EXCELLENT ; 
RULE 1 : IF WVD_Measure IS VERYLOW AND 
WVD_Weight IS MEDIUM THEN WVD_Score IS 
EXCELLENT ; 
RULE 2 : IF WVD_Measure IS VERYLOW AND 
WVD_Weight IS HIGH THEN WVD_Score IS VERYGOOD ; 
RULE 3 : IF WVD_Measure  IS LOW AND WVD_Weight IS 
LOW THEN WVD_Score IS EXCELLENT ; 
RULE 4 : IF WVD_Measure  IS LOW AND WVD_Weight IS 
MEDIUM THEN WVD_Score IS VERYGOOD ; 
   
RULE 5 : IF WVD_Measure  IS LOW AND WVD_Weight IS 
HIGH THEN WVD_Score IS AVERAGE ; 
RULE 6 : IF WVD_Measure  IS AVERAGE AND 
WVD_Weight IS LOW THEN WVD_Score IS VERYGOOD ; 
RULE 7 : IF WVD_Measure  IS AVERAGE AND 




   TERM VERYPOOR := (6.5,0.0) (7.5,1.0) (9.0,1.0) ; 
   TERM POOR := (5.31,0.0) (6.25,1.0) (7.22,0.0) ; 
   TERM AVERAGE := (4.14,0.0) (5.0,1.0) (5.9,0.0) ; 
   TERM VERYGOOD := (2.95,0.0) (3.75,1.0) (4.6,0.0) ; 
   TERM EXCELLENT := (0.0,1.0) (2.5,1.0) (3.28,0.0) ; 
   METHOD : COG; 
END_DEFUZZIFY 
; 
RULE 8 : IF WVD_Measure  IS AVERAGE AND 
WVD_Weight IS HIGH THEN WVD_Score IS POOR; 
RULE 9 : IF WVD_Measure  IS HIGH AND WVD_Weight IS 
LOW THEN WVD_Score IS AVERAGE ; 
RULE 10 : IF WVD_Measure  IS HIGH AND WVD_Weight IS 
MEDIUM THEN WVD_Score IS POOR ; 
RULE 11 : IF WVD_Measure  IS HIGH AND WVD_Weight IS 
HIGH THEN WVD_Score IS  VERYPOOR; 
RULE 12 : IF WVD_Measure  IS VERYHIGH AND 
WVD_Weight IS LOW THEN WVD_Score IS POOR ; 
RULE 13 : IF WVD_Measure  IS VERYHIGH AND 
WVD_Weight IS MEDIUM THEN WVD_Score IS 
VERYPOOR ; 
RULE 14 : IF WVD_Measure  IS VERYHIGH AND 




Listing 26: Sample FCL file for creating fuzzy scores for the WVD measure.  
 
RULEBLOCK IMPACT _SCORE_RULES 
RULE 0 : IF LVC_Score IS EXCELLENT AND WVD_Score IS VERYPOOR 
THEN   IMPACT_Score IS AVERAGE ; 
RULE 1 : IF LVC_Score IS VERYGOOD AND WVD_Score IS VERYPOOR 
THEN   IMPACT_Score IS POOR ; 
RULE 2 : IF LVC_Score IS AVERAGE AND WVD_Score IS VERYPOOR THEN   
IMPACT_Score IS POOR ; 
RULE 3 : IF LVC_Score IS POOR AND WVD_Score IS VERYPOOR THEN   
IMPACT_Score IS VERYPOOR ; 
RULE 4 : IF LVC_Score IS VERYPOOR AND WVD_Score IS VERYPOOR 





Listing 27: Sample FCL file for integrating the LVC and WVD fuzzy scores for the Impact 
attribute. 
 
Using the property chain axioms explained in Section 7.3.2.1, one can now automatically 
infer trustworthiness scores from the populated measures of any given project. Listing 28 
provides a list of sample queries used for integration and fuzzification. 
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Listing 28: SPARQL query illustrating the inference of overall trustworthiness scores. 
 
7.5 Chapter Summary 
In summary, we introduced OntTAM, a trustworthiness assessment model which is an 
instantiation of our SE-EQUAM assessment model. OntTAM takes advantage of our SV-AF, a 
unified knowledge representation of different SE knowledge resources and SVDBs, and extends 
these knowledge bases to allow for an automated analysis and assessment of trustworthiness 
quality attributes. We further presented a concrete instantiation of our assessment model that not 
only provides a formal modeling of trustworthy quality attributes but can also be 
extended/customized to specific stakeholder needs. We illustrated how a concrete instantiation of 
OntTAM for a small subset of sub-factors, attributes, and measures related to the trustworthiness 
of reusable components can be created. The measures which we included in the study are: API 
breaking changes, security vulnerabilities, and license violations.  
In the next chapter, we conclude the thesis and discuss some possible future works.  
  
Query 1: At attribute level 
SELECT distinct ?project ?impactScore 
WHERE { 
  ?impactAttribute a onttam:Impact.   
  ?project onttam:hasAttribute ?impactAttribute. 
  ?impactAttribute onttam:hasScore  ?impactScore.  
  FILTER (?impactScore = “EXCELLENT”). 
} 
 
Query 2: At factor level 
SELECT distinct ?project ?factorScore 
WHERE { 
  ?factorAttribute a onttam:Factor.   
  ?project onttam:hasFactor ?factorAttribute. 
  ?factorAttribute onttam:hasScore  ?factorScore.  




Chapter 8  
8 Conclusions and Future Work 
 
In this chapter, we summarize the findings of this research and discuss some promising 
directions for future work.  
 
8.1 Summary of the Findings 
 We conducted a comprehensive review of the SE literature which focused on the 
question: “to what extent do SE researchers use the vulnerabilities information hosted in 
public SVDBs in their research”. From our survey we observed that: 
o There is an increasing awareness of SVDBs in the research community in terms 
of papers being published describing the use and application of SVDBs in the SE 
domain. 
o The majority of surveyed articles (91%) used common SVDBs in their work, 
whereas only 9% relied on specialized SVDBs.  
o Common SE repositories used in combination with SVDBs are source code and 
bug repositories. 
o Most of the surveyed studies applied SVDBs only to a limited number of SE 
activities. We found the most popular SE tasks in the surveyed articles were 
empirical research (37% of articles), modeling (20% of articles), source code 
analysis (for static/dynamic vulnerability analysis 16% of articles), and testing 
(14% of articles).  
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o Most studies relied on only one SVDB for their contribution. The common use of 
SVDBs in these SE tasks was extracting vulnerability examples for validating the 
assumptions proposed by authors and comprehending the security vulnerability 
affecting the software system. Also, studies on vulnerability repositories focused 
on harvesting statistical trends or creating vulnerability models and using them for 
prediction. Other studies focused on the vulnerability reporters who possess the 
most important information. 
 We introduced a novel knowledge engineering methodology using Formal Concept 
Analysis (FCA) to semi-automate the software vulnerabilities knowledge acquisition and 
extraction from SVDBs. 
o We conducted a literature survey of existing software security vulnerability 
ontologies. 
 Our comparison shows that only 50% of the reviewed vulnerabilities 
ontologies are publicly available online.  
 None of the surveyed ontologies specified that they used a systematic 
knowledge engineering approach while developing their ontologies. Most 
of the presented ontologies are based on the author’s experience in the 
vulnerability domain.  
 Our survey also shows that most papers refer to public advisories (e.g., 
SVDBs) as their main source of vulnerability information. However, none 
of the papers explained in detail how the SVDB(s) was used in their 
knowledge engineering methodology.  
 Many articles only referred indirectly to SVDBs while describing their 
general background section and did not include an actual use of the 
SVDBs.  
o We proposed SEVONT, an abstraction hierarchy of software security 
vulnerabilities analysis ontologies. We proposed a semi-automated methodology 
using FCA to create a unified ontological knowledge model (SEVONT) that 
supports knowledge sharing, linking, and inference across SVDB boundaries. 
o We presented alignment rules to facilitate knowledge integration and improve our 
overall knowledge design. 
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o We illustrated the applicability of our modeling approach by providing examples 
of how our modeling approach supports vulnerability analysis across individual 
SVDBs.  
 Use case #1: Showed the benefit of using our knowledge modeling 
approach to link different SVDBs and investigate the vulnerability 
disclosure date issue. The study shows that 21,654 CVEs appear in two 
different SVDBs (D1 and D2) and that of these, 16,337 (75%) are 
disclosed in D2 prior to being published in D1 (with a median number of 
seven days between the two reports). On the other hand, 3,848 (18%) of 
vulnerabilities were published first in D1 before they were included in D2. 
Only 7% of the vulnerabilities show the same publication date in both 
SVDBs. Our results show that users who rely only on D1 and are unaware 
of exploits reported in D2 will not receive any alerts from D1.  
 Use case #2: Is an extension of use case #1, which showed that our 
approach can automatically infer missing vulnerability information in D2 
such as the exploit type (described by CWE standard) and the exploit 
severity score (described by CVSS standard).  
 We developed a Security Vulnerability Analysis Framework (SV-AF) to support 
evidence-based vulnerability detection. The framework has the following achievements: 
o Integrate different knowledge sources ontologies such as build systems 
ontologies, source code ontologies, version systems ontologies, etc. 
o Implement ontologies alignment using Probabilistic Soft Logic (PSL) framework 
which establishes weighted links between ontologies. 
o Evaluated with two case studies to illustrate the applicability of the presented 
approach. We identified that 750 Maven project releases are directly affected by 
known security vulnerabilities and by considering transitive dependencies, an 
additional 415,604 Maven projects can be identified as potentially affected by 
these vulnerabilities. 
 We introduced a novel approach for automatically tracing source code vulnerabilities at 
the API level across project boundaries.  
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o We extended our previous SV-AF framework with knowledge from other 
repositories, such as version control systems (VCS) and build systems to provide 
additional analysis services such as: (1) identifying and tracing the use of 
vulnerable code in APIs to projects, and (2) providing notifications about 
vulnerabilities found in APIs (and their dependent component) that can affect a 
specific project. 
 We introduced a novel Ontological Trustworthiness Assessment Model (OntTAM) which 
is integrated with SV-AF to 1) support the automated analysis and assessment of quality 
attributes related to the trustworthiness of libraries and APIs in open-source systems, and 
2) provide developers with additional insights into the potential impact of reused libraries 
and APIs on the quality and trustworthiness of their projects. We illustrate the 
applicability of our approach by assessing the trustworthiness of libraries in terms of their 
API breaking changes, security vulnerabilities, license violations, and their potential 
impact on client projects. 
 
8.2 Future Work 
 
8.2.1 Current Limitations 
Users studies. While we performed several case studies to show the applicability of the 
proposed knowledge model, the fact that we did not incorporate developers’ opinions in our 
designed model and the lack of conducted studies remains a limitation of our work. For example, 
a controlled user-study should be performed to evaluate how easy it is to integrate our 
knowledge model into current software development processes. In addition, a user study 
involving developers of open source projects should be performed to evaluate the usefulness of 
our vulnerability dependency analysis in improving the trustworthiness of these systems. 
 
The presented approach for identifying transitive dependencies in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 might 
not be generalizable for non-Maven projects since the case studies we conducted were limited to 
the use of the Maven dependency management system. However, given the flexibility and 
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openness of our knowledge modeling approach, dependency information from build repositories 
or resources other than Maven can also be integrated into our approach. The quality of our 
analysis will however depend on the ability to extract these dependencies accurately. While the 
fact extraction process for other build systems (e.g., Ant96, Gradle97, and MSBuild98) differs from 
the one we used for Maven, the core domain concepts remain the same for these repositories.  
Another threat to the validity of our research is that our evaluation has mainly focused on a 
quantitative analysis of the results from the case studies, limiting our ability to generalize the 
applicability and validity of the approach. 
 
Design Quality. One of the major benefits of our unified vulnerability metamodel approach 
SEVONT (Chapter 4) is its underlying formalism (machine-readable) and the resulting ease of 
reuse. While machine readable, the reuse of ontologies can be only partially automated and still 
requires an ontology expert in order to extend and validate the new ontology design. In 
particular, modeling new constraints and relations or support for inferring knowledge that is not 
explicitly modeled in the metamodel requires expertise in ontology modeling and reasoning. We 
believe that this threat is not unique to our domain and can be observed in other modeling 
domains (e.g., software design, database design), where the quality of the final model/design 
similarly depends mostly on the expert performing the design/modeling step. However, we 
partially mitigate this threat by using FCA theory for our SEVONT’s system and domain 
ontologies integration, and predefined semantic rules for knowledge integration (discussed in 
Chapter 4).   
Another major benefit of our approach is its ability to seamlessly integrate and reuse 
ontologies while maintaining the quality of the resulting knowledge model. While assessing the 
quality of an ontology design, or even any design in general, is an inherently difficult problem 
since what constitutes a quality design will depend on different non-functional requirements 
(e.g., reuse, usability, extensibility, expressiveness, and reasoning support). We partly addressed 
this threat by using existing reasoners (such as Pellet, Hermit, and JFact) and tools (OOPS!99 and 
the Neon Toolkit100) to check our ontology design for taxonomic, syntactical, and consistency 







problems. To determine if our ontology constraints were sufficient to identify incorrect data, we 
incrementally populated the ontologies with facts during the evaluation process. While the 
reasoners did not report any inconsistencies in our ontologies, OOPS! reported a few problems in 
our ontologies referring to some violations of design rules found in the OOPS! rule catalogue. 
However, these identified violations were only related to some missing license information and 
annotations (such as rdfs:label and rdfs:comment) for some of our ontology elements. 
Another potential threat to our research is whether the set of concepts we considered in SV-
AF is sufficient to capture the semantics of the analyzed domains. There is always a trade-off in 
the design of knowledge bases in terms of their expressivity and their usefulness; an equilibrium 
should be established between the amount of information that is sufficient to accomplish a task 
and the granularity of the knowledge that should be available to produce useful results. We 
addressed this threat by showing that our modeled concepts are sufficient to provide flexible 
analysis services through the described case study experiments.  
Validating the correctness of the newly inserted knowledge (e.g., Chapter 7), such as adding 
a vulnerable project that is not actually a vulnerable project is yet another potential threat. This 
threat can only be partially mitigated by adding rules and constraints against the populated 
concepts, since much of the interpretation of what constitutes a vulnerable project in an 
assessment model is subjective to human interpretation and the specific assessment context. 
A potential threat to the trustworthiness approach (Chapter 7) is whether the set of measures 
we considered in our assessment as part of OntTAM evaluation is sufficient to capture 
trustworthiness as a factor. We addressed this threat by selecting our trustworthiness measures 
from a well-established subset of existing trustworthiness models, such as PAS 754:2014, 
QualiPSo [261], and Boland et. al. [262]. While we only selected a very small subset of these 
trustworthiness attributes, we believe this subset is sufficient to illustrate the applicability of our 
assessment model. The objective of our study was not to verify the assessment model for its 
completeness but rather to demonstrate that OntTAM can be instantiated to a given (user 
specific) assessment context. The study also shows that instantiating and extending OntTAM to 




Mining SVDBs and SE Repositories. The research presented in this thesis relies on the ability 
to mine facts from the vulnerabilities databases and SE repositories to populate our ontologies. A 
common problem with mining software repository is that these repositories often contain noise in 
their data due to ambiguities, inconsistencies, or incompleteness. For our studies, we were able to 
mitigate this threat since vulnerabilities published in SVDBs (e.g., NVD) are manually validated 
and managed by security experts. Also the SE data we used in Chapter 5, 6, and 7 was based on 
the Maven repository that captures dependencies related to a particular build file. A key premise 
of Maven is that its dependencies are fully specified and available, therefore eliminating 
ambiguities and inconsistency in the dataset. 
Other threats to the mining of these repositories are related to the fact that we only extracted 
vulnerabilities reported from 2002 to 2017 from the SVDBs (e.g., NVD) datasets. While our 
selected data range may not be generalizable for all vulnerabilities, it does cover the majority of 
all published vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the dataset also covers a broad range of projects and 
vulnerabilities, ensuring that the dataset can be considered large enough to avoid any bias 
towards certain vulnerabilities or affected libraries. 
 
Vulnerability Patches and Usage. The change-list of programming constructs used to identify 
the usage of vulnerable code fragments in vulnerable components depends on the availability of 
patch information. In NVD, however, not all identified vulnerabilities include a complete 
reference to their related patches. Furthermore, we also observed cases where these references 
exist only as a textual description of the patch instead of a URL to the actual source commit, 
limiting our ability to automatically extract the source code information related to such a 
particular patch. 
The case studies introduced in this research are limited in their scope to open source Java 
projects, and the results obtained from these studies might therefore not be generalizable to other 
programming languages or system types. Given that our modeling approach is based on different 
levels of abstraction, we also abstract common aspects of source code and build dependencies in 
our knowledge model. Currently, we do model object-oriented programming languages, software 
vulnerabilities, software licenses, and build repositories at the domain-specific layer of our 
knowledge model. In our modeling approach, these ontologies can be easily extended to specific 
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system level ontologies to model and capture knowledge specific to any object-oriented 
language, build repository, or vulnerability database.  
 
8.2.2 Opportunities for Future Research 
The presented research involves different areas of computer science, including SW technologies, 
knowledge model, mining software repositories, and source code analysis. This diversity of 
topics also leads to multiple research directions in which the work presented in this thesis can be 
extended as part of future work.  
 
8.2.2.1 An Ontology-based Approach to Automate Tagging of Software 
Artifacts 
SE repositories contain a wealth of textual information such as source code comments, 
developers’ discussions, commit messages, and bug reports. These free form text descriptions 
can contain both direct and implicit references to security concerns. The goal is to derive an 
approach to extract security concerns from textual information that can yield several benefits, 
such as bug management (e.g., prioritization), bug triage, or capturing zero-day attack. As part of 
our ongoing research we have already proposed an automated tagging approach which relies on a 
semantic ground for the tagging process. More specifically, we introduce a methodical approach 
for automatically classifying and tagging security concerns found in free-form SE artifacts (e.g., 
bug reports) using an optimized topic model algorithm [263]. Our approach relies on a variation 
of the original Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [264] machine learning algorithm, the Seeded-
LDA[263]. Seeded-LDA improves topic detection accuracy by incorporating previous 
information, by using seeds (known set of concepts) that bear a positive or negative polarity for a 
given topic domain. These seeds can be obtained from various resources, such as paradigm word 
lists, a full subjectivity lexicon, or filtered subjective lexica. In our case, we take advantage of a 
specialized lexicon of security terms provided by the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE101) 
dictionary. This dictionary describes publicly known information related to security 
vulnerabilities and exposures. The main contribution of our approach is that it can extract such 
                                                     
101 https://cwe.mitre.org/ 
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security concerns from free-form text descriptions without requiring any supervised training 
data. More specifically, we map all words in a software document (e.g., bug reports), not just 
entities, to a set of ontological concepts. Using the word-concept distributions we can now apply 
an entirely unsupervised labeling approach to our dataset. Our preliminary experiments involving 
the tagging of bug reports show that our approach can extract relevant security concepts, thus 
reducing the manual effort required in classifying bug reports while at the same tagging them 
automatically with more representative and standardized security tags. As part of these studies, 
we mapped these extracted security concepts (cybersecurity ontology) to SV-AF (Chapter 5). 
Given this unified ontology representation, we can now take advantage of SW [13] reasoners to 
further infer both implicit and explicit semantic links between the extracted cybersecurity 
information and other software artifacts. Furthermore, the ontological representation also allows 
for both extensibility and reuse of our knowledge model for different application contexts.  
 
Note: An earlier version of the work completed in this section has been published in the 11th 
ACM / IEEE International Symposium on Empirical Software Engineering and Measurement 
(ESEM 2017) [265]. 
 
As part of our future work, the attack pattern ontology can be developed and combined with 
cybersecurity tagging ontology and integrated with SV-AF. This will lead to a more powerful 
vulnerability analysis model; we plan to investigate potential vulnerability patterns based on the 
usage of vulnerable components. These patterns will provide us with additional insights into 
assessing and predicting the quality of software systems.  
 
8.2.2.2 SE-GPS: Semantic Global Problems Scanner Visualization Tool 
One future research direction is developing a tool that is able to visualize both direct and indirect 
vulnerable dependencies. In particular, this future work proposes a tool to better understand how 
much security vulnerabilities affect APIs directly, with the aim of providing more insights into 
how such API dependencies may be affected by security vulnerability indirectly. We partially 
implemented some of the suggestions provided by our study from Chapter 3. Our proposed 
visualization tool provides two visualizations addressing two viewpoints, specifically: 
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1. Direct vulnerabilities visualization, which helps to identify the security vulnerabilities that 
affect the specified APIs and shows the severity levels along with their disclosure dates.    
2. Transitive vulnerable dependencies visualization, which provides some insights about how 
the analyzed API depends on other vulnerable APIs components and shows the security 
vulnerabilities attached to these components.  
We implemented SE-GPS, a web-based tool available online [215], that integrates with our 
SV-AF framework introduced earlier in this thesis. The tool focuses on the visualization 














Figure 63: Tool Architecture. 
Figure 63 depicts the main components of SE-GPS architecture. As can be seen, SE-GPs is 
decomposed into a server side, which includes the knowledge base SPARQL102 engine and the 
web services, and a client side with the website. Figures 64 and 65 show the current 
visualizations that SE-GPS offers.  
Figure 64 shows the transitive vulnerable dependencies for a given project (e.g., Geronimo-
jetty6-javaee5 version 2.1.1). In fact, Geronimo-jetty6-javaee5 version 2.1.1 itself has no 
reported vulnerability but some of the external APIs contain vulnerabilities that might affect the 
project. 
Figure 65 shows the vulnerabilities associated with a component (in this example Tomcat 
version 7.0.42) and the node color indicating the number of vulnerabilities affecting a node (e.g., 
dark color corresponding to a large number of vulnerabilities; in this case Tomcat 7.0.42 is 
affected by 10 security vulnerabilities). In future work we plan to further extend SE-GPS by 
creating an Eclipse as a plugin which will provide developers contextual vulnerability 
notifications within their development process. 
                                                     




Figure 64: Visualizing indirect vulnerable dependencies. 
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